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Abstract
This thesis traces tensions between pluralism, elimination and resistance in the centuries-old
narrative underlying the uncertain legal foundations of Crown sovereignty in the territory now
known as Canada. The first half of the work applies the emerging literature of settler colonialism
to a close reading of a selection of leading scholarship on Aboriginal rights jurisprudence to
identify whether the Canadian courts are reproducing elements of settler colonialism in their
decisions. This review raises serious doubts about the legitimacy of Canadian courts to impartially
and fairly resolve disputes involving Indigenous peoples. It also narrows the legal issue in such
cases to assessing the legitimacy of competing claims to jurisdiction between the settler colonial
state and Indigenous peoples. The second half of this work then draws on the literature of
Indigenous resurgence, blockades, jurisdiction and the rule of law to construct a framework for
examining juridical sites where conflicting assertions of Indigenous and settler colonial authority
are a dispositive factual and/or legal issue. This framework is used to analyze a selection of leading
Indigenous blockades cases as a way of further understanding the challenges that courts and
Indigenous peoples face in seeking to decolonize law and restore a pluralistic legal order.
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Introduction: From Settler Colonialism to Indigenous Resurgence
For almost four decades graduate students in law1 and legal scholars have turned their minds
towards Canada’s uncertain legal foundations and its destructive impact on the existing
relationships that Indigenous peoples have with their land.2 This impressive span of study makes
the problem seem relatively nascent when we include the commissions of inquiry from the last
three centuries3 which shows that this problem predates Confederation under the July 1, 1867
Of the select theses and dissertations that I have reviewed which deal mainly with the question of Canada’s claim
to sovereignty through discovery, see: Brian Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, As Affected
by the Crown's Acquisition of their Territories (D. Phil Thesis, Oxford University, 1979), [Slattery, PhD]; John
Borrows, Traditional Use, Treaties and Land Title Settlements: A Legal History of the Anishnabe of Manitoulin
Island (PhD Dissertation, Osgoode Hall Law School, 1994), [Borrows, PhD]; Mei Lin NG, Convenient Illusions: A
Consideration of Sovereignty and the Aboriginal Right of Self-Government (LLM Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law
School, 1994).
2
By relationships with land I mean more than just legal rights and obligations. To cite just a select few from leading
and emerging scholars, see e.g.: Brian Slattery, “The Hidden Constitution: Aboriginal Rights in Canada” (1984)
32:2 Am J Comp L 361, [Slattery, Hidden]; ---, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights” (1987) 66 Can Bar Rev 727,
[Slattery, Understanding]; ---, “The Organic Constitution: Aboriginal Peoples and the Evolution of Canada” (1996)
34 Osgoode Hall LJ 101; John Borrows, “(Ab)Originalism and Canada’s Constitution” (2012) 58 SCLR (2d) 351,
[Borrows, (Ab)Originalism]; ---, Freedom & Indigenous Constitutionalism (Toronto: UTP, 2016), [Borrows,
Freedom]; ---, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: UTP, 2010), [Borrows, Constitution] ---, Recovering
Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto: UTP, 2002), [Borrows, Recovering]; ---, “The Durability of
Terra Nullius: Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia” (2015) UBC L Rev 701, [Borrows, Tsilhqot’in]; ---,
“Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v British Columbia” (1999) 37:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 537,
[Borrows, Alchemy]; ---, “Constitutional Law from a First Nation Perspective: Self-Government and the Royal
Proclamation” (1994) 28 UBC L Rev 1; Kent McNeil, “Sovereignty and Indigenous Peoples in North America”
(2016) 22:2 UC Davis J Intl L & Pol’y 82, [McNeil, Sovereignty]; ---, “The Decolonization of Canada: Moving
Toward Recognition of Aboriginal Governments” (1994) 7:1 Western Legal History 113, [McNeil, Decolonization];
---, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in Canada: Treaties, Legislation, and Judicial Discretion” (2001-2002) 33
Ottawa L Rev 301, [McNeil, Extinguishment]; Hamar Foster, “Forgotten Arguments: Aboriginal Title and
Sovereignty” (1991) 1 Manitoba LJ 343, [Foster]; Mark D. Walters, “Brightening the Covenant Chain: Aboriginal
Treaty Meanings in Law and History After Marshall” (2001) 24 Dalhousie LJ 75, [Walters, Covenant Chain]; ---,
“The "Golden Thread" of Continuity: Aboriginal Customs at Common Law and Under the Constitution Act, 1982”
(1999) 44 McGill LJ 711, [Walters, Golden Thread]; Felix Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties: Aboriginal Nations
and Canada (Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, 2012), [Hoehn]; Patrick Macklem, “First Nations Self-Government
and the Borders of the Canadian Legal Imagination” (1991) 36 McGill LJ 382; Shiri Pasternak, “Jurisdiction and
Settler Colonialism: Where Do Laws Meet?” (2014) 29:2 CJLS 145. [Pasternak, Jurisdiction]; and Janna Promislow,
“Treaties in History and Law” (2014) 47:3 UBC Law Rev 1085, [Promislow].
3
For a concise summary of the earlier commissions in RCAP, see: Canada. Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, vol 2 Restructuring the Relationship (Ottawa:
Supply and Services, 1996) at 246-249, [RCAP]; Province of Canada, Legislative Assembly, “Report on the Affairs
of the Indians in Canada, Part I: Commission from Sir Charles Bagot to Rawson William Rawson et al, 10 October
1842” in Sessional Papers, Appendix EEE (1844-45), Appendix EEE, [Bagot Report]; Province of Canada,
Legislative Assembly, “Report on the Affairs of the Indians of Canada, laid before the Legislative Assembly, 20th
March 1845” in Sessional Papers, Appendix T (1847); Province of Canada, Legislative Assembly, "Report of the
Special Commissioners appointed on the 8th of September, 1856 to Investigate Indian Affairs in Canada" in
1
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enactment of the British North America Act4 that marks Canada’s official birthday. While the
landscape of this problem has been and continues to be well charted, the problem effectively
remains unchanged: Canada’s legal and political systems are built on, and maintained by, deeply
racist ideas and this directly results in the perpetual impoverishment of Indigenous peoples.
While there are many Indigenous voices, academic and activist alike, that routinely expose
Canada’s colonial project and the deep structural harm it is causing Indigenous peoples; for me,
Arthur Manuel, a Secwepemc author, activist and political leader, is one voice that stands out for
his ability to simplify what is a very complex problem.5 In a recent essay titled “Are You A
Canadian?” Manuel addressed the upcoming celebration of Canada’s 150th birthday writing “it is
time for us to decide if we want to continue to be colonized peoples or if we want to seek selfdetermination. We have to face the fact that Canada is a settler state that was created by Great
Britain to take over our Indigenous territories for use and benefit of Canada.”6 Manuel’s work
(inherited from his father Grand Chief George Manuel7) locally and at the international level
provides a jarring juxtaposition to the sense of pride that most Canadians have in themselves8 and

Sessional Papers, No. 21 (1858).). See also: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Honouring the Truth,
Reconciling for the Future: Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada
(Ottawa: TRC, 2015), [TRC, Summary].
4
British North America Act, 1867, RSC 1985, app II, no 5.
5
Arthur Manuel & Grand Chief Ronald M. Derrickson, Unsettling Canada: A National Wake-up Call (Toronto:
Between the Lines, 2015), [Manuel, Unsettling]
6
Arthur Manuel, “Are You A Canadian?”, (August-December 2016) First Nations Strategic Bulletin at 1-4, online:
< http://www.mediacoop.ca/sites/mediacoop.ca/files2/mc/fnsb_aug_dec_16.pdf>, [Manuel, Are you a Canadian].
7
George Manuel and Michael Posluns, The Fourth World: An Indian Reality, (New York: The Free Press, 1974)
[Manuel and Posluns]. (Grand Chief George Manuel’s work not only resulted in the inclusion of Aboriginal and
Treaty rights into s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, but also formed the groundwork for the World Council of
Indigenous Peoples, an international community that would eventually result in the United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295 (Annex), UNGAOR, 61 st Sess, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/61/49
(2008) 15. [UNDRIP]. See: Peter McFarlane, Brotherhood to Nationhood: George Manuel and the Making of the
Modern Indian Movement (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1993), [McFarlane]).
8
Maire Sinha, Canadian Identity, 2013 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2013), online:
<http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-652-x/89-652-x2015005-eng.htm>.
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the broader global perception of Canada as a welcoming multicultural society.9 What Manuel
captures in his essay is an aspect of what it means to be “a Canadian” when we take an honest look
in the mirror and are faced with an unsettling reflection of our colonized reality that is all too often
obscured from our normative frame of view. Perhaps because of this, Manuel defines colonization
in a straightforward way, writing:
Colonization is a complex relationship but simple to understand if you know that
dispossession, dependency and oppression are the consequences that it is designed
to produce between the colonizer and the colonized. …the moment you dispossess
someone of their land and make him or her dependent upon the colonizer, you
create a person willing to fight to be free and independent again. In this way,
colonialism is against world peace.10
By distilling colonization to what it reproduces, Manuel’s direct connection between the assertion
of colonial authority to steal Indigenous lands and the inevitable resistance which results, frames
the central problematic of this thesis and the pattern it sets out to identify.
Broadly this thesis situates the literatures of settler colonialism, decolonization and
Indigenous resurgence within an analysis of the role of the courts in adjudicating cases involving
the rights of Indigenous peoples. The specific question I ask is whether the courts are reproducing
the settler colonial logic of elimination when resolving disputes involving Indigenous blockades.
The purpose for analyzing blockades cases is that they provide a unique and momentary record of
the ongoing struggle between Indigenous peoples and the settler colonial state over sovereignty
and jurisdiction. I find these records are unique for how the voices of both the settler colonial state
and the Indigenous peoples are represented in them. Thus, on the one hand, they are exclusively
written by judges exercising their power to speak the law on behalf of a settler colonial state which
has unilaterally assumed the exclusive authority to control, own and govern lands within the

Daniel Schwartz, “How Canada is perceived around the world” CBC News (1 July 2015), online:
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/how-canada-is-perceived-around-the-world-1.3132343>.
10
Ibid.
9
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territorial boundaries of the state of Canada. On the other hand, the voice of Indigenous peoples in
these decisions are directly contesting the colonial state’s assumption of authority and control over
their lands and resources. This presents an immediate conflict for a judge tasked with upholding
both the authority of the settler colonial state and the rule of law. By analyzing the judicial decision
through a rule of law lens, I suggest that we can reach some conclusions about the limitations of
the courts as legitimate adjudicators over the claims to authority made by Indigenous peoples.
Further to this, by selecting blockades cases which were peripheral to leading Aboriginal title and
rights cases, we uncover an underlying demand by Indigenous peoples for sovereignty and
jurisdiction in those cases. In doing so, we bring to light a clearer picture of how the logic of settler
colonialism is being reproduced in Aboriginal jurisprudence. This deepens the problematic of
reconciling sovereignties that has become the leading topic for legal scholars. However, this also
reveals the necessary role that Indigenous resurgence, and the direct assertion and exercising of
Indigenous law on the ground, must play in decolonizing law.
In Chapter 1, I begin by defining settler colonialism. In Chapter 2, I examine a selection of
Canada’s earlier commissions and the literature on Aboriginal rights jurisprudence. In Chapter 3,
I construct a frame of analysis using jurisdiction, rule of law and the literature on Indigenous
resurgence and blockades. In Chapter 4, I set out to determine whether the pattern of settler
colonialism is being reproduced in a selection of the leading Indigenous blockades cases. In my
conclusion, I discuss my findings and raise a key question that I believe will require communitybased fieldwork to answer. I suggest that seeking to answer this question through the blockades
context will contribute to the emergent discussions currently taking place in the research into the
resurgence of Indigenous law and authority grounded in relationships with the land, as opposed to
a racist assumption of sovereignty and entitlement transplanted centuries ago.

4

Chapter 1: Settler Colonialism: An Emerging Pathology of Violence
From the outset, it is useful to make clear that the study of settler colonialism is much newer than
the legal scholarship on Aboriginal rights jurisprudence. It was relatively recently in 2010 that
Lorenzo Veracini traced the theoretical emergence of the field in which he pointed to Patrick
Wolfe’s 1998 book, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology as providing its
“extrication” moment from colonial studies and in turn giving rise to the need for “the development
of a dedicated interpretive field.”11 Thus, in the context of Canadian scholarship, while it is
described as an emerging, but “dedicated field of inquiry”12, there is a growing body of scholarship
that incorporates settler colonialism to analyze many of the techniques that Canada is deploying
to address its fundamental problem.13 Based on my research to date I have not yet uncovered any
dedicated legal scholarship that directly employs the lens of settler colonialism to an analysis of
Aboriginal rights jurisprudence14 and in particular the decisions of judges in dealing with
Indigenous blockades. This is what I intend to do in this thesis.

11

Lorenzo Veracini, Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) at 9,
[Veracini]. (In marking the sudden passing of Patrick Wolfe in 2016, Veracini writes in the obituary that Wolfe’s
seminal 1998 work in defining settler colonialism was something of an unforeseen bonus that emerged from
focusing on the history of Australian anthropology. This provides an anecdotal lesson in the approaches required to
uncover and expose the multitude of ways in which these patterns of violence and oppression can remain hidden.
See: Lorenzo Veracini, “Obituary: Patrick Wolfe (1949-2016)” (2016) 6:3 Settler Colonial Studies 189-90,
[Veracini, Obit].).
12
Shiri Pasternak, Jurisdiction and Settler Colonialism: The Algonquins of Barriere Lake Against the Federal Land
Claims Policy (PhD Thesis, University of Toronto Department of Geography, 2013) at 5, [Pasternak, PhD].
13
Of the select works that I have reviewed closely and have informed the shape of this work, see e.g.: Pasternak,
PhD, ibid; Glen Coulthard, Red Skin White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2014), [Coulthard]; and, Audra Simpson, Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across
the Borders of Settler States (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2014), [A. Simpson].
14
A possible exception to this is the political theorist Michael McCrossan’s analysis of “the discursive relations
between members of the judiciary and legal counsel representing Indigenous peoples” in the Aboriginal title case of
Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1110, [Delgamuukw]. McCrossan also suggests that there is a
similar gap in the legal scholarship on Aboriginal jurisprudence that has yet to explain the problematic of Crown
sovereignty as Canada’s legal foundation. See: Michael McCrossan, “Contaminating and Collapsing Indigenous
Space: Judicial Narratives of Canadian Territoriality” (2015) 5:1 Settler Colonial Studies 20-39, [McCrossan].

5

What is Settler Colonialism?
According to Lorenzo Veracini, settler colonialism as a distinct form of colonialism has been
discussed by scholars going back as far as the work of Darwin, Marx and Engels in the nineteenth
century.15 In tracing the emergence of settler colonialism as a “subset category within colonialism”
to being “understood as an antitype category,” Veracini acknowledges Patrick Wolfe’s history of
anthropology in Australia for providing the critical turn.16
Wolfe’s work sets out three key elements that define settler colonialism: structure or
structural characteristic, land or territoriality (access to land), and a logic of elimination which
informs a range of practices.17 The first two elements serve to explain replacement as settler
colonialism’s primary drive, as Wolfe puts it “The determination 'settler-colonial state' is
Australian society's primary structural characteristic rather than merely a statement about its
origins. The primary object of settler-colonization is the land itself…a winner-take-all project
whose dominant feature is not exploitation but replacement.”18 In his later work defining what he
calls the “logic of elimination” I see the separate notions of “land itself” and the “winner-take all
project” collapsing into the irreducible element of “access to territory” or “territoriality”, as Wolfe
puts it “to get in the way of settler colonization, all the native has to do is stay at home. Whatever
settlers may say—and they generally have a lot to say—the primary motive for elimination is not
race (or religion, ethnicity, grade of civilization, etc.) but access to territory. Territoriality is settler
colonialism’s specific, irreducible element.”19 Wolfe’s distinction between territoriality and race

15

Veracini, supra note 11 at 1-2.
Ibid at 9.
17
Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an
Ethnographic Event (London & New York: Cassell, 1999) at 163, [Wolfe, Settler Colonialism]; ---, “SettlerColonialism and the Elimination of the Native” (2006) 8:4 J Genocide Research 387 at 388, [Wolfe, Elimination].
18
Wolfe, Settler Colonialism, ibid.
19
Wolfe, Elimination, at 388. (Citing: Deborah Bird Rose, Hidden Histories: Black Stories from Victoria River
Downs, Humbert River and Wave Hill Stations (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press 1991) at 46.).
16

6

as driving the logic of elimination raises profound questions for me from a legal perspective, for
it disturbs a prevailing view that the colonial state’s fundamental characteristic is racism, which is
widely adopted in regards to colonialism’s fundamental legal doctrines of discovery and terra
nullius.20 As I read it, Wolfe’s distinction does not remove racism as a feature of colonialism, or
render it irrelevant. Rather, it suggests that racism is a rationalization that develops when
elimination and access to territory are made the primary objective. To understand this better, Wolfe
describes the logic of settler colonialism as “a sustained institutional tendency to eliminate the
Indigenous population [which] informs a range of historical practices that might otherwise appear
distinct—invasion is a structure not an event.”21 By describing the logic of elimination as the
source of practices that a settler or settler colonial state deploys, I think it makes sense to see racism
as a practice of elimination not as the driving logic or justification behind settler colonialism. This
distinction is clearer in the negative/positive dimensions and examples of practices that Wolfe
describes:
[S]ettler colonialism has both negative and positive dimensions. Negatively, it
strives for the dissolution of native societies. Positively, it erects a new colonial
society on the expropriated land base… The positive outcomes of the logic of
elimination can include officially encouraged miscegenation, the breaking-down of
native title into alienable individual freeholds, native citizenship, child abduction,
religious conversion, resocialization in total institutions such as missions or
boarding schools, and a whole range of cognate biocultural assimilations. All these

20

See e.g.: Lindsay Robertson, Conquest by Law: How the Discovery of America Dispossessed Indigenous Peoples
of Their Lands (Oxford: OUP, 2005); Robert J. Miller, Jacinta Ruru, Larissa Behrendt and Tracey Lindberg,
Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies, (Oxford/New York: Oxford
University Press, 2012); Robert J. Miller, “The Future of International Law in Indigenous Affairs: The Doctrine of
Discovery, the United Nations, and the Organization of American States” (2011) 15 Lewis & Clark L Rev 847; and
Tonya Gonnella Frichner, Special Rapporteur Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Impact on Indigenous
Peoples of the International Legal construct known as the Doctrine of Discovery, which has served as the
Foundation of the Violation of their Human Rights, Preliminary Study, UNECOSOCOR, 2010, UN Doc
E/C19/2010/13), online: <www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/E.C.19.2010.12%20EN.pdf>.
21
Wolfe, Settler Colonialism, supra note 17 at 163.

7

strategies, including frontier homicide, are characteristic of settler colonialism. …
Settler colonialism destroys to replace.22
Thus, while it is possible to say that racism is a prominent characteristic of each of these practices
or strategies if they were looked at separately, when looked at together there is more coherence, I
can see how they could be viewed as practices of an overall logic of elimination and territoriality.
Other scholars have since defined settler colonialism in ways that I think have expanded
on Wolfe’s initial three elements. One of these is Dene scholar and political theorist Glen
Coulthard who frames settler colonialism as a relationship “characterized by a particular form of
domination… where power—in this case, interrelated discursive and nondiscursive facets of
economic, gendered, racial, and state power—has been structured into a relatively secure or
sedimented set of hierarchical social relations that continue to facilitate the dispossession of
Indigenous peoples of their lands and self-determining authority.”23 Notably, each of Wolfe’s three
elements are contained in here, but what Coulthard provides us with is an expanded understanding
of the structure as a power dynamic, as he puts it “the subjective and structural composition of
settler-colonial power.”24 Another prominent expansion on this power dynamic of settler colonial
relations comes from Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang who give settler colonialism a suitable
shorthand; violence, and one that operates on multiple layers, as they write “the disruption of
Indigenous relationships to land represents a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological
violence. This violence is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler but is reasserted
each day of occupation.”25

22

Wolfe, Elimination, supra note 17 at 388. (Citing: Raphaël Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of
Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 1944) at 79).
23
Coulthard, supra note 13 at 6-7. (Emphasis in the original).
24
Coulthard, ibid at 24. (Emphasis added).
25
Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, “Decolonization is not a metaphor” (2012) 1:1 Decolonization: Indigeneity,
Education & Society 1 at 5-6, [Tuck & Yang].
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The importance of incorporating Coulthard, Tuck and Yang into defining the concept of
settler colonialism for the purposes of this thesis is two-fold: First, I struggle with a limitation that
I perceive in Wolfe’s use of the word “project” to characterize settler colonialism. Such a
characterization seems to contradict the permanence and absence of temporality captured by the
word “structure”. Further, it does not suggest the relational power dynamic of violence. This
expanded definition, in my view, more accurately captures what is actually involved in putting
settler colonialism into practice and eliminating Indigenous peoples from their land.
Second, this expanded definition provides us with a framework that can be applied to an
analysis of social and legal practices and effects at any point in time, whether that is a historical
period, or present day. This allows us to identify, by comparison over time, both the elements of
the structure and the internal logic as they develop and evolve to reproduce the primary goal of
elimination and replacement. When this is done, it is possible to start capturing what emerges as
an element of settler innovation that is required to sustain the kind of decades and centuries long
campaign against both the inevitable resistance by Indigenous peoples, as well as the introduction
of new ideologies, or political and legal theories that could undermine or shut down altogether the
project of settler colonialism. Thus, I see innovation as an expansion of the element of the logic of
elimination that Wolfe described as a “sustained institutional tendency” which “informs a range”
of practices.26 This aspect of innovation helps to explain the complex array of practices that have
been mapped out by the different studies reviewed below, but it also alerts us to be attentive to the
fact that the settler colonial state may be engaging in new practices.
Together, these two points emphasize that settler colonialism does not merely start as a
paint-by-numbers invasion and then advance steadily forward. Nor should its continuation be seen
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as simply an accident or by-product of the momentum of history. If settler colonialism exists today,
then somebody is deliberately keeping it going through practices that should be identifiable based
on their reproduction of settler colonial violence.
This is where the power dynamics and violence of settler colonialism becomes truly
apparent. As Frantz Fanon writes “colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with
reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state and it will only yield when confronted with
greater violence.”27 Fanon further connects this natural state with its articulation, as he writes “We
have seen how the government’s agent uses a language of pure violence. The agent does not
alleviate oppression or mask domination. He displays and demonstrates them with the clear
conscience of the law enforcer, and brings violence into the homes and minds of the colonized
subject.”28 In reading these together, there is a tendency to ask whether there is an inconsistency
in Fanon’s view that on the one hand equates colonialism with a lack of reasoning faculties, while
on the other describes the colonizer as conscious and clear in their violence and makes no attempt
to hide it. In reflecting on this, I find the inconsistency is removed if we read Fanon as stating that
the settler is aware of his violence, but is not open to negotiating if or how he will stop. This is
where the logic of elimination becomes immovable and irrational for while it has the capacity to
innovate and transform, it will only use that capacity to produce and reproduce violence. Violence
is settler colonialism and the latter does not exist without the other.
I find these aspects of logic, reasoning, consciousness, clarity and boldness are all
interesting sites of discussion in the study of settler colonialism. Focusing for the moment on the

27

Frantz Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, translated by Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press Inc, 1963) at
61. (Note: This quote is from the original 1963 translation. The 2004 translation, which is the edition I will rely on
from here on out, reads “colonialism is not a machine capable of thinking, a body endowed with reason. It is naked
violence and only gives in when confronted with greater violence.” See: Frantz Fanon, Wretched of the Earth,
translated by Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press Inc, 1963) at 23, [Fanon, Wretched].).
28
Fanon, Wretched, ibid at 4.

10

last one, the clear conscience and boldness in Fanon’s description, I find that it comes up against
aspects of settler guilt, obscuring and hiding that have been noted by others. For instance, in
explaining why “settler colonialism as a specific formation has not yet been the subject of
dedicated systematic analysis”, Veracini suggested that part of the nature of settler colonialism
itself is found in seeing that “the actual operation of settler colonial practices is concealed behind
other occurrences.”29 As he puts it “the settler hides behind” many things: the sovereign coloniser,
or “his labour and hardship”; and from this concealed position the settler argues that “he is not
responsible for colonialism;” and that he “does not dispossess anyone;” but rather “enters a ‘new,
empty land to start a new life’, indigenous people naturally and inevitably ‘vanish’; it is not settlers
that displace them… Settler colonialism obscures its own production.”30 The settler characteristic
of hiding fits with what Tuck and Yang describe as “settler moves to innocence” which they define
as “strategies or positionings that attempt to relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or responsibility
without giving up land or power or privilege, without having to change much at all.”31
Now, if we look at this point of possible contention closely, what at first appears to be a
clash is, when looked at as an example of settler innovation, actually an overlap around the
confirmation of the conscience of the settler and their awareness of their complicity in perpetuating
violence against Indigenous peoples. Thus, where once the settler colonial state could confidently
and openly act out their hate, racism and bloodlust, times have changed and the state must now
find a way to pursue the same primary objective of elimination, but using a different language. In
other words, I think it is worth considering that the difference between the boldness that Fanon
describes in 1963 and the hiding and moves to innocence that Veracini and Tuck and Yang describe
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50 years later, might be explained if we see the change as a product of settler innovation over time
in the face of new ideologies and perspectives that have resulted in increased political and social
pressures which challenge settler colonialism’s logic of elimination. From this point we can posit
that while the settler colonial state may be capable of reasoning and appearing to be open to
negotiations, when we examine these appearances closer we may find that their primary objective
of elimination remains completely intact. In other words, when we investigate and examine the
practices that have sustained settler colonialism, we need to be aware that settler colonial violence
is not just the stereotypical frontier homicide of Hollywood westerns, manifest destiny and Indian
wars, but that it is also a language, an epistemology, an education, a religious conversion, a
citizenship, an alienable freehold title, and even new legal principles.
To summarize, for the purposes of this thesis, I see settler colonialism as being defined by
the following four elements: a structure of power and domination, a primary objective of
territoriality or access to land, a logic of elimination that drives an innovation to develop a range
of practices, technologies or rationalizations, and a violence that disrupts relationships on multiple
levels. In the next section I expand on these elements by reviewing a selection of studies that
investigate the range of settler practices or techniques that have been used to produce and
reproduce the same effects that the theory of settler colonialism predicts.
Past and Present: Transforming Violence into Law, Jurisdiction and Sovereignty
For the purposes of this thesis, the studies selected for this review illustrate the ways in which
violence has been transformed into settler colonial law, jurisdiction and sovereignty. I separate this
selection into two groups: The first group are the studies of nineteenth century settler colonialism
by Lisa Ford and Cole Harris. I selected and grouped these studies together because they emerge
from different disciplines—legal history and critical geography—and they predate Lorenzo
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Veracini’s overview. Thus, to an extent I see them as examples of the approach that Wolfe used in
1998 to first arrive at the concept,32 which focused on the techniques used by the settlers to produce
the effects we now identify as settler colonialism. This group, therefore, provides examples of
identifying settler colonialism through more of an empirical approach that focuses on the technique
and effects of practices from a certain period in time.
The second group are the studies of Shiri Pasternak and Glen Coulthard which have defined
Canada as a settler colonial state. What distinguishes this group from the first is that they build off
the explanatory power of Patrick Wolfe’s defining concept and combine it with other theories and
tools to analyze an existing technique or practice that is currently being used by the Canadian state.
Thus, I read their studies as trying to understand and verify that the current techniques they are
investigating are in fact reproducing settler colonialism today.
Read together, I see the temporal shift between these two groups as providing confirmation
of the fundamental characterization of settler colonialism as an enduring structure of power based
on, and maintained by, a logic of elimination. Further, the studies also offer a strong understanding
of the tension between the contradictory objectives of settler colonialism and legal pluralism. This
understanding is so strong that I would argue they confirm the two cannot coexist. Beyond this,
the studies provide an array of analytical tools that allow us to identify, both in the past and the
present, how settlers, and settler colonial states, reproduce violence and transform it into settler
sovereignty, jurisdiction and law.
A. The Past: Settler Sovereignty and Jurisdiction on the Edge of Empire
Lisa Ford’s comparative case study of early nineteenth century criminal cases in the American
Veracini explains this in Wolfe’s obituary writing “As far as he was concerned, when he had written it, settler
colonialism as a mode of domination was not the main focus. And yet, to explain the evolution of anthropology
Patrick defined settler colonialism as distinct from colonialism. No one had theorised it before and in a systematic
way.” See: Veracini, Obit, supra note 11 at 189.
32
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state of Georgia and the Australian colony of New South Wales, investigates the practices of
jurisdiction and legal discourses used by the settler courts to perfect settler sovereignty and
territoriality.33 The study focuses on a historical period “suspended between empire and statehood,
between local and global. It is about defining sovereignty as the order of indigenous peoples in
space; a project undertaken by Anglophone settler polities around the globe between 1822 and
1847.”34 Ford’s study is situated within a core tension between the older imperial order of legal
pluralism and political negotiations with Indigenous peoples, and the rapacious appetite for
complete and perfect territoriality demanded for by settler colonialism, as Ford writes “After 1800,
plural legal practices came under pressure. Evolving global discourses of sovereignty combined
with new technologies of governance brought new people and new ideas to settler peripheries. In
just two decades, settler and indigenous violence became crucibles of sovereignty talk, as the idea
of perfect territorial sovereignty clashed with tenacious pluralities.”35
In order to deal with this tension between legal pluralism and settler sovereignty, Ford
explains that the “settler courts in the 1820s and 1830s, then, did something quite radical.”36
Specifically, the practices of the courts is summed up in “exercising criminal jurisdiction over
violence between indigenous people,” and that by doing this “settler courts asserted that
sovereignty was a territorial measure of authority to be performed through the trial and punishment
of every person who transgressed settler law in settler territory.”37 Notably, Ford credits the courts
practices as “both innovative and uniquely destructive of indigenous rights. After 1820, courts in
North America and Australasia redefined indigenous theft and violence as crime, and in the
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process, they pitted settler sovereignty against the rights of indigenous peoples.”38 The
fundamental elimination of Indigenous jurisdiction and law is captured in how Ford defines settler
sovereignty writing “the legal obliteration of indigenous customary law became the litmus test of
settler statehood.”39 Exercising jurisdiction over indigenous peoples to eliminate them is not a
simple project, but one that requires violence and manipulation to carry it out, as Ford writes:
Settler violence, then, was clothed in law—a law which, in important respects,
settlers constituted and controlled. Recent comparative legal histories have
emphasized how settler communities and their legislatures manipulated laws of
property and civil law better to fit the project of indigenous dispossession and of
property development. Some very recent frontier histories have suggested that
lawlessness in late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century North America
contained within it a meta-narrative about indigenous sovereignty. As Cumfer and
Dowd have shown, when they systematically ignored indigenous rights and
murdered indigenous people, Tennessee and Pennsylvania frontiersmen
contributed to the discourse and practice of settler sovereignty over indigenous
people and their land.40
As we see here, settler manipulation of law and violence are prominently intertwined and Ford’s
study provides insight into how the two are wrapped up in the logic of elimination that is relied
upon by the settler courts, as she explains “This new judicial discourse of perfect settler
sovereignty left precious little space for first peoples. Even as settler communities in North
America and the Antipodes started to romanticize the slow disappearance of their noble savages,
common-law courts condemned them to juridical death.”41
For me, the key thing that emerges from Ford’s work is the role of the settler courts in
transforming settler colonial violence through logic and legal reasoning into something resembling
law, jurisdiction and territoriality, as Ford summarizes in her conclusion:
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They redefined settler sovereignty as a territorial measure of authority that left little
or no space for indigenous rights to property, to sovereignty, or to jurisdiction. They
recrafted plural settler polities into modern nation-states whose legitimacy was
predicated on the subordination of indigenous rights. The many acts of dissolution,
oppression, and marginalization that followed were all performances of
sovereignty. State legislation displaced Aborigines from their country to
missions—a systematic attempt to erase indigeneity through spatial, social, and
legal domination.42
The critical relevance of Ford’s investigation is that it reminds us, particularly in the North
American context, that we have been down the road of legal pluralism and negotiations around
jurisdiction; that in fact this was the norm throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,43
but in the end settler colonialism was not satisfied with that. It will not stop until it has perfected
territoriality and Indigenous peoples are in the way of that primary objective. Although Ford’s
study looks at history, she makes it perfectly clear that her conclusions are not just historical facts:
The exercise of jurisdiction over indigenous crime performs the myth of settler
sovereignty over and over. Sovereignty as territorial jurisdiction defines the
parameters of indigenous rights to this day.
…
Settler sovereignty has a history—a history that is more recent, more local, and
more contingent than many have supposed. It is one of the most brutal iterations of
nineteenth-century territoriality. It was made and challenged on the farthest
peripheries of empire, in the context of global discourse and global networks of
trade. Finally, however, it was defined as the exercise of jurisdiction over
indigenous crime. The most powerful legal myth in common-law settler polities,
then, cannot be purged of its plural origins. Settler sovereignty starts and ends with
indigenous people.44
What is frightening about this conclusion, for me at least, with its acknowledgement of global
discourse and trade juxtaposed with the assertion of jurisdiction over Indigenous peoples in order
to criminalize them, is that it could be just as applicable to any number of conflict zones in the
twenty-first century as it was to the settler colonies of Georgia and New South Wales in the
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nineteenth century.
Cole Harris provides us with an understanding of how this same project of elimination was
implemented in British Columbia during the nineteenth century through a careful study of the
powers underlying the imposition of the Indian Reserve system. 45 Of particular note is the
emphasis that Harris places on looking at the structure of power relations and their effects to also
simplify the complexity of this colonial project, writing “Comprehensive and intricate, it quickly
dispossessed one set of people and established another. But to emphasize the complexity of
colonial power, as the postcolonial literature tends to do, is not in itself particularly helpful. The
challenge, rather, is to look inside the complex to establish how particular powers operated and to
what particular effect.”46 By focusing on the effects, Harris exposes how state sanctioned violence
lies at the root of the settler colonial state’s structure of power in writing about how the “initial
ability to dispossess rested primarily on physical power and the supporting infrastructure of the
state. Once the power of violence had been demonstrated, the threat of it was often sufficient. The
colonial state sought and, backed by the British military, was often able to impose, a monopoly on
violence. It introduced the governmental framework of the modern state, within which
colonization proceeded.”47
Like Ford’s study, Harris’s study also uncovers the process by which settler colonial
violence is transformed into settler law and territoriality. The contrast is that this process is not an
innovation of the courts, but of the legislature. Notably, these practices were deliberately informed
and rationalized by a logic that was prominently racist, but was above all things, rooted in the
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elimination of Indigenous peoples, as Harris writes “The legitimation of and moral justification
for dispossession lay in a cultural discourse that located civilization and savagery and extolled the
advantages for all concerned of replacing the latter with the former.”48
While state-sanctioned violence and racism are central findings in Harris’ study, where it
is most compelling is in his identification of the specific and primary role that law played in
orchestrating the dispossession of Indigenous peoples for the exclusive benefit and enrichment of
White settlers, as he writes “All these disciplinary technologies were necessary, but law provided
a far more comprehensive framework than did the others for recalibrating land and life on the
colonizers’ terms and without reference to indigenous antecedents.”49
B. The Present: Jurisdiction and the Colonial Politics of Recognition
The thing that stands out most in a comparison of the techniques of nineteenth century settler
colonialism, when the modern state was being born, and the techniques of the modern state today,
is a striking similarity in the fundamental tensions at work between the settler colonial state’s
discourse of territoriality and an emerging, or re-emerging, discourse of pluralism.
Shiri Pasternak’s dissertation examines the struggle over jurisdiction by the Algonquins of
Barriere Lake and how, in particular, they contest the settler colonial state of Canada’s claims to
sovereignty over their territory.50 Pasternak explains that her dissertation “turns our attention to
the practices of settler colonial sovereignty in Canada, and especially to the role Indigenous law
plays in resisting dispossession of their lands.”51 Pasternak’s study offers a good comparative to
Ford and Harris’ because it is situated within the same tensions of settler colonialism and pluralism
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represented by two different policy mechanisms for resolving land claims. First, the pluralism
mechanism is represented by “a resource co-management agreement signed in 1991 between the
Algonquins, Canada, and Quebec” which “illustrates the best and the worst of what can happen
when Indigenous and settler laws meet.”52 Notably, this “Trilateral Agreement” was an initiative
of the Algonquins and it was rooted in the legal pluralism that characterized the order of things
before the emergence of the modern settler colonial state, as Pasternak writes “From the
Algonquins’ perspective, the Agreement was based on their historic 3-figure wampum belt that
ensured the community would always exercise leadership over their territory in partnership with
the French and British nations.”53
The story that unfolds from this unique example of cooperation in more modern times, is
a confirmation of the enduring elements of elimination and territoriality, as Pasternak explains
“through a multiplicity of legislative, bureaucratic, economic, and repressive security tactics, the
federal and provincial governments withdrew their commitments to share jurisdiction.”54 The
underlying explanation that Pasternak provides for these tactics of withdrawal is that ultimately
the Federal government was concerned that sharing jurisdiction with Indigenous peoples “would
undermine the government’s preferred policy for settling unresolved land claims through the
Comprehensive Land Claims policy.”55 Notably, this policy stands in direct contrast to the
jurisdiction sharing model of the Trilateral Agreement, as Pasternak explains it “operates as a
technique of settler colonial jurisdiction-making on Indigenous lands, transforming unceded
Indigenous territory into fee simple lands, disclosing new possibilities for economic exploitation
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and land alienation, and by reconfiguring Indigenous lands under provincial rather than federal
powers.”56 Thus, when we look at this study comparatively in the context of Ford and Harris’
findings, we can find that the effects of the Comprehensive Land Claims policy allow us to see
that it is a practice of the settler colonial state that performs the same elimination of Indigenous
rights and jurisdiction by transforming them into forms that are contained within specific
geographical areas that do not disturb settler sovereignty.
In reviewing the technique of jurisdiction further, Pasternak identifies part of the logic that
underlies its use, writing “In Canada, the state’s claims to jurisdiction over Indigenous lands
assumes the authority to inaugurate law where law already existed, and presumes the new forms
that law will take. These presumptions preclude asking pertinent questions about which laws
should apply on these lands.”57 The reach of this logic is not limited to policy making, but is
reproduced in the form of a problematic that the courts are faced with (a problem of their own
making, although they don’t acknowledge it as such), as Pasternak explains “it is incumbent on
the courts to shield the details of colonial acquisition from themselves to persist in their reasoning
against Indigenous assertions of jurisdiction over their lands. Challenges to state sovereignty are
considered beyond the jurisdiction of the court, eliding the crucial period of inauguration.”58
When looked at in comparison to Ford and Harris’s studies, what becomes apparent is that
this fundamental assumption of authority and jurisdiction is one that emerged primarily through a
deliberate and conscious practice and performance of law and policy through both the settler courts
and the settler legislative powers in the nineteenth century. The point to take away from
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Pasternak’s analysis is that the logic of elimination remains unchanged, although it has found new
forms through which it is expressed.
Glen Coulthard’s study looks at the shifts in political discourse around the struggles of
Indigenous peoples in Canada for self-determination.59 Drawing primarily on the works of Marx
and Fanon, Coulthard lays out a clear argument for undermining the settler colonial politics of
recognition and the limitations of the liberal paradigm, and then supports this argument through a
comprehensive empirical study of the Dene peoples’ struggle for recognition.60 In particular, he
focuses on how this struggle has “increasingly been cast in the language of ‘recognition’” and
traces the evolution of this technique, its effects—prominently the “recognition” of Aboriginal
rights under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 198261—as well as the “flurry of intellectual activity
that has sought to unpack the complex ethical, political, and legal questions that these types of
claims raise.”62
Similar to Ford and Pasternak’s study, Coulthard’s work is also situated in a tension
between the settler colonial state and a pluralistic vision that he describes “is couched in the
vernacular of ‘mutual recognition.’”63 Coulthard argues against this writing “the politics of
recognition in its contemporary liberal form promises to reproduce the very configurations of
colonialist, racist, patriarchal state power that Indigenous peoples’ demands for recognition have
historically sought to transcend.”64 Broadly, Coulthard’s study demonstrates how detrimental this
reproduction has been, as he writes “much of our efforts over the last four decades to attain settler-
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state recognition of our rights to land and self-government have in fact encouraged the opposite—
the continued dispossession of our homelands and the ongoing usurpation of our self-determining
authority.”65
Like the others, Coulthard analyses specific practices of the settler colonial state. One in
particular, that draws a comparative with Harris’ work, is how Coulthard draws a strong
connection between the racist civilization discourse that underpinned the imposition of the Indian
Reserve system and how that discourse is being reproduced to the same effect within urban centres,
writing “we are seeing a similar logic govern the gentrification and subsequent displacement of
Indigenous peoples from Native spaces within the city. … gentrifiers often defend their
development projects as a form of ‘improvement,’ where previously ‘wasted’ land or property …
are made more socially and economically productive.”66 When this logic is viewed “through a
colonial lens, [it is viewed] as yet another ‘frontier’ of dispossession central to the accumulation
of capital. Through gentrification, Native spaces in the city are now being treated as urbs nullius—
urban space void of Indigenous sovereign presence.”67
Where Coulthard’s study stands apart from the others is that it critically analyses some of
the practices that Indigenous peoples have developed to obtain “recognition” within the settler
colonial structure of power. One prominent example involves the resource sharing agreements that
are often entered into with industry which Coulthard engages with as follows:
A similar problem informs self-determination efforts that seek to ameliorate our
poverty and economic dependency through resource revenue sharing, more
comprehensive impact benefit agreements, and affirmative action employment
strategies negotiated through the state and with industries currently tearing up
Indigenous territories. Even though the capital generated by such an approach
could, in theory, be spent subsidizing the revitalization of certain cultural traditions
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and practices, in the end they would still remain dependent on a predatory economy
that is entirely at odds with the deep reciprocity that forms the cultural core of many
Indigenous peoples’ relationships with land.68
In the end, while Coulthard acknowledges “that over the last forty years Indigenous peoples have
become incredibly skilled at participating in the Canadian legal and political practices” his findings
lead him to conclude “that our efforts to engage these discursive and institutional spaces to secure
recognition of our rights have not only failed, but have instead served to subtly reproduce the forms
of racist, sexist, economic, and political configurations of power that we initially sought, through
our engagements and negotiations with the state, to challenge.”69
For me, the strength of Coulthard’s analysis comes through in demonstrating how the logic
of elimination is ultimately encoded within the types of agreements that are being produced by the
current discourse of “recognition.” Further, Coulthard’s argument demonstrates a consistent theme
throughout the studies above, which is that settler colonialism and legal pluralism are
incompatible.
Conclusion
Although the study of settler colonialism may still be considered as emerging, we should realize
that its lessons and concepts are readily identifiable in the long history of colonialism itself if we
only look for them. Settler colonialism is about more than just history repeating itself. It is about
the most violent acts of history being reproduced, over and over, to the point of being normalized
so that they can be repeated today in ways that are increasingly harder to detect. For anyone who
believes in peace, through whatever lens, I think it is incumbent on that belief to identify the
ideologies and practices that work against it.
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One of those ideologies is settler colonialism. When we draw all of the above together we
are provided with a clear definition of its core elements: a violence that disrupts relationships on
multiple levels, a relational structure of power and domination, a primary objective of territoriality
or access to land, and a logic of elimination that drives an innovation to develop a range of
practices, technologies and rationalizations. The review of empirical studies above, from different
disciplines ranging from geography to history to politics and comparing the past to the present,
demonstrates and confirms these elements by investigating the specific practices that the settler
colonial state uses to reproduce violence in its insatiable program to eliminate and replace.
The studies selected above have been chosen because they demonstrate how the logic of
elimination has been used in North America, and Canada in particular, to inaugurate settler law,
jurisdiction and sovereignty in the nineteenth century, and how that same logic is being reproduced
within the existing legal and political practices and discourses today for the same effect. What
reviewing these studies in comparison demonstrates is that this logic of elimination contains an
element of innovation that allows it to be obscured, hidden and even presented as emancipatory.
As mentioned in the opening of this chapter, I have yet to uncover any legal scholarship
that directly applies this particularly theory of settler colonialism to the jurisprudence on
Aboriginal rights. However, there is a wide range of scholarship on that jurisprudence. Thus, in
the next chapter, I begin to pursue this course of investigation by reviewing a selection of the
commissions and literature for evidence of some of the elements that define settler colonialism.
As I will explain, this allows us to narrow the legal problematic to the issue of jurisdiction and
points us in the direction of looking more closely at Indigenous blockades cases.
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Chapter 2: Whose Land is Canada Built On?
A country cannot be built on a living lie. We know now, if the original settlers did not,
that this country was not terra nullius at the time of contact and that the newcomers
did not ‘discover’ it in any meaningful sense. We know also that the peoples who lived
here had their own systems of law and governance, their own customs, languages and
cultures.70
— Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP)
Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996
The official legal story of Canada—its sovereignty, territorial authority, system of politics and
laws which serve as the bedrock for the jurisdiction of every judge and all the rights, privileges
and material entitlements that Canadians (including myself) enjoy and ostensibly take for granted
every day—is that it was founded upon the concept of terra nullius, which assumed that all of
North America was “empty, essentially barren and uninhabited land”71 and the doctrine of
discovery.72 For over three centuries, the European imperial powers repeatedly acted out these
ideas “by making grandiose territorial claims… as though the continent was juridically vacant and
the Indigenous peoples living there did not have sovereignty.”73
As we know from Lisa Ford’s study above, these sweeping legal claims were deliberately
taken up by the settler colonial courts in the nineteenth century to shape the discourse of
territoriality into settler sovereignty, jurisdiction and law. This was an exercise of pure legal
innovation with no basis in fact, as Kent McNeil writes “To the extent that these claims extended
beyond the areas controlled by Europeans at the time—which was almost invariably the case—
they cannot have been based on factual possession or the actual exercise of jurisdiction.”74
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Notably, this discourse of territoriality was repeated in Canada in the form of the royal
commissions in the nineteenth century, two of which I will review here. These provide a clear
record of how the logic of elimination was being applied by Canada as rationalizations for its racist
policies. The first is the Report of the Bagot Commission of 1845/47 which made clear findings
of the active and ongoing dispossession and destruction of Indigenous lands by European squatters
and industrialists in clear contravention of British Imperial law at the time under the Royal
Proclamation of 176375 while also acknowledging that “The protection which the Government
intended to throw over the Indians was not and could not be sufficiently maintained.”76 In other
words, white settlers were breaking the law, the government was doing nothing about it, and this
was apparent to everyone, particularly Indigenous peoples whose communities and ways of life
were being destroyed by the settler invasion and whose clear and detailed petitions to the Crown
in response were numerous.77 What makes the Bagot Report exemplary of the logic of elimination
during this time is in how this dispossession and destruction is rationalized, first by asserting that
Europeans were lawfully entitled to take “land of which the Savages stood in no particular need”,
and then bolstering that settler entitlement by repeatedly asserting the “ignorance” of Indigenous
peoples, “their remarkable fondness for spirits” and how their “inability also to compete with their
white brethren debarred them, in a great measure, from the enjoyment of civil rights.”78
While this rationale is visibly racist, what exposes the logic of elimination embedded
within these statements is comparing them with the Indigenous perspective. In writing about the
geopolitical contexts that influenced the Proclamation, Anishinaabeg scholar John Borrows writes
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that from the Indigenous perspective, the royal order of King George III was a promise “that the
British would respect existing political and territorial jurisdiction by incorporating First Nations
understandings of this relationship in the document.”79 As Borrows notes, the Proclamation failed
to fulfill this promise because “its wording recognized Aboriginal rights to land by outlining a
policy that was designed to extinguish these rights.”80 The fundamental contradiction inherent in
recognizing a legal interest so that it could be legally erased was not lost on Indigenous peoples.
In order to address this failure, the Treaty of Niagara was made in 1764 which, in contrast to the
unilaterally drafted and declared Proclamation, directly incorporated Indigenous perspectives and
practices of diplomacy and law making to produce “a multination alliance in which no member
gave up their sovereignty”.81
What is significant about analysing the rationale of the settler colonial power from the
Indigenous perspective is that we can see this tension between legal pluralism and settler
colonialism. In this way, the Indigenous perspective provides a contrast which sharpens our ability
to identify the logic of elimination and whether it is being relied upon. Thus, we can see how the
Bagot Report relies on this logic by distorting the facts and law that are relevant to a proper
determination of whether dispossessing Indigenous peoples of their land is lawful. This eliminated
the sovereignty and jurisdiction of Indigenous peoples by failing to acknowledge their existing
legal recognition under the Proclamation, as well as distorting their equal entitlement to the
protection of the law, not just individually as subjects of the Crown, but as allies, partners, brothers,
hosts and Treaty nations.
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The same logic can be seen being reproduced in the Report of the Pennefather Commission
of 1858 which relied on it to set out in greater detail how the Crown could expedite its
predetermined objective which it described as “gradual civilization”82 or rather the assimilation of
Indigenous peoples. Fundamentally, this program was not about civilization or assimilation in any
morally supportable sense, but about perfecting settler sovereignty by completing the
dispossession of Indigenous peoples from their lands and discontinuing the annuities that were an
integral part of the treaty and land sharing relationship.83 The intention to liquidate Indigenous
lands in order to open them up for white settlers was explicitly put in the outset of the Pennefather
Report which stated that it “endeavoured to define the actual limits of the Indian Territory, with a
view to ascertain what may be convertible into funds to aid in the support of the Aborigines when
the Imperial aid shall be withdrawn, and which may be available to meet the demands of the white
population for land after reserving so much as may be necessary for the Indians themselves.”84
Notably, the racist discourse of Indigenous inferiority used to rationalize the Bagot Report
is now embedded in this mandate. But what brings it out as a product of the logic of elimination is
how it is used to rationalize the predetermined objective that Indigenous peoples must be
dispossessed of their lands for the primary benefit of the expansion of the white settler society,
with just a pecuniary and temporary benefit to be left for Indigenous peoples to support them when
the Imperial Crown ceased the practice of payments or gifts in exchange for the friendship of
Indigenous nations; a practice that had long been fundamental to the relationship between the
Crown and Indigenous peoples and was required by the Treaty of Niagara and subsequent
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treaties.85 By unilaterally ending a treaty requirement grounded specifically in Indigenous legal
perspectives about sharing, and replacing it with an entitlement drawn from a strictly white settler
perspective, one can see how the logic of elimination is trying to find a way of reconciling the
fundamental legal contradiction created by the assertion of Crown sovereignty through the
Proclamation by eliminating Indigenous sovereignty.
This discourse of territoriality and the logic of elimination was reproduced throughout
Canada’s policies towards Indigenous peoples86 and the early Aboriginal rights jurisprudence
cases in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries which relied explicitly on the doctrines of
discovery and terra nullius as the clear legal basis upon which the Crown’s sovereignty and title
had crystallized. A review of those decisions is not necessary, because what matters most for our
purposes is that the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in the landmark decision in Guerin affirmed
that Canada’s legal claim to sovereignty and ownership are founded on this discourse and logic
holding that “The principle of discovery which justified these claims gave the ultimate title in the
land in a particular area to the nation which had discovered and claimed it.” 87 This affirmation of
discovery as the foundation of Crown sovereignty and title allowed the SCC to do two key things
which have set the trajectory of jurisprudence regarding the constitutional rights of Aboriginal
peoples recognized under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.
The first is that the SCC confirmed Aboriginal title as a legal interest to land which exists
as a “burden on the radical or final title of the Sovereign.”88 The second, based on the confirmation
of Aboriginal title, was to define the relationship between the Crown and Indigenous peoples as
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one that makes Indigenous peoples fundamentally dependent on the Crown and thus requiring the
application of fiduciary principles to any dealings or actions taken by the Crown in regards to the
legal interests of Aboriginal peoples.89 This framing of the relationship has been repeated
throughout the development of Aboriginal rights jurisprudence which has steadily reshaped itself
around the doctrines of reconciliation and the honour of the Crown through major decisions in Van
der Peet,90 Delgamuukw,91 Haida Nation92 and Tsilhqot’in Nation.93
The literature on Aboriginal rights has consistently problematized Canada’s official legal
story and how it has shaped legal doctrine. The first contribution I wish to make in this thesis is
that when we conceptualize the problem through the concept of settler colonialism, immediately
we can see that the SCC is transforming a power relationship of domination into law by eliminating
the underlying title of Indigenous peoples and replacing it with that of the Crown’s. Trying to
understand how this is done is where the explanatory power of the logic of elimination reveals that
the analysis of legal and political scholars examining the role of the courts have been identifying
in some detail how the elements of settler colonialism are being reproduced in law.
The benefit of this contribution, I argue, is that it brings the Aboriginal rights jurisprudence
into a different light. This exposes a potential limitation in this literature which I view as
overlooking how deeply embedded the logic of elimination is within this jurisprudence. On this
same point, I think a possibility that must be considered is whether this same logic is being
unwittingly reproduced in this scholarship through conclusions that implicitly rely on what I will
refer to as an “aspirational assumption” that the settler colonial systems of law, politics and even
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reason will eventually work to bring about justice for Indigenous peoples. In a sense, this reflects
the same prevailing view about “mutual recognition” that Coulthard is arguing against in the
political discourse. Whether a similar argument in the legal discourse should be made for a
rejection of Aboriginal rights jurisprudence as emancipatory is part of the underlying inquiry in
this thesis which my examination of blockades cases below hopes to expand.
To be clear, my identification and critique of this “aspirational assumption” is one that
emerged naturally from my close reading of some of these leading works in the literature and was
not one that I was looking to identify in particular. It is only recently that I have become aware of
an emergent body of scholarship that is starting to identify what Eve Tuck and Marcia McKenzie
describe as “the ways in which social sciences, when not cognizant of settler colonial structures,
can replicate some of the epistemic violences of settler colonialism and exhibit some of the
tendencies of that structure to accumulate at all costs.”94 I have not fully reviewed this area of
scholarship, but to the extent that my identification of the “aspirational assumption” fits any of the
patterns being identified by others, then I would suggest that this provides legal and political
scholars with incentive to be further reflective and attentive to the assumptions they rely upon.
To demonstrate how the elements of settler colonialism are being identified and then
overlooked by the assumption in the literature, I look at three forms of analysis in this chapter that:
1) problematize the creative role of the courts; 2) identify inconsistencies in the logic of the courts;
and, 3) honestly examines the legal and political realities underlying the courts’ reliance on the
assumption of territoriality and the prospects of negotiations with the state.
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Creativity of the Courts: Inventing New Ways to Eliminate Indigenous Sovereignty
Judges can be a creative bunch, particularly when it comes to uprooting unfounded and
discriminatory ideas that are deeply entrenched in the prevailing views of law and society. A
prominent example in Canadian law is the “living tree doctrine” a bedrock rule of interpretation
that was invented by the Privy Council to deal with the task of explaining why the SCC was wrong
to conclude unanimously that women were not “persons” under Canada’s founding constitutional
statute, the British North America Act.95 What is striking about the Privy Council’s decision is that,
in 1929, it calls the “exclusion of women from all public offices…a relic of days more barbarous
than ours,” but then sets out the continuous line of authority and rationalizations for that exclusion
reaching back two millennia, even directly quoting the tribal laws written down in the Germania.96
The SCC had correctly relied on this authority, but the problem, as the Privy Council put it, was
that “Customs are apt to develop into traditions which are stronger than law and remain
unchallenged long after the reason for them has disappeared.”97
By creatively describing Canada’s constitution as a “living tree” which required “a large
and liberal interpretation”98 the Privy Council was able to give the law the strength it needed to
break free from a deeply structural form of discrimination, no matter how traditional, and usher in
an important moment for women’s rights and gender equality. The living tree has been used many
times over to give courts the power to recognize “the existence and importance of unwritten
constitutional principles”99 so that they may interpret Canada’s constitution in a way that
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“accommodates and addresses the realities of modern life”100 further allowing the law and the
society it rules to redefine itself free from other long held discriminatory and baseless traditions.
The overarching recommendations of RCAP and the TRC are to assert the “that Aboriginal
peoples must have room to exercise their autonomy and structure their own solutions.”101 One
would think that the living tree gives the courts the power needed to implement this. Yet, for
reasons unknown or unstated, Indigenous peoples are excluded, and, ironically given the Persons
Case, Indigenous women who are statistically the most vulnerable group in Canadian society are
particularly excluded.102
The clear effect of this exclusion erases Indigenous jurisdiction, as John Borrows writes
“Interpreting Aboriginal and treaty rights through the same lens as other constitutional provisions
would allow Indigenous peoples to exercise jurisdiction in relation to violence against women.
[But they] are not interpreted in the same way as other constitutional provisions: Aboriginal
peoples can only possess constitutional rights if they are rooted in the past.”103 The contradiction
with the Persons Case, which is about breaking from the past, is striking. Yet the reason for this
is elusive, as Borrows writes “While constitutional rights of all stripes find their genesis in some
historic moment, only Aboriginal peoples’ constitutional rights are limited by such moments.”104
The exclusion impacts more than just Indigenous jurisdiction, since the living tree “invites
democratic participation because… Canadian constitutional law is an open-ended, ongoing
activity.”105 Thus, the courts are not only eliminating Indigenous jurisdiction, they are also
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disenfranchising Indigenous peoples from the constitutional dialogue as founding nations.
It is in the effective exclusion and elimination of Indigenous nationhood and jurisdiction
that I see Borrows has identified the elements of settler colonialism. Yet, I find this definition is
overlooked in his conclusion because it rests on an aspirational assumption that the courts will
eventually work and that applying the living tree equally will mean “Canada’s constitution would
be more unified and less discriminatory. Aboriginal peoples’ rights would be considered in a
broader light, and Canada would be strengthened.”106
While the courts have excluded Indigenous peoples from the benefit of their creative
powers, they have not held back in using those powers to deny them justice. Kent McNeil
demonstrates this in his critical review of the interlocutory and appeal decisions in the Chippewas
of Sarnia case that dealt with Aboriginal title land that was unlawfully surrendered in the 19th
century.107 From the outset, McNeil argues that because of Canada’s flawed foundations “In
virtually all of Canada, Crown assertions of sovereignty therefore need to be re-evaluated by
examining both the legal and the factual basis for the Crown's claims.”108 In analyzing the
interlocutory decision of Campbell J., McNeil identifies the judge’s “invention of a 60-year
equitable limitation period” calling it a “remarkable departure from legal principle and
precedent.”109 McNeil saves his sharpest criticism for the Ontario Court of Appeal which upheld
that invention, calling the use of judicial discretion to extinguish Aboriginal title “disturbing” and
one that “raises serious questions about the role of the courts in adjudicating Aboriginal claims,
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and the impact on the law generally of decisions involving Aboriginal rights.”110
By demonstrating how the courts have eliminated Indigenous legal interests in order to
protect settler interests, I find that McNeil clearly identifies how the logic of settler colonialism is
being reproduced by the courts. In his conclusion, McNeil relies on the aspirational assumption by
pointing out that the same tools used to create the problem can be used to solve it, writing “judicial
creativity should be directed towards finding solutions that achieve an appropriate balance and at
the same time abide by fundamental principles. Unfortunately, the creativity shown by the Court
of Appeal in this instance failed to achieve either of these objectives.” 111 While I don’t disagree
with this conclusion as a matter of legal analysis, if viewed through the lens of settler colonialism
I think one needs to question whether the logic of elimination and the innovation of the settler
courts will not just reproduce the same result of judicially eliminating Aboriginal title, but in a
form that is harder to detect or appears more acceptable to legal scholars.
While McNeil’s analysis focuses on Aboriginal title, Janna Promislow articulates similar
doubts about the role that courts can play in the interpretation of treaties by situating their role
within the broader forces at work, as Promislow writes “With the coercive force of the state behind
it and the role of courts as public authorities, the narrative that emanates from courts has a
controlling impact on the public history of treaties. When law, history, and political theory collide
through the law, the legitimacy and character of the national narrative is at stake.”112 For me,
these connections speak not only to the legitimacy of the courts, but to the power dynamic of their
role in examining, as McNeil says we must, the factual and legal bases of Canada’s claim to
sovereignty.
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A good example of how narratives and discourses can be used to reproduce the power
dynamics of settler colonialism in law is found in the early analysis of the entrenchment of
Aboriginal rights into Canada’s constitution by Brian Slattery. Slattery sets out his analysis by
drawing connections between law and national narratives writing “All national myths involve a
certain amount of distortion. But some at least have the virtue of broad historical accuracy, roughly
depicting the major forces at work. The myth that underlies much legal thinking about the history
of Canada lacks that redeeming feature.”113 Again, Slattery identifies not only that Canada’s story
is baseless, but emphasizes an absence of any virtue to strive for accuracy that is exceptional by
comparison. In his conclusion Slattery predicts that Aboriginal rights would “provide solutions to
a number of longstanding problems and grievances” because s. 35(1) officially confirmed that “the
original rights of native American peoples are held to have survived the Crown's acquisition of
sovereignty, except insofar as these were incompatible with the Crown's ultimate title”.114
In this I find Slattery’s optimism about Aboriginal rights moving forward is based on an
aspirational assumption. Notably, that optimism is clearly burdened by a precondition that what
the Crown has gained through its myth and discourse of its territoriality remains untouchable. The
immediate problem that I have with the optimism and the precondition is that they both reproduce
the settler colonial state’s territoriality in implicit and explicit ways. In a subsequent article,
Slattery draws attention to the fact that this precondition is lacking justification as he writes:
Canadian law treats the question of when and how the Crown gained sovereignty
over Canadian territories in a somewhat artificial and self-serving manner. To state
a complex matter simply, the courts apparently feel bound to defer to official
territorial claims advanced by the Crown, without inquiring into the facts
supporting them or their validity in international law.115
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What is significant about Slattery’s analysis is that it goes beyond identifying this element of
territoriality and points out that it is being reproduced by the courts in a way that is exceptional by
international law standards. What this suggests is that the settler colonial myth that Canada
continues to assert as normative, is actually drifting further away from acceptable standards.
Reading both pieces together, I see Slattery pointing out that this lack of a redeeming quality is
not just a problem for the national myth, but also one for the courts.
The legal historian Hamar Foster identified these same concerns in questioning “How the
act of discovery or mere words on paper can be transformed into rights and jurisdiction over
Aboriginal nations remains a mystery.”116 Despite an absence of justification, the resiliency of the
precondition can be seen as Foster concedes that “even if one is obliged to accept the elevation of
that mystery into a legal doctrine, a corollary is that what went before remains until specifically
abrogated.”117 By pointing out the mystery, but conceding that either it won’t be solved or solving
it is not necessary, I see Foster identifying how the courts are reproducing settler colonialism here.
This problem is reiterated in his conclusion, as he writes:
So it may not matter that the courts have hitherto set their faces against tribal
sovereignty. It can be revived and can qualify as an ‘existing’ Aboriginal right
under s. 35(1) because it has always been there, had we only the wit to see it. As an
impartial observer might say: if we are going to have mysteries, let us be certain
that they work both ways.118
Again, the aspirational assumption is relied upon here, but Foster arguably gives it some support
by separating the mysterious work of law from the more visible role of the courts and hoping that
the strength of the former will prevail over the stubbornness of the latter.
The scholarship on the absence of justification for Crown sovereignty is much broader than

116

Foster, Forgotten Arguments, supra note 2 at 385.
Ibid.
118
Ibid at 385-86. (Emphasis added).
117

37

this, but from this selective review we can see there is some consistency in both the identification
of the reproduction of settler colonialism and a reliance on an aspirational assumption in the
conclusions. The problem I have with the aspirational assumption is that, even without applying
the concept of settler colonialism, it paradoxically goes against the analysis which continues to
cast serious, and increasingly irredeemable doubt on the role that law and the courts can play in
adjudicating issues involving Indigenous peoples. There is a significant discomfort for me in the
absence of a clear justification for relying on this aspirational assumption for the simple reason
that if we only continue to confirm instances when courts are not impartial decision makers, and
that mysteries do not work both ways, it only makes sense to me that our doubts about the reliability
of that assumption should grow. Yet, the resilience of this assumption throughout the literature
suggests to me that it either holds out the possibility of a truth that reason alone cannot express or
reveal, or perhaps more practically, that the assumption is necessary for analyzing Canadian law.
In either case, if this aspirational assumption must remain a key part of the legal scholarship, then
I would argue, given the growing evidence eroding this assumption, that our analysis must start
including evidence and arguments that justify our reliance on this assumption because without it I
think the risk that this scholarship is unconsciously reproducing the logic of elimination grows.
“Because it does not make sense”: The Logic of Elimination in Judicial Decisions
If we can identify that the courts are reproducing elements of settler colonialism, then we should
be able to identify some of the ways that the courts are doing this. There are many examples of
this in the literature, but I limit my review here to three prominent and distinct examples that
identify gaps or problems in the courts’ reasoning which I view as good examples of how the
courts are reproducing the logic of elimination in their decisions.
The first example comes from the precedent setting Aboriginal rights case of Van der Peet
38

where the SCC was faced with finding a way to recognize Aboriginal rights as a possible legal
entitlement without disturbing the settler interests that claim the same space and resource. First,
Lamer CJC acknowledged “the doctrine of aboriginal rights exists, and is recognized and affirmed
by s. 35(1), because of one simple fact: when Europeans arrived in North America, aboriginal
peoples were already here, living in communities on the land, and participating in distinctive
cultures, as they had done for centuries.”119 Next, he juxtaposed this with the assumption of
territoriality and defines the overarching mandate of s. 35(1) around the discourse of reconciliation,
writing “the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) must be directed towards the
reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown.”120
In his review of Van der Peet, Mark D. Walters writes that to this point, Lamer CJC’s
“analysis is consistent with imperial common law principles.”121 In this there is still some hope
that the mysterious powers of the law, in articulating what it called “reconciliation” could work
both ways. However, the hope captured in this principle is overshadowed by a fatal “conceptual
leap that (arguably) detaches Van der Peet from the common law” when Lamer CJC tries to put
reconciliation into practice by setting out the “integral to a distinctive culture test.”122 In breaking
down Lamer CJC’s logic, Walters writes the “reasoning seems to be this: (a) Aboriginal rights
arise from prior occupation of territory by distinctive Aboriginal societies having their own
customary laws; therefore, (b) Aboriginal rights are limited to customs that made their societies
distinctive.”123 Walters then points out the conceptual leap writing “The cases he cites support (a)
but do not support (b). Furthermore, (b) does not follow inexorably from (a). Although the cases
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mention that Aboriginal peoples were ‘distinct’, there is no suggestion that the distinctiveness of
their cultures was the reason for the recognition of their rights.”124
As I read it, Walters’ analysis of the SCC’s logic identifies its reliance on the logic of
elimination in more detail by demonstrating that the assumption of territoriality is so deeply
embedded within the logic of Canadian law that judges are capable of articulating it as if it is
perfectly true and reasonable. While this casts serious doubt on the role of the courts, I find that
Walters’ analysis provides support for relying on the aspirational assumption by demonstrating
that the logic of elimination can be identified by pointing out where its assumptions create
contradictions and inconsistencies. Further underscoring this point is Walters’ conclusion that the
SCC’s logic not only contradicts the common law, but that it violates the rule of law “by
introducing a confusing and (from the local perspective) arbitrary rule that deprived culturally nonintegral parts of the legal system of any force.”125 Like Foster, this separates the role of the courts
from the rule of law in a way that supports the latter as a standard by which we can determine
whether the courts are undermining the legitimacy of their role.
This problem with the logic of Canadian law was reproduced more dramatically in
Delgamuukw, the first s. 35(1) Aboriginal Title case to reach the SCC released the year after Van
der Peet and 13 years after the landmark case in Guerin. In trying to explain Aboriginal title as a
legal interest in land without disturbing the assumption of territoriality, Lamer CJC for the majority
writes “Aboriginal title is a burden on the Crown’s underlying title. However, the Crown did not
gain this title until it asserted sovereignty over the land in question. Because it does not make sense
to speak of a burden on the underlying title before that title existed, aboriginal title crystallized at
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the time sovereignty was asserted.”126 Notably, the reasoning here in Delgamuukw is expanding
on how Aboriginal title was defined in Guerin. It is tempting to see this as a response to the
criticisms of Slattery and Foster that there is a lack of justification and motivation in the courts’
reasoning to strive for accuracy and explain its mysteries. However, the durability of the
territoriality discourse and the courts’ incapacity to deal with it is, in my view, captured in Lamer
CJC’s now infamous closing words “Let us face it, we are all here to stay.”127
In his review of the decision, John Borrows takes direct aim at what it is that really “does
not make sense” when courts attempt to reconcile the assumption of territoriality with the fact that
Indigenous peoples have a pre-existing legal and sovereign interest to the land, writing:
It does not make sense that one could secure a legal entitlement to land over another
merely through raw assertion… It is even less of a ‘morally and politically
defensible’ position when this assertion has not been a neutral and noble statement,
but has benefited the Crown to the detriment of the land's original inhabitants. As
such, ‘it does not make sense’ to speak of Aboriginal title as being a ‘burden’ on
the Crown's underlying title. As ‘it does not make sense to speak of a burden on the
underlying title before the title existed,’ Aboriginal peoples wonder how it ‘makes
sense’ that Crown title ‘crystallized at the time sovereignty was asserted.’128
By identifying what is an obvious failure of the Court to justify its continued reliance on the
assumption of territoriality, Borrows clearly identifies the elements of settler colonialism being
reproduced: the elimination of Indigenous sovereignty in order to affirm settler sovereignty.
That this is put so clearly is significant, but where Borrows’ analysis goes deeper is in how
he deconstructs the logic of elimination embedded in the courts reasoning by tracing how it has
been reproduced throughout history, writing “The key words that unlock sovereignty's power are
of ancient origin. Practitioners of its craft can summon a tradition that reaches deep into the past.
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It flows from classical times through the Renaissance. Political and legal ascendancy are conveyed
to those who can conjure fictions that vindicate their claims of authority.”129 In this, Borrows not
only makes a strong connection between the logic of elimination and a power relationship of
domination, but he provides it with a deep genealogy that predates the genesis of colonization in
Canada.130 As the Persons Case demonstrated, the courts have the power to break from deeply
rooted discriminatory traditions. Yet somehow the failure of the court to do so when it comes to
Indigenous peoples makes this racism exceptional. This is felt in Borrows’ conclusion as he writes
“While the Court’s encouragement of negotiated settlements is promising… its observation that
‘we are all here to stay’ does not tell us where ‘here’ is. It is clear that if ‘here’ is principally
defined in relation to a reconciliation with magical assertions of Crown sovereignty, ‘here’ will
never be a place where Aboriginal peoples will feel at home.”131
It goes without saying that there is little hint of the aspirational assumption in the
conclusion here. Further, if we consider Pasternak and Coulthard’s studies which are published 15
years after this conclusion, we find that whatever looked promising in these “negotiated
settlements” has simply not borne any fruit. In fact, what is most striking in Borrows’ conclusion
is that it identifies the irreducible element of settler colonialism, territoriality, which ultimately
makes it impossible for the settler sovereignty and Indigenous sovereignty to peacefully coexist.
While the first Aboriginal title decision demonstrated how the SCC will use the logic of
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elimination to reproduce the assumption of territoriality, the most recent Aboriginal title decision
has demonstrated that the same powers of logic and legal reasoning cannot be used to undo the
most racist tenets of that assumption. This seems to be what the SCC attempted to do in Tsilhqot’in
Nation by stating, matter-of-factly, that “The doctrine of terra nullius (that no one owned the land
prior to European assertion of sovereignty) never applied in Canada.”132
Again, John Borrows precisely sums up the fallacy of this statement by pointing out the
obvious contradiction in the same paragraph of the Court’s decision, writing:
If only this declaration were deeply true. Canadian law still has terra nullius written
all over it. The same paragraph that purportedly denied terra nullius contains the
following statement: “At the time of assertion of European sovereignty, the Crown
acquired radical or underlying title to all the land in the province.” If that land was
owned by Indigenous peoples prior to the assertion of European sovereignty, one
wonders how the Crown acquired title in the same land by merely asserting
sovereignty, without a version of terra nullius being deployed. The Crown's claim
to underlying title on this basis “does not make sense.” Some kind of legal vacuum
must be imagined in order to create the Crown's radical title. The emptiness at the
heart of the Court's decision is disturbing.133
The significance of this to further understanding how deeply embedded the logic of elimination is
in the legal reasoning of the SCC is troubling for it suggests that the aspirational assumption, long
reflected in the literature, about the SCC’s ability to use its creative and mysterious powers both
ways, if only it were willing to do so, may be wrong.
In his conclusion, Borrows writes “So-called underlying Crown title is a fiction… This
comment has pointed out areas that need greater attention from the Supreme Court of Canada in
order to extend its rejection of terra nullius… Until that day occurs, Canada remains a deeply
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colonial state built on the vilest of discriminatory tenets.”134 Again, this aspirational assumption
continues to be maintained paradoxically alongside evidence that directly undermines its
reliability, and further with nothing to justify it, but the word “until.” By comparison, Andrée
Boisselle makes a similar closing comment in her analysis of the same decision, as she writes:
Until that standard is properly applied to Indigenous claimant groups, the Canadian
state perpetuates the racist vision that prevented the recognition of Indigenous
nations as the equivalent of nation states in the eyes of the European powers
colonizing North America, and produced the infamous proposition that the
continent was terra nullius until European powers asserted jurisdiction over it.135
Like Borrows, the weight of the aspirational assumption is felt in that one word; until. As stated
above, if we are to rely on this assumption, then we should provide more of an argument to support
it than until. At least for me, Boisselle’s analysis of the “seemingly innocuous clarification” by the
SCC to the Aboriginal title test serves as a good example of the type of evidence that is needed to
support our reliance on the aspirational assumption. As Boisselle explains “the Court merely
clarified that the standard of occupation that must be met to ground possessory title at common
law has to do with the intention and capacity to control the land, rather than with the manner and
use of the land in question.”136 I agree with Boisselle that this change, which is slight but creative,
is important and holds out all the potential she describes as she writes:
Indeed, affirming that the title test rests on the proof of control puts the issue of
Indigenous territories’ boundaries, and therefore of Indigenous nations’ recognition
of each other’s authority and jurisdiction over their respective territories, at the
forefront of the legal inquiry. It effectively places Indigenous normativity—treaties
between neighbouring Indigenous nations, permissions granted, denied or skirted
to enter a group’s territory—at the heart of Canadian law.137
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In reading both papers together, I see that Boisselle’s conclusions are perhaps trying to fill the
“emptiness at the heart of the decision” that Borrows sees. But, the limitation to this potential,
which is not only consistent throughout the literature and central to Boiselle’s analysis as reflected
in the earlier quote, is that all of this great potential for justice is left encapsulated in that one word;
until. Until the law works equally; until mysteries work both ways; until the fruits of the living tree
can be used to nourish the truth that Indigenous peoples have kept alive at great cost and have been
struggling to assert for centuries in the face of genocide and settler colonial violence; until then,
the aspirational assumption that the courts may produce justice arrives stillborn with the longawaited, hard fought for, and groundbreaking recognition of Aboriginal title.
I must admit that the tension between the tones of optimism and frustration in the analysis
of this groundbreaking judicial decision, the first to issue a long awaited declaration of Aboriginal
title, resonates deeply with me. The problem of “No Justice on Stolen Native Land!” is one that I
started learning more about over years spent working as a community journalist and activist in
Montréal. It was a driving factor for why I decided to go to law school, particularly choosing to
go to Thompson Rivers University in Secwepemcul’ecw, the territory of the Secwepemc and
homeland of inspiring Indigenous leaders, thinker and activists like Grand Chief George Manuel,
William “Wolverine” Ignace Jones, Irene Billy, Arthur Manuel and Janice Billy and the decades
of grassroots struggles over land that they were engaged in. 138 Entering law school charged up, I
was quickly disillusioned when I was briefly introduced to the doctrine of discovery in my first
year property law class.139 As the grind of law school took its toll, this disillusion gave way to
emptiness; an irony that I probably should have anticipated given the literal meaning of terra
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nullius. A bigger irony is that my determination to address that emptiness by directly engaging
with the problem helped me to survive law school, become a lawyer working exclusively in
Aboriginal law, connect me with my own Indigenous roots—revealed to me by my grandmother
who had kept them unspoken most of her life, and all of mine, for many reasons (stories for another
time and place)—and eventually pointed me towards this thesis. Throughout all of this work I have
repeatedly traced the development of the Aboriginal jurisprudence from Guerin to Delgamuukw
to Tsilhqot’in Nation and their corresponding analysis and literature. To me, seeing an endemic
pattern of optimism and potential concurrent with frustration left me feeling puzzled and empty.
If I am being honest, seeing this pattern discouraged me each time I turned my mind to
how and what my own efforts might possibly have to contribute. I was at a loss to come up with a
way to analyze blockades decisions without repeating this frustrating pattern. It was only when I
read Borrows’ article again for evidence of how the courts are reproducing the settler colonial
logic of elimination that I began to see how this casts the problem in a different light, as he writes
“Canadian law still has terra nullius written all over it… Some kind of legal vacuum must be
imagined.”140 Viewed this way, I suddenly saw how Borrows’ concluding remarks illuminated the
logic of elimination in the SCC’s reasoning as he writes:
The Court's assumption of a legal vacuum… implies that legal vacuums exist
wherever Indigenous rights exist… These propositions are the echo and remnants
of terra nullius. Crown power can be directly traced to discriminatory assumptions
rooted in European sovereign assertions when the Crown ‘discovered’ Canada.
These assumptions are repeated and applied in the Tsilhqot’in Nation case.”141
Assumptions, implications, propositions: When viewed through the lens of settler colonialism it
became clear to me that the logic of elimination is being reproduced in each of these unexplained
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mysteries, logical leaps and contradictions. This logic has always been there, it has been identified
over and over, yet for some reason the legal scholarship has not called it out for what it reproduces:
The transformation of violence into settler law, jurisdiction and sovereignty.
Assumption of Territoriality: Is the Colonial Court a Thinking Machine?
James Tully argues effectively that western political theories can be used to delegitimize
colonization writing “Political theorists can employ the language of western political thought
critically to test these dubious justifications, to delegitimize them and to test the claims of
indigenous peoples for and of freedom.”142 I find Tully’s political argument compatible with
McNeil’s legal argument that the legitimacy of Crown sovereignty can and must be re-examined.
While I believe that Glen Coulthard’s argument for rejecting the colonial politics of
recognition provides a full counter argument to Tully’s position, as noted above, underlying this
thesis is an inquiry into whether the same argument can be made in law. The reason for this is
because, as the discussion above has considered, there remains an aspirational assumption in the
literature that, from time to time, finds some evidence and reasoning to support it by separating
the rule of law from the role of the courts. The question is whether this separation is significant
enough to undermine the assumption of territoriality and root out the logic of elimination that
reproduces it. Put another way, to borrow Fanon’s phrasing: Is the colonial court a thinking
machine? Or is it predetermined to transform violence into law; to use its creativity and the logic
of elimination to find new ways of articulating the same objective of territoriality?
To get at this question further we must look squarely at how the SCC has embedded the
assumption of territoriality in the doctrines of reconciliation and the honour of the Crown. These
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have been central to a perceived transformation of Aboriginal rights jurisprudence that began with
the SCC’s decision in Haida Nation.143 Brian Slattery described this decision as portraying “the
fundamental law governing Aboriginal rights as more dynamic than static.”144 As Slattery
explains, this resulted in a paradigmatic shift specifically with regards to how the SCC described
“the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty, as opposed to its acquisition of sovereignty.”145 Most
significantly, this shift opened up the “potential for evolution”.146 As we have now come to expect,
this potential is limited, something Felix Hoehn points out in his close study of this paradigmatic
shift, writing that “Reconciling sovereignties is a political task, and so it can only be negotiated;
reconciliation cannot be imposed by a court. However, this does not exclude other important roles
that courts can and should play in relation to claims of sovereignty… Sovereign Aboriginal nations
can exist within Canada, and they can look to courts for recognition of that sovereignty.”147
To me, Hoehn’s conclusion is somewhat paradoxical in the sense that, on the one hand he
acknowledges that the strictly political nature of reconciling sovereignties identifies the limitation
of the courts ability to fix the problem. Yet on the other hand, he suggests that courts do have the
power needed to recognize Indigenous sovereignty. This paradigmatic shift, burdened by the
necessity of a political task, left me suspicious as to what exactly distinguishes reconciling
sovereignties from recognizing them. It also left me further doubtful about the role of law in
addressing this problem. If politics is ultimately where the potential for a resolution exists, then in
my view Coulthard’s argument has largely settled this debate—unfortunate pun intended.
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In seeking to expand my inquiry into the political realities of the assumption of
territoriality, I turned to the separate works of anthropologist Michael Asch and sociolegal scholar
Mariana Valverde. In his book, On Being Here to Stay, Asch takes the SCC’s definition of
reconciliation to task, first by pointing out the flawed proposition it contains, writing “what at first
blush reads as an open-ended process becomes one based on this singular pre-condition: the
agreement on the part of Indigenous peoples that the scope of their political rights, and in particular
their right to self-determination, is circumscribed by the fact that, at the end of the day, whatever
rights they may have are subordinate to the legislative authority of the Canadian state.”148 By this
point, it is clear that this singular precondition is the assumption of territoriality. In contrast to how
legal scholars have questioned the absence of a justification for this assumption, what makes
Asch’s challenge stand out is the straightforward way he flips the SCC’s definition around, writing
“this logically ought not to be the case, if for no other reason than that the political rights of
Indigenous peoples already existed at the time that Crown sovereignty was asserted and, therefore,
it is the question of how the Crown gained sovereignty that requires reconciliation with the preexistence of Indigenous societies and not the other way around.”149 In this move I find that Asch
exposes the logic of elimination embedded within the assumption that SCC has relied upon.
Asch’s description of the precondition as singular strikes a devastating blow to the
potential of reconciling sovereignties through a paradigmatic shift, because it exposes that the
process of reconciliation is the same predetermined path that the Crown has set out for Indigenous
peoples since the Proclamation. In fact, perhaps it is necessary to go further and propose that as
long as this precondition continues to be relied upon by the courts, there can be no reason to rely
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on the aspirational assumption that continues to be reproduced by the legal literature. Support for
this position is found in seeing that the only conclusion discussed above which did not rely on this
aspirational assumption was the one that also clearly identified the assumption of territoriality
inherent in the SCC’s definition of reconciliation. Again, that conclusion came from John Borrows
who writes “if ‘here’ is principally defined in relation to a reconciliation with magical assertions
of Crown sovereignty, ‘here’ will never be a place where Aboriginal peoples will feel at home.”150
In contrast to how Asch exposes the logic of elimination by inversing the SCC’s reasoning,
I believe Mariana Valverde demonstrates the existence of this logic in her book Chronotopes of
Law151 by pointing out how elimination is being reproduced in both the jurisprudence and the
political space where reconciliation is meant to be implemented. Valverde uses a multidisciplinary
sociolegal framework that updates her previous studies of the honour of the Crown doctrine.152 In
examining “the internal dynamics of the mystical entity named in the doctrine” Valverde writes
“As a matter of legal fact, it is the doctrine that obliges the government to take some measures to
fix the tear in the national fabric. But when the words ‘the doctrine of’ are deleted by judges, and
the words ‘honour of the Crown’ are treated as both the grammatical subject of a sentence and the
motor force of law, a miraculous act, for which the word ‘performative’ is inadequate, is
achieved.”153 Here, Valverde’s analytical approach transcends the identification of logical
contradictions by focusing on how judges concoct different meanings in the words and principles
they use or create.
This view begins to demystify the courts powers, but where Valverde’s analysis is
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particularly insightful is in how it debunks the “miracle” by projecting the practical effects of the
Court’s magic onto the temporal and spatial fields of jurisdiction and social discourse, writing:
[W]hile the doctrine has worked to recognize aboriginal peoples’ dignity and land
rights to some extent, the fact that it does so through the legal technology of ‘the
honour of the Crown’ bars the kind of open-ended heteroglossic dialogue that a
postcolonial society would need… aboriginal nations are barred from exercising
not only sovereignty but even jurisdiction unless such jurisdiction is benevolently
granted to them by governments… There is, in other words, a game of jurisdiction
going on, as well as disputes about resources and control; and all of those
asymmetrical engagements have as a precondition the ‘assertion’ of colonial
sovereignty. That specific forms of spatiotemporality facilitate certain
jurisdictional moves and foreclose others… is fully demonstrated here. 154
Here the logic of elimination is identified by demonstrating how the specific moves of the court in
their reasoning reproduces territoriality and eliminates Indigenous claims to sovereignty and
jurisdiction. What makes Valverde’s identification of this logic slightly different from Asch’s is
that, in addition to pointing out the lack of any justification or reason for the assumption of
territoriality, Valverde demonstrates that its effects are barring Indigenous peoples from having a
proper role in the constitutional dialogue needed for transitioning into a postcolonial era. Recall,
that these are the same prevailing effects that legal scholars have been identifying for decades, yet
lacking an explanation as to why. What the non-legal perspectives of Valverde and Asch point out
is that there simply is no reasonable explanation to be found. In part, what helps them to reach this
conclusion is that they do not seem to give the courts the benefit of the aspirational assumption.
They simply point to the logical contradictions and the violence that it reproduces.
Valverde sums up the contradiction in a way that is similar to Borrows, writing “it is
precisely the incantatory repetition of the phrase ‘honour of the Crown’ that makes it seem as if
the doctrine which is in fact being elaborated in contemporary judges’ words is an ancient legal
fact—though the lack of citations to standard common law sources or legal treatises suggests
154
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otherwise.”155 Emptying out the SCC’s latest and boldest attempt to usher in a paradigmatic shift
for addressing the problem strikes a devastating blow to the aspirational assumption that there is
any potential to be found in the capacity of the courts to correct the problem. When read alongside
Borrows’ more recent analysis of the SCC’s attempt to erase terra nullius, these conclusions draw
our attention back towards the question of whether colonials courts, when all the dusts of mystery
and constructed meaning settles, are simply programmed to reproduce violence.
This question evokes Frantz Fanon’s powerful line that “colonialism is not a thinking
machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state and it will
only yield when confronted with greater violence.”156 There is a tendency, at least for western
theorists I think, to dismiss this latter part of Fanon’s point. Although Tully isn’t responding
directly to Fanon, I think he captures this tendency in part when he writes “it is impractical to
struggle for freedom in deed by direct confrontation, it is possible to struggle in words by
confronting and seeking to invalidate the two legitimating hinge propositions.”157 I read this as
saying, instead of greater violence we need greater reason. However, even if we do see it this way,
this argument again implies the same aspirational assumption without a way to validate it.
Whether in legal or political theory, throughout this review we have seen that this
assumption is becoming less reliable as the doubts and contradictions inherent in the courts’
reasoning continue to pile up. As Coulthard persuasively demonstrates, four decades of
confronting those contradictions, as Tully suggests we do, has not moved Indigenous peoples any
closer to the kind of freedom that they have spent centuries struggling for, but has “in fact
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encouraged the opposite”.158 Such a conclusion leads us to accept Fanon’s conclusion, that the
colonial court is not a thinking machine and that our aspirational assumption is nothing more than
a mirage on the horizon; scholars so thirsty for any sign of justice in the jurisprudence of a settler
colonial legal system that they construct an oasis in each new landmark decision from the SCC.
But is this really the end of the inquiry? Recall that there is still some evidence to support
the alternative, that the courts are aware of their leaps and contradictions. Perhaps if we think
about the people who populate courts, the judges, we might find some evidence of an awareness
and an ability to turn things around. Thus, before we can discard the potential for law entirely, one
last question should be asked: Who are we trying to reason with? Throughout our review of the
legal literature, the assumed answer to this question has been the courts as an institution. But what
about the judge? While we cannot truly know the mind of a judge, political theory allows us to
consider people as political actors and in this Michael Asch’s work is insightful. As I read it,
Asch’s concluding thoughts suggest unlocking the potential of the aspirational assumption will
require more than logical arguments from outside, but self-reflective honesty from within:
[W]hen it comes to reconciliation with Indigenous peoples, the presumption that
‘might makes right’ is not good enough. Rather, it suggests that we begin by asking
ourselves what the shape of a relationship with Indigenous peoples would be were
we to replace the de facto ‘assertion of Crown sovereignty’ with an approach that
asks how that would look were we to base reconciliation on the de jure principle
that, in our way of understanding, it is simply wrong to move onto lands we know
belong to others without permission.159
In contrast to Hoehn’s ‘political task’, Asch’s view here pushes the task of reconciling
sovereignties even further into the political sphere and turns it inwards on the individual settler. I
think this is a necessary turn, albeit one that comes into direct conflict with the present habits of
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the settler to “hide” and “obscure” the reproduction of settler colonial violence. In terms of Asch’s
analysis, I see a problematic in how he maintains a reliance on the role of law (a reconciliation
based on settler legal principles) and by extension the role of the courts to ultimately frame and
referee that exercise. The discussion above has illustrated how this reliance has to this point only
reproduced violence. Therefore, what justifies our reliance on settler law and the colonial courts?
The answer is less than satisfying, but at length Asch’s work suggests it is important to not
abandon our hope in law altogether because, after he dispenses with numerous other fallacies in
the political arguments against fully implementing the self-determination of Indigenous peoples,
he then virtually erodes any hope in a political solution as he reaches the conclusion that:
The self-determination argument puts Settlers in a no-win position. We may be
convinced by reasoned argument that Indigenous peoples have the same right to
self-determination as do other colonized peoples, and the consequence may well be
a recognition on our part that we have no right to stay. Yet, as Lamer aptly
summarized, we are here to stay. Therefore, even though the argument may be
compelling, we are likely to reject it. To ask us to accept that Indigenous peoples
have this right, then, is to virtually ensure that we will ‘choose against it.’160
Asch’s brutal honesty reveals that there is some political truth in the presumption that ‘might
makes right’ which is acutely captured in the colonial context by Fanon’s equation of colonialism
with violence. Further, it seems that Asch is perhaps suggesting that it is this presumption which
Lamer CJC is truly articulating through his oft-cited closing words in Delgamuukw: “Let us face
it. We are all here to stay.”161 If this is so, then it leads inevitably to the conclusion that a structure
of power built on the logic of elimination may be incapable of redefining itself because whatever
principles that law, as the institution tasked with social and political oversight, tries to develop,
they are ultimately at the mercy of the interpretation of the settler colonial government, and the
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majority of settlers themselves, who are likely to reject it to the extent that it compromises their
territoriality. Does this mean that settlers are programmed to reproduce settler colonialism?
Again, it is here where we see how reconciliation facilitates the reproduction of settler
colonial violence, as Tuck and Yang write “Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy,
about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will
decolonization look like? … What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler?”162
It is clear that Asch is engaging these questions through his honesty and careful examination of
the potential of treaty relations to, as he puts it “offer us the means to reconcile the fact that we are
‘here to stay’ with the fact that there were people already here when we first arrived.” 163 While
there is much in Asch’s approach that I agree with, as always, the potential in that approach is held
up by another until moment: until there is honesty from settlers, courts and governments above all.
So again, the potential is based on an assumption that settler courts and governments should
at least be capable of honesty. Unfortunately, when we examine the narrative of reconciliation
being crafted by Canada for evidence to support this assumption, we do not find honesty. Instead,
we find the logic of elimination being reproduced through examples of unilateral moves which
“ultimately represent settler fantasies of easier paths to reconciliation.”164 There are many such
moves being made in this day and age, but I will limit this to the following two examples.
The first one comes from a 2013 speech titled “Defining Moments: The Canadian
Constitution” in which Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin stated “Reconciliation recognizes the
reality that Canada is made up of people of First Nations descent but also people who are
descended, not just from European forbears, but from people from all parts of the globe. Whatever
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our views about that, it is a reality and we must accept it.”165 The second comes from what should
have been a historic speech by the Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs, the Honourable
Carolyn Bennett, officially pledging to the world that Canada intended “nothing less than to adopt
and implement the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in accordance
with the Canadian Constitution” and stating “I firmly believe that once you know the truth, you
cannot unknow the truth. We now know the truth. We know the reality of our shared reality with
Indigenous people in Canada. We now need all Canadians to embark on the journey of
reconciliation.”166 This remark is striking in the context of our review above. But, like Borrows’
inquiry into what Lamer CJC meant by “here” in Delgamuukw, if we look closely, we are left
wondering what do these two very powerful women, and representatives of the Crown’s political
and judicial personas really mean when they say “reality” and “truth”?
First, what is clearly missing in these statements is any hint of the honest questions that
reconciliation requires settlers to ask of themselves. The lack of honesty in Minister Bennett’s
statement on behalf of the Liberal federal government came rushing quickly to the forefront as
Canada immediately began backpedalling on its commitment to implement UNDRIP through
official statements that it was “unworkable”167 even while sharply denying that it was going back
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on its words.168 With that honesty absent, it becomes clear that this rhetoric of reconciliation is
again unilaterally asserting that the “truth” and “shared reality” which Canadians and Indigenous
peoples alike “must accept” is fundamentally based on the assumption of territoriality which still
lacks a legal, factual and moral basis, or even any attempt at a reasonable explanation for why it
is remotely justified. What is further astonishing about these unilateral moves is the clear
foreclosure of dialogue captured by statements like “Whatever our views about that, it is a reality
and we must accept it.”169 Thus, reconciliation is a story to be told by settlers and Indigenous
peoples alike, on the precondition that its concluding chapter is already written entirely by settlers
in a way that guarantees the perfection of settler sovereignty.
By unilaterally imposing the settler reality and truth on Indigenous peoples in this way,
these political statements from high ranking representatives of the Crown, are just forms of settler
colonial violence disguised as progressive calls to action because they again eliminate Indigenous
peoples’ perspectives and voices from the type of honest postcolonial dialogue that Asch’s settler
Indigenous relations approach requires. In doing this they further obscure the actual reality and
truth of the violence that Indigenous peoples continue to demand Canadians acknowledge and
account for. Michi Saagig Nishnaabeg scholar Leanne Simpson vividly captures this:
If Canadians do not fully understand and embody the idea of reconciliation, is this
a step forward? It reminds me of an abusive relationship where one person is being
abused physically, emotionally, spiritually and mentally. She wants out of the
relationship, but instead of supporting her, we are all gathered around the abuser,
because he wants to “reconcile.” But he doesn’t want to take responsibility. He
doesn’t want to change. In fact, all through the process he continues to physically,
emotionally, spiritually and mentally abuse his partner. He just wants to say sorry
so he can feel less guilty about his behaviour. He just wants to adjust the ways he
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is abusing; he doesn’t want to stop the abuse. Collectively, what are the implications
of participating in reconciliation processes when there is an overwhelming body of
evidence that in action, the Canadian state does not want to take responsibility and
stop the abuse? What are the consequences for Indigenous Peoples of participating
in a process that attempts to absolve Canada of past wrong doings, while they
continue to engage with our nations in a less than honourable way?170
There is no denying this reality and truth. If an assumption is to be made at this juncture about the
reasoning faculties of colonial courts and governments on the issue of the Crown’s claim to
sovereignty, then it is here that I would argue a critical component of the kind of settler honesty
demonstrated and demanded by Asch’s treaty relations approach requires, in my view, making the
assumption that Fanon is right to equate colonialism with violence and incapacity for reason.
There are many compelling reasons to assume that the settler colonial state of Canada is
not a thinking machine. And while this conclusion may be made about the state as a structure, I
find that extending this conclusion to the people who work every day to maintain that structure
would understate things and let them off the hook too easily. Chief Justice McLachlin and Minister
Bennett are very intelligent and accomplished women who are quite capable of thinking. The
problem is that they, and their predecessors and contemporaries, have exercised their thinking
capacity in ways that have maintained a power relationship of dominance marked by violence that
deliberately puts Indigenous lives in harm’s way in order to protect the status quo of settlers.
Because Indigenous lives are at stake every day, because settler colonial violence is being
reproduced in every action, what we cannot assume any longer is that Canadian courts, as
structures, are going to always, or eventually, use their power in a manner that is inconsistent with
the elimination of Indigenous peoples. However, whether individual judges, as people are capable
of rejecting this logic and reasoning impartially, is a question that must remain open.
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Thus, in our analysis of the decisions of a judge, we need to place on them the burden to
demonstrate their impartiality. For analytical purposes, this means that when the courts explicitly
or implicitly rely on the assumption of territoriality in their reasoning, and fail to provide a reason
for doing so in their decisions involving Indigenous peoples, particularly those cases where
colonial sovereignty is directly challenged, that such a move is equated with the reproduction of
settler colonial violence. In other words, the colonial court may not be a thinking machine, but we
should leave open the possibility that the human judge sitting on the bench is.
Conclusion
In 2017, Canada is celebrating 150 years of transforming violence into law, jurisdiction and
sovereignty. As Arthur Manuel explains in his latest essay, when this celebration is viewed for
what it is “Indigenous Peoples need to be careful NOT to honour the 150 years of colonization
because this will validate the racism that is implicit in Canadian colonialism. Instead,” continues
Manuel “Indigenous Peoples and Canadians who believe in human rights need look at Canada’s
150th Birthday Party as [a] period to undertake a commitment to decolonize Canada and recognize
the right of Indigenous Peoples to self-determination.”171
Throughout this chapter we have reviewed plenty of evidence to support Manuel’s claim
that Canada is a settler colonial state and that this structural characteristic “is deeply engrained in
the entire constitutional and legal fabric of Canada.”172 We have traced this logic of elimination
from the blatantly racist justifications in the Bagot Report of 1845-47 and the Pennefather Report
of 1858, we have seen it embedded within the hard-fought struggle for “recognition” and the
entrenchment of Aboriginal and Treaty rights into the Constitution, we have traced this logic’s
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evolution through the development of the Aboriginal rights jurisprudence, and we have now seen
it contained within the long-awaited declaration of Aboriginal title and even the formal adoption
of UNDRIP. While the language has changed, and new progressive sounding principles and
discourses have emerged, what matters is that substantively Canada has not shifted one iota from
the primary objective of territoriality it asserted in 1763. In fact, what this retrospective of the
reasoning and the dozens of different scholarly writings have demonstrated is that the logic of
elimination has driven both courts and governments alike to be as creative as possible in
maintaining the project of settler colonialism, even to the point of declaring, absurdly, that terra
nullius never applied in Canada and that they know the “shared reality” of settler colonization.
This kind of record leaves little room for the aspirational assumption to be relied upon in
politics or law. When looked at in light of settler colonial studies and the empirical work of Ford,
Harris, Pasternak and Coulthard, this record raises serious questions about the potential that the
latest paradigm shift in Aboriginal rights jurisprudence has for ushering in a true era of legal
pluralism and mutual recognition that respects an uncompromised right to self-determination for
Indigenous peoples as called for by UNDRIP.
At length, we need to accept, as Arthur Manuel has stated we must, that Canada is a settler
colonial state and that its institutions are presently committed to protecting its exclusive claim to
territoriality by reproducing the logic of elimination in their policies and decisions. However, we
must also remain open to the possibility that separate from institutions, that the people living under
a settler colonial regime, if they undertake an honest examination of themselves and their
obligations, are capable of rejecting this logic and using their creativity and innovation to construct
new and more positive discourses and relations that respect and protect the existence of Indigenous
peoples, their laws and their authority. I view this as a major theme and call to action reflected
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throughout Manuel’s book, Unsettling Canada: A National Wake-Up Call in which he writes:
The land retains its power and its beauty. All we have to do is rethink our place on
it. Simply by removing the shadow of the doctrine of discovery, you find a rich
tapestry of peoples who need to sit down to speak to each other as equals and build
a new mechanism to co-operate with each other, to satisfy each other’s needs and
aspirations in the modern world. There is room on this land for all of us and there
must also be, after centuries of struggle, room for justice for Indigenous peoples.
That is all that we ask. And we will settle for nothing less.173
Significantly, this message of co-existence, justice, peace and equality is one that was prominently
put by his father, Grand Chief George Manuel, forty years earlier in his book The Fourth World:
An Indian Reality in which he writes:
The greatest barrier to recognition of aboriginal rights does not lie with the courts,
the law, or even the present administration. Such recognition necessitates the reevaluation of assumptions, both about Canada and its history and about Indian
people and our culture – assumptions with which people have lived for centuries.
Real recognition of our presence and humanity would require a genuine
reconsideration of so many people’s role in North American society that it would
amount to a genuine leap of imagination. The greatest preservative for racial myths
is the difficulty of developing a new language in which the truth can be spoken
easily, quietly, and comfortably.174
Again, this same message is one that can be traced back to the Memorial to Prime Minister Sir
Wilfrid Laurier written by the Chiefs of the Secwépemc, Nlaka’pamux, and Syilx Nations in 1910
who, in accordance with their laws and desires for peace, initially responded to the invasion of
settlers with good will stating “These people wish to be partners with us in our country. We must,
therefore, be the same as brothers to them, and live as one family. We will share equally in
everything half and half in land, water and timber, etc. What is ours will be theirs, and what is
theirs will be ours. We will help each other to be great and good.”175 Unfortunately, this vision of
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mutual recognition and coexistence was ignored by violence and the unilateral imposition of a
settler colonial legal and political order and the Chiefs responded by declaring:
So long as what we consider justice is withheld from us, so long will dissatisfaction
and unrest exist among us, and we will continue to struggle to better ourselves. For
the accomplishment of this end we and other Indian tribes of this country are now
uniting and we ask the help of yourself and government in this fight for our rights.
We believe it is not the desire nor policy of your government that these conditions
should exist.176
Grand Chief George Manuel described the catastrophic effect of this on the Secwépemc, writing
“Within my own lifetime I have seen my people, the Shuswap nation, fall from a proud state of
independence… to a condition of degeneration, servitude, and dependence as shameful as any
people have ever known.”177 But, continues Grand Chief George Manuel “I have also seen my
people make the beginning of the long, hard struggle back to the plateau that is our proper place
in the world.”178 In making that struggle to reclaim the inherent right to self-determination his
life’s work, Arthur Manuel writes in the closing of his book “This is where we are now heading.
We invite all Canadians to join us to help move the final obstacles together. We can accomplish
this as friends and partners as we have at times in the past. Or we can do it as adversaries, in
anguish. Our path toward decolonization is clear. It is up to Canadians to choose theirs.”179
This is the kind of message that Canadians could be celebrating today and into the future.
But what stands in the way of a pluralistic and mutually respectful society in these lands, is Canada
itself. As a settler colonial state it is the opposite of the multicultural, inclusive and diverse country
that it repeatedly tells itself and the world that it is. While the door to decolonization remains open
for Canadians to be honest with themselves and to reject settler colonialism in all of its forms, it is
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most critical to acknowledge that Indigenous peoples have kept that door open through their
tireless resistance from the first moment of colonization. For this reason, it is to these voices and
the theory and practice of Indigenous resurgence that we turn to explore in the next chapter as we
continue to develop our discussion ahead of an analysis of the role of the courts in resolving
disputes involving Indigenous blockades.
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Chapter 3: Indigenous Resurgence and the Rule of Law
These models put the hens in charge of the hen house and the fox under interrogation.
If it is truly time to talk “reconciliation,” then how we reconcile is critically important.
I can see no evidence whatsoever that there exists a political will on the part of the
state to do anything other than neutralize Indigenous resistance, so as not to impinge
upon the convenience of settler-Canadians. The only way to not be co-opted is to use
our own legal and political processes to bring about justice…
Our liberatory and inherent theories of resurgence also do not tell us to persistently
search through the web of colonial traps for settler political recognition and to
gleefully accept white paper liberalism designed to redistribute resources and rights,
placating the guilt of settler Canadians and neutralizing Indigenous resistance. Our
inherent theories of resurgence are transformative and revolutionary. They are meant
to propel and maintain social, cultural and political transformative movement through
the worst forms of political genocide; and I think it is important to understand them as
such.180
— Leanne Betasamosake Simpson,
Dancing on Our Turtle’s Back, 2011
As discussed in the first chapter, the history of Indigenous resistance is one that is often found
when we read between the lines of the one-sided versions of history recorded by the colonizers
who define Indigenous peoples as “Savages”, whose “ignorance” and “remarkable fondness for
spirits” justifies their dehumanization and dispossession of land.181 We know these rationalizations
are more than just racist stereotypes, but that they are driven by a logic of elimination that seeks
to perfect settler sovereignty and territoriality. As touched upon in the last chapter, we also know
that by acknowledging and listening to the Indigenous perspective we can begin to see more
sharply how this logic is deeply embedded in Canada’s official legal story and the decades of legal
reasoning that has shaped the jurisprudence on Aboriginal rights. When we take a closer look at
that official story we see that Indigenous resistance has been, and is still a part of the national
narrative.
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We see that the flawed promise of “Protection” under the Proclamation in 1763 was
significantly influenced by Indigenous resistance through the uprising known as Pontiac’s War.182
We see that when the promise of “Protection” was never kept, Indigenous resistance took the form
of petition after petition to stop the destruction of their lands and that settlers responded with a
policy of “gradual civilization.”183 We see that when the policy proved to be inefficient for the
settlers and they introduced the “Potlach Law”184 that Indigenous resistance took their criminalized
practices and ceremonies underground, as Leanne Simpson writes:
My ancestors resisted by simply surviving and being alive. They resisted by holding
onto their stories They resisted by taking the seeds of our culture and political
systems and packing them away, so that one day another generation of Michi
Saagiig Nishnaabeg might be able to plant them. I am sure of their resistance,
because I am here today, living as a contemporary Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg
woman. I am the evidence. Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg people are the evidence.
Now, nearly two hundred years after surviving an attempted political and cultural
genocide, it is the responsibility of my generation to plant and nurture those seeds
and to make our Ancestors proud.185
Since inaction, assimilation and criminalization had all failed to eliminate Indigenous peoples, the
settler colonial state started to set up a system of “recognition”, which, as Grand Chief George
Manuel writes, was a “process of granting recognition with one hand and taking it away with the
other… a policy that led to a complete denial of Indian title.”186 When many Indigenous Nations
refused to be fooled by this colonial trap, they resisted by hiring lawyers to bring claims for
Aboriginal title, and again Canada reacted by making it an offence “to raise funds for the purpose
of pressing any Indian claim.”187 Eventually, criminalization was repealed in 1951, but, as George
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Manuel writes, the reasons for the repeal “did not lie in convincing the Parliament of Canada of
our humanity. It lay in the fact that the tradition of the potlach never died. The organizing and
coming together of people to work for our common goals never stopped.”188
Indigenous resistance is, and always has been, how the door for peace and respect for
humanity stays open. It has never been about convincing the settler colonial state to provide
accommodations for or to “recognize” Indigenous peoples. The last two chapters have attempted
to make it clear that studying, and practicing Aboriginal rights jurisprudence is broadly about
learning the latest in settler colonial state technology and innovation for transforming violence into
sovereignty, jurisdiction and law. The turning point in the broader argument of this thesis is this:
I believe that if legal scholars want to begin to understand law as a pathway to peace and respect
in the context of the settler colonial state, then we need to start by studying law through the praxis
of Indigenous resurgence, why it supports the necessity of direct action and how its practices create
sites of jurisdictional conflict that offer us an opportunity to expose how the courts are reproducing
the logic of elimination in their judgements.
What is Indigenous Resurgence?
Like the study of settler colonialism, Indigenous resurgence is also an emerging field of
intellectual, scholarly and grassroots activity. Of those writing in this field, I consider the works
of Mohawk scholar Taiaiake Alfred189 and Michi Saagig Nishnaabeg scholar Leanne Simpson190
provide the foundational theorization, while the works of Dene scholar Glen Coulthard,191
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Mohawk scholar Audra Simpson192 and Secwepemc authors and scholars Janice Billy193 and
Arthur Manuel194 provide us with greater detail into the specific practices and forms that
Indigenous resurgence can and should take on the ground. In this section, I will focus on sketching
out the theory of Indigenous resurgence before turning to some of the specific forms and practices
that it takes.
Indigenous resurgence is a theory and practice of decolonization “on our own terms,
without the sanction, permission or engagement of the state, western theory or the opinions of
Canadians.”195 It more than just a rejection of the settler colonial traps of liberal recognition, rather,
as Leanne Simpson writes, it moves “beyond resistance and survival to flourishment and mino
bimaadiziwin.”196 Taiaiake Alfred also makes this point, writing “The challenge for those of us
seeking to move beyond mere survival, to engender social and political movements taking us to a
place beyond colonialism, is to convince Onkwehonwe to draw on our inherent and internal
resources of strength and to channel them into forms of energy that are capable of engaging the
forces that keep us tied to colonial mentality and reality.”197 For Alfred, both the attitudes and
actions of Indigenous resurgence are “actions of a certain type, actions that restore the selflessness
and unity of being that are at the heart of indigenous cultural life, that reject individualistic and
materialist definitions of freedom and happiness, and that create community by embedding
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individual lives in the shared identities and experiences of collective existences.”198
Finding the energy and strength within is both the objective and the first action to be taken,
as Simpson writes “If this approach does nothing else to shift the current state of affairs—and I
believe it will—it will ground our peoples in their own cultures and teaching that provide the
ultimate antidote to colonialism… Transforming ourselves, our communities and our nation is
ultimately the first step in transforming our relationship with the state.”199 Importantly, there is a
self-awareness of how the energy and strength of the individual is invested, as Simpson writes “I
have spent enough time taking down the master’s house, and now I want most of my energy to go
into visioning and building our new house.”200 In this sense, it is critical to see Indigenous
resurgence as a theory of decolonization that is distinct from the study of settler colonialism for it
is not strictly defined by confirming the existence of settler colonial violence and identifying its
many evolving practices.
In the same sense, it is important to distinguish Indigenous resurgence from decolonization
as understood by Frantz Fanon who describes it as “clearly an agenda for total disorder” that “can
only find its significance and become self coherent insofar as we can discern the history-making
movement which gives it form and substance. Decolonization is the encounter between two
congenitally antagonistic forces that in fact owe their singularity to the kind of reification secreted
and nurtured by the colonial situation.”201 While Fanon is correct in saying that the existence and
necessity of Indigenous resistance is inextricably wrapped up historically with the invasion and
continued occupation of settler colonialism; it is important to see that Indigenous resurgence as a
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theory and practice of regenerating “traditional values” is not similarly framed as a mere response
to the violence of settler colonialism, as Coulthard writes “the resurgence paradigm defended by
Alfred and Simpson does not require us to dialectically transcend Indigenous practices of the past
once the affirmation of the practices has served to reestablish us as historical protagonists in the
present.”202 Distinguishing Indigenous resurgence in this way is also important to separate its
practices from being generalized as representing the “greater violence” that Fanon theorizes is the
confrontational force required to overthrow colonialism. There can be no doubt that settler
colonialism is violence in many forms, but Indigenous resurgence is substantively greater than
violence, as Coulthard puts it “Indigenous resurgence is at its core a prefigurative politics—the
methods of decolonization prefigure its aims.”203
From this theoretical basis emerges a number of methods and practices of Indigenous
resurgence emerge, but for the purposes of this thesis, we turn now to focus specifically on the
form of direct action typically referred to as a “blockade” and seek in particular to understand the
argument made for the necessity of this action to the broader resurgence of Indigenous peoples.
The Necessity of Direct Action
As discussed above, the narrative of Indigenous resistance is the obscured half of Canada’s official
legal story. As Kiera L. Ladner writes, this narrative is being told through many forms of
Indigenous resistance ranging “from legal actions to public marches or demonstrations on the
lawns of government buildings, and from Métis armed insurrections to protesting uranium
exploration. Such struggles have even presented themselves as suicides.”204 In this way, the form

202

Coulthard, supra note 13 at 154.
Ibid at 159.
204
Kiera L. Ladner & Leanne Simpson, “This is an Honour Song” in Leanne Simpson & Kiera L. Ladner, eds, This
is an Honour Song: Twenty Years since the Blockades (Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring Publishing, 2010) at 2-3, [Ladner
& Simpson].
203

69

that resistance takes ranges from individual to collective, as Ladner writes “[e]very single
Indigenous nation in Canada has a long history of resistance.”205 In this it must be assumed that
every nation has their own ways of resisting that are germane to their culture and history.
By the same measure, no form of resistance is more important than another, but they can
be distinguished and this is where the necessity of blockades as a form of resistance resides. As
Ladner explains, the Kanien’kehaka resistance at Kanehsatà:ke and Kahnawà:ke in the summer of
1990 (the Oka Crisis) “was different” from other forms of resistance because of the impact it had
through the “powerful images every night on the news for months—images that became a defining
moment for many of us. Images that generated unprecedented Indigenous response in the form of
solidarity blockades across Turtle Island.”206 There are many factors beyond the media coverage
for why the Oka Crisis stands out as such a significant expression of Indigenous resistance. These
range from the historical and geopolitical significance of that place as one of the first expressions
of coexisting settler colonialism (the French Crown and Jesuit missionaries) and military alliance
with Indigenous peoples207 to the surreal deployment of the Canadian military against their former
Haudenosaunee military allies 270 years later—who, it must be remembered, without them the
British would not have conquered the French in 1760 and Canada would not have defended itself
against the Americans in 1812; and, in a word, Canada would not exist—all to protect the possible
addition of 9 holes to a golf course.208
While the Oka Crisis epitomizes the elimination of Indigenous peoples for the purpose of
protecting the most trivial of settler interests, what stands out the most about the Oka Crisis is that
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its impact reached far beyond its immediate spatial and temporal limitations, both in the form of
solidarity blockades across the continent, as well as through the ongoing consequences which
include the commission that produced RCAP.209 In all of these factors and effects, the Oka Crisis
is an event where the many complexities of settler colonialism, across Turtle Island, were suddenly
made visible to Canadians and Indigenous peoples alike. It shocked a part of their moral
consciousness that the logic of elimination is intended to leave confused and disoriented.
This is part of the power inherent in the blockade as a form of resistance. It not only disrupts
the settler colonial state on many levels—economic, social, political and legal—but can in some
cases reverse its momentum by prompting an honest self-reflective turn. The inherent power of the
blockade also makes it a lightening rod of controversy, particularly in discourses of Indigenous
resistance, as Glen Coulthard explains “With respect to those approaches deemed ‘legitimate’ in
defending our rights, emphasis is usually placed on formal ‘negotiations’—usually carried out
between ‘official’ Aboriginal leadership and representatives of the state—and if need be coupled
with largely symbolic acts of peaceful, nondisruptive protest that abide by Canada’s ‘rule of
law.’”210 The result of this, continues Coulthard, is that “forms of ‘direct action’ that seek to
influence power through less mediated and sometimes more disruptive and confrontational
measures” are “increasingly deemed ‘illegitimate’” and worse, despite “their diversity and
specificity… tend to get branded in the media as the typical Native ‘blockade.’ Militant,
threatening, disruptive, and violent.”211
Engaging this debate directly, Coulthard identifies and responds to three arguments that
are typically used to delegitimize forms of direct action. The first argument is that “negotiations
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are, objectively speaking, simply more effective in securing the rights and advancing the interests
of Indigenous communities.”212 In response, Coulthard writes “This is simply false. Historically,
I would venture to suggest that all negotiations over the scope and content of Aboriginal peoples’
rights in the last forty years have piggybacked off the assertive direct actions—including the
escalated use of blockades—spearheaded by Indigenous women and other grassroots elements of
our communities.”213 The second argument follows a line of reasoning that holds “these tactics
disrupt the lives of perhaps well-intentioned but equally uninformed non-Indigenous peoples, First
Nations will increasingly find themselves alienated and our causes unsupported by average,
working-class Canadians.”214 In response, Coulthard makes two points: First, that “getting this
reaction from the dominant society is unavoidable… Power and authority have been unjustly
appropriated, and much of it will have to be reinstated. This will inevitably be very upsetting to
some; it will be incredibly inconvenient to others.”215 Second, continues Coulthard “this criticism
or concern smells of a double standard. I suspect that equally ‘disruptive’ actions undertaken by
various sectors of, for example, the mainstream labor movement, including job actions ranging
from the withdrawal of teaching, transit, and healthcare services to full-blown strike activity does
not undergo the same criticism and scrutiny”.216
The third argument relates particularly to blockades, which Coulthard frames as follows
“On the surface, blockades in particular appear to be the epitome of reaction insofar as they clearly
embody a resounding ‘no’ but fail to offer a more affirmative gesture or alternative built into the
practice itself. The risk here is that, in doing so, these ressentiment-laded modalities of Indigenous
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resistance reify the very structures or social relationships we find so abhorrent.” 217 It is important
to note that this argument lines up with the theoretical tensions that distinguish Indigenous
resurgence from other decolonization practices. Coulthard’s response to this argument begins from
this distinction and is critical to understanding blockades as a practice of Indigenous resurgence:
This concern, I claim, is premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of what these
forms of direct action are all about… Forms of Indigenous resistance, such as
blockading and other explicitly disruptive oppositional practices, are indeed
reactive in the ways that some have critiqued, but they are also very important.
Through these actions we physically say “no” to the degradation of our
communities and to exploitation of the lands on which we depend. But they also
have ingrained within in them a resounding “yes”: they are the affirmative
enactment of another modality of being, a different way of relating to and with the
world. … They embody through praxis our ancestral obligations to protect the lands
that are to who we are as Indigenous peoples.218
As I read it, Coulthard’s broader thesis situates direct action, including the diverse range of tactics
that are branded as “blockades”, as a practice that is necessary to Indigenous resurgence. In the
context of the discussion so far, this places Indigenous resurgence, and blockades, in direct tension
with the discourse around what forms and approaches should be considered “legitimate” and
consistent with what Canadian law considers to be the “rule of law.”
To my view, in the “no” and “yes” aspects of the blockade as Coulthard describes, there is
a mirrored reflection of Patrick Wolfe’s description of the negative and positive dimensions of
settler colonialism: Negatively they reject or seek dissolution of an old structure; positively they
seek to construct and affirm a new structure and society. When viewed as a practice, it is possible
then to compare and Indigenous blockades and the role of the settler colonial courts along the lines
of their respective claims to be inaugurating authority, jurisdiction, law and obligations.
In seeking to engage this question of what forms of inaugurating jurisdiction and law
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should be deemed “legitimate” and consistent with the “rule of law,” we need to first examine in
greater detail the particular claim that Indigenous blockades embody an assertion of Indigenous
authority, jurisdiction, law and control over territory. From there we can set out the basic
framework of jurisdiction and the rule of law itself which will set up the discussion for our final
chapter which engages in a case-review of some of the leading blockades decisions in Canadian
jurisprudence.
Indigenous Blockades
As Coulthard explains, the “blockade” as a general term is a product of media branding which can
now immediately trigger negative connotations and images of militancy, threats and violence.
From the outset it must therefore be noted that the “blockade” takes many forms and attempts to
generalize them should be avoided, a caution which is frequently repeated in the literature.219
Despite this caution, if one generalization should be made based on the literature, it is that
blockades involve an expression of Indigenous relationships to their land and can be properly
understood, first and foremost, as expressions of Indigenous authority, control and Indigenous law.
Support for this assertion is found in three characteristics of almost every blockade I have
witnessed or reviewed in the scholarship: 1) The long history of their use against outsiders; 2)
Their physical occupation and control of land and resources; and 3) Their complex underbelly
encompassing all the social and political variables and costs of resistance and struggle.
In his comprehensive historical and contemporary review of blockades for the Ipperwash
Inquiry, John Borrows notes that their use predates the arrival of Europeans and was based in well-
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developed systems as part of an array of legal, political and diplomatic mechanisms “that
Aboriginal peoples employed to secure their resources.”220 After the arrival of Europeans, blockades

were used strategically and creatively in the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the
European powers during the eighteenth century as a way of reminding the Europeans of their
tenuous position and dependence on the military strength of Indigenous peoples in the geopolitical
struggles for control of Turtle Island.221 In specific cases, blockades were used to continue
reasserting independence as colonial surveyors divided up lands for settlement.222 Thus, long
before and long after the arrival of Europeans, blockades have consistently been a primary way
that Indigenous peoples continue to assert and exercise control and authority over resources and
relationships in connection with a physical space: their land. There is nothing to indicate that
blockades have ever been removed or disconnected from existing Indigenous legal and political
orders. In fact, the literature shows the opposite; Indigenous blockades continue to be clear
expressions of Indigenous law and territorial authority.
In almost every inventory or review that I have looked at, blockades are described as a
physical occupation of land.223 This generic description is partly why generalizations should be
avoided, because it simply does not capture the complexity of the authority and relationships at
work; both in the geography of the blockade,224 but in the political and social narratives behind

John Borrows, “Crown and Aboriginal Occupations of Land: A History & Comparison” (Research Paper
Commissioned by the Ipperwash Inquiry, 15 October 2005) [Borrows, Occupations] at 5.
221
Ibid at 9-10. See also: R v Sioui, [1990] 1 SCR 1025 at 1052-54, [Sioui]. (The Court in Sioui acknowledges in
detail the military and diplomatic strength of the Indian Nations and the pivotal role they played in shaping the
outcome of the Seven Years War between France and Great Britain.)
222
Borrows, PhD, supra note 1 at 167.
223
Borrows, Occupations, supra note 220 at 22; Peter H. Russell, “Oka to Ipperwash: The Necessity of Flashpoint
Events” in Leanne Simpson & Kiera L. Ladner, eds, This is an Honour Song: Twenty Years since the Blockades
(Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring Publishing, 2010) at 29. [Russell, Flashpoint]; Hodgins, Blockades, supra note 219.
224
Blomley, Blockades, supra note 219.
220

75

it.225 Nicholas Blomley’s review of blockades in BC over a 15-year period situates blockades
within a contemporary geographical frame of resistance through control of land describing “a
blockade as an attempt to interfere with the flow of people and/or commodities through the
placement of an obstruction, either partial or complete.”226 Filling in the intricate textures of
culture, politics, kinship relations, meaning, autonomy, law and responsibility Blomley writes:
For the decision to blockade is further sustained and justified with reference to a
complex set of cultural understandings inherent to Native peoples. If a blockade
serves to deny logging trucks access to a disputed area, in other words, that action
may be justified not only in terms of the protection of a disputed economic resource,
narrowly defined, but also in terms of the innate right of a people to manage its
own affairs and a non-negotiable mandate from the Creator to protect lands that it
holds in trust.227
This point extends to the use of blockades as part of a number of efforts engaged in the
community’s ongoing struggle, not only to assert their authority, but to uphold their obligations
under Indigenous law. Significant to Blomley’s review of dozens of blockades is that he situates
it within the decision-making structures of the community, writing “while renegade blockades do
occur, they seem to be the exception. Generally, it seems, blockades are established after wide
deliberations within a band and, on occasion, with neighbouring bands or a full Council.”228 Again,
this emphasizes the legitimacy of the blockade within the legal and political orders of the
Indigenous community that is engaging in the form of direction action.
Another point that is clear in the literature is that today blockades are the ongoing
affirmation of an organized Indigenous resistance to the invasion of settler colonialism. This
visible form of resistance is seen in the fact that nearly every blockade in the last fifty years has
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been deeply connected to acts of dispossession and destruction of Indigenous lands, resources and
economies through the use of force that is routinely sanctioned by the legal system.229 Despite this
singularity throughout history, as Fanon might view it, it is critical to note that the literature on
blockades also supports Coulthard’s claim that blockades are about more than just a reaction to
settler colonialism, but that they represent a positive affirmation of Indigenous resurgence.
John Borrows captures this in his most recent work writing “the continued eruption of civil
(dis)obedience demonstrates that Indigenous peoples will not retreat from taking a direct role in
trying to construct their place in the world.”230 The constructive role that blockades play is a
response to what Borrows, in earlier work, described as a “major flashpoint” that arises from “the
lack of recognition and acknowledgement of Aboriginal perspectives and historical rights to land
and resources.”231 In a closer review of these flashpoints, Peter H. Russell expanded on their nature
and underlying causes, writing “The flashpoint event occurs when members of the Aboriginal
community see that the government, without settling the long-standing dispute, is permitting
activities to take place that ignore Aboriginal interests in the area and, in effect, deny Aboriginal
or treaty rights.”232 These same causes are reflected in findings from two-years of hearings by the
Ipperwash Inquiry in which Commissioner Linden concluded that blockades are clear evidence of
the failure of the Crown to deal with the systemic problems that cause them, stating “The frequency
of occupations and protests in Ontario and Canada is a symptom, if not the result, of our collective
and continuing inability to resolve these tensions consistently.”233 Without taking away from the

229

Borrows, Occupations, supra note 220 at 3.
Borrows, Freedom, supra note 2 at 102.
231
Ibid at 24.
232
Russell, Flashpoint, supra note 223 at 29.
233
Honourable Sidney B. Linden, Commissioner, Report of the Ipperwash Inquiry, vol 4 (Toronto: Attorney General
of Ontario, 2007) at 79, online: <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/ipperwash/index.html>.
[Ipperwash Report].
230

77

important findings of the Ipperwash Inquiry, it must be noted that it should not take a multi-million
dollar Royal Commission to reach this conclusion, given that Nicholas Blomley reached the same
conclusion 11 years earlier, writing that blockades “speak to a systemic and enduring failure on
the part of the dominant society to accommodate the legitimate demands of colonized peoples.”234
While there are many affirmative points to be made about blockades, it is necessary to
understand that in the discourse around the “legitimacy” of these diverse forms of direct action,
that this discussion properly takes place within respective Indigenous communities and therefore,
as Kiera L. Ladner writes “it is important to understand that resistance often has an underbelly—
stories of a community divided and stories which serve to divide a community. It is important to
acknowledge that underbelly.”235 Val Napoleon captures what largely goes unseen to outside
viewers through a series of stirring and heart-breaking vignettes about the figures and people
behind the blockades that she has personally known, writing:
At their best, these blockades and direct political actions enabled narratives wherein
despair and anger was channeled into resistance and meaningful demands for
justice… After and beyond the blockades, the many acts of violence and selfdestruction in the stories can also be characterized as continued forms of resistance
against the erasure of meaning-making. But we must consider who is bearing the
cost of these acts of resistance.236
What Napoleon reveals through her stories is that blockades are not simply acts of resistance, but
that they can harbour a space where settler colonial violence can be reproduced that is kept internal,
to the individuals and communities involved. As Napoleon puts it “Blockades and other direct
political actions include the myriad human experiences, good and bad, positive and negative, that
form the stories we hold.”237 The significance of acknowledging the blockade in its entirety,
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particularly in the context of a discussion around “legitimacy”, is that it reminds us that these
actions are never taken lightly or easily. They are acting out sacred and legal obligations under
Indigenous law that take into consideration the variety of costs and consequences for the individual
or community involved that can ripple outwards for generations.
In spite of the costs, blockades continue to be a course taken in increasing frequency. In
examining this dynamic, what emerges is another argument for their necessity which Russell
situates in a basic lack of any political and legal alternative path to justice, as he puts it “They do
not deliver full justice, but they do put a stop to furthering an injustice. … so long as political
negotiations and litigation fail to stop injustices or provide timely and adequate resolution of
disputes about the rights of Aboriginal Peoples and the treaty obligations of governments,
flashpoint events, despite their adverse aspects, will be necessary.”238 In this, the necessity of the
blockade to Indigenous resurgence provides us with a strong direction to study them in contrast
with the parallel development of Aboriginal rights jurisprudence.
In setting up this contrast, the first point to note is that in almost every leading decision in
Aboriginal rights jurisprudence there is a presumptive unlawfulness applied to the physical actions
that Indigenous peoples perform. As Shin Imai puts it, most of the leading cases “began as
relatively minor prosecutions for breaches of regulatory statutes. In R v Sparrow the fishing net
was too long; in R v Badger the First Nation hunters were on private land; in R v Van der Peet ten
salmon were sold without a licence...”239 This fact already aligns with what Lisa Ford identifies as
the principle practice of the settler colonial courts in constructing settler sovereignty “the exercise
of jurisdiction over indigenous crime performs the myth of settler sovereignty over and over.

238

Russell, Flashpoint, supra note 223 at 45.
Shin Imai, “The Adjudication of Historical Evidence: A Comment and an Elaboration on a Proposal by Justice
LeBel” (2006) 60 UNB LJ 146 at 146. (Case citations omitted).
239

79

Sovereignty as territorial jurisdiction defines the parameters of indigenous rights to this day”240
By this fact alone, Aboriginal jurisprudence is already a space where the long standing tradition of
criminalizing and oppressing Indigenous resistance, law and authority for the sole purpose of
maintaining the settler colonial state is kept alive and well.
While these cases are not exceptional through the lens of settler colonialism, what makes
them exceptional for Canadian jurisprudence is that “It is rare, outside of the Aboriginal context,
for offences such as these to be considered by the Supreme Court of Canada. Convictions usually
result in relatively light non-penal penalties and most cases are settled through plea bargains before
they go to trial.”241 Now, within that already exceptional group of cases in Canadian law, what sets
blockades decisions apart from all of the other physical actions that Indigenous peoples take in
their struggle to have their rights recognized is that the physical action that is being presumptively
criminalized is not trying to feed yourself, or build a shelter, or generate a little bit of a local
economy; it is the irreducible act of physically occupying space and embodying a relationship with
the land that the settler colonial state has not eliminated. It is a claim to authority over land that
rejects the assumption of territoriality that has been constructed and relied upon by the settler
colonial courts in order to reproduce the myth of settler sovereignty. It is, to apply Coulthard’s
framing, a simple “No” to the existence of settler sovereignty, and a “Yes” to the existence of
Indigenous peoples. Through the blockade, Indigenous peoples have taken the fundamental act of
continuing to affirm their existence and have used it to express an incredible range of complex
aspects that are fundamental to who they are as Indigenous peoples. The action of a blockade not
only expresses these things in the present, but it transcends the fundamental barriers of time itself
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by projecting the past and the likely future of generations to come if a resolution to the pathology
of settler colonialism is not found. As Leanne Simpson writes “Something must be done now—
before another twenty years pass… Our hope is that something is done. This is not what we want
for future generations.”242
Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law
The blockade itself is a unique site where the past, present and future claims of Indigenous peoples
to exist comes into direct conflict with the existence of the settler colonial state. Each time the
blockade enters a court of law, the judge or judges presiding over the dispute are inevitably tasked
with an existential crisis of authority. In these moments, the legitimacy of the rule of law and the
legitimacy of the settler colonial state are juxtaposed as the jurisdictional question is put under the
microscope. Examining how judges deal with this moment is the central inquiry to be undertaken
as we examine some of the leading blockades cases. In this section I set out the framework by
which the jurisdictional issue can be identified in judicial decisions and how the legitimacy of the
rule of law in each case can be examined.
As the discussion above has set out, a legal analysis of blockades begins with the
conceptualization of these juridical sites as a struggle over jurisdiction, as Shiri Pasternak writes
“at the heart of this encounter, is a conflict over the inauguration of law—or the authority to have
authority—and the specific forms of struggle that arise when competing forms of law are asserted
over a common space.”243 Similarly, Wapshkaa Ma'iingan (Aaron Mills) projects the problem as
one “about sharply different legal orders imposing differing (and often conflicting) sets of
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obligations on the same group of people.”244 What we see in comparing these descriptions is that
the jurisdictional lens allows us to see how the blockade expresses both the spatial and relational
aspects of law at the point where it is being claimed to exist.
The key here is that we are focused on the point where law is exercised. This gives our
framework for legal analysis a primary question, as Shaunnagh Dorsett and Shaun McVeigh
explain “to exercise jurisdiction is to bring law into existence… We can, therefore, consider
jurisdiction as the first question of law, because it asks whether law exists at all, and thus
determines what can properly be considered law.”245 When put this way, the analytical lens of
jurisdiction allows us to untangle the competing claims of Indigenous peoples and Canada by
focusing on the inaugural and singular point of law—where it is exercised. This is the point where
law comes into existence. Starting with this point allows us to identify analytical sites where we
can examine the legitimacy of the competing claims of authority through the primary question:
Does law exist?
There are two main sites of analysis that jurisdiction enables us to identify in the context
of a blockade: The first is the blockade itself, the physical presence on land, where Indigenous
peoples claim jurisdiction over that space by exercising it on the ground. The second is where the
settler colonial state claims jurisdiction through its executive, legislative and judicial branches
carrying out a variety of practices, including the granting, or enforcing, of legal interests to land
through leases, injunction orders, the arrest of Indigenous peoples and ultimately the destruction
of the blockade. Now, while jurisdiction allows us to identify these two sites for analysis and gives
us a primary question to ask, it does not give us the tools necessary to evaluate the legitimacy of
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the competing claims. Those tools can only come from the particular rules that govern the existence
and legitimacy of the law being asserted.
Of these two sites, the claim we are focused on in this thesis is that of the settler colonial
state which is asserted through the judge who in presiding over the blockade assumes the
jurisdiction to do so based on an obligation to uphold the rule of law. The reason for this is twofold: First, the literature on blockades is sufficient to support the generalization that Indigenous
law exists at the site of the blockade. Further, as the discussion above has pointed out, in order to
investigate the legitimacy of the blockade and whether Indigenous law was properly inaugurated,
we would need to gather knowledge relevant to the Indigenous Nation whose laws are being
asserted through the blockade. This task is not only outside the scope of the existing literature, but
also this project. Second, absent the assurance that Indigenous law exists on the blockade, the
problematic identified throughout this thesis is whether the courts are reproducing settler colonial
violence in blockades cases by relying on the logic of elimination in a way that effectively causes
the disappearance of Indigenous peoples, in law, in order to affirm the assumption of territoriality.
Therefore, the issue of legitimacy we are asking in each case is whether the judge or judges
presiding over a blockades case have exercised their judicial authority in a way that is consistent
with the rules that govern the use of that authority. The lens of jurisdiction allows us to answer this
question, because it “gives us the form and shape of law and the idiom of law… This is the ‘diction’
part of the term ‘jurisdiction’. When we think about an idiom we are thinking about the language
and style of talking about law.”246 Thus, to inaugurate law and exercise it, there must be a
performance of it. Because jurisdiction has technical meanings247 I find it helpful to also refer to
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it in its literal translation as “the power to speak the law.”248 In doing so I seek to emphasize that
the irreducible element of jurisdiction that we are analyzing here is its performance.
We know that in form the authority of a judge is performed through spoken or written
reasons. Thus, in analyzing the judge’s power to speak the law, we are looking at the judicial
decision. Broadly, I take the set of principles and rules which govern the legitimacy of this
performance of jurisdiction to be the rule of law. There are many views about the rule of law.249
In the context of analyzing judicial decisions from a rule of law standpoint, a useful starting point
is the distinction that David Dyzenhaus has articulated between rule of law and rule by law in the
context of the judge’s role in a “wicked legal regime” effectively meaning, in this context, a
political and legal order that is aptly characterized by settler colonialism.250 Essentially, in
Dyzenhaus’ case-study of judicial decisions under apartheid South Africa, the notion of rule by
law is characterized when a segment of society is oppressed and excluded from the benefit or
participation in the traditions of a liberal democracy.251 An example of this under apartheid was
the subjection of blacks to laws passed by a legislature whose members were elected by a system
that blacks could not vote in.252
The negative effect of rule by law is that it undermines the legitimacy of the political sphere
and the justification for the independent judicial sphere to be partially, or wholly deferential to the
political and democratic powers of governance.253 While there are near identical parallels between
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the settler colonial states of apartheid South Africa and Canada an analogy is not necessary to
apply Dyzenhaus’ distinction when we recall that there is a deliberate exclusion of Indigenous
peoples from the benefit of the living tree doctrine, the creation of barriers to their engaging in the
constitutional dialogue and an entire jurisprudence on Aboriginal rights that is, without question,
wholly deferential to the political powers. Furthermore, the rule by law also explains many of the
aspects of Canada as a settler colonial state which have been identified above. Thus, we can see
that there is clearly a case to be made that the rule by law concept applies to Canada. But what of
the aspirational assumption?
If there is support for an aspirational assumption to be found in legal theory, it exists in the
concept of the rule of law, which Dyzenhaus explains holds out a “bare promise” for those who
are struggling against oppression “to achieve full rights of political participation” through
“extraparliamentary politics.”254 Thus, even in a situation as democratically insufficient as
apartheid South Africa, Dyzenhaus’ case-study tells us that it is still possible to identify places
where the rule of law is being kept alive by looking for it in the decisions of judges, as he writes
“it mattered a great deal both that there was a legal order and that judges were committed to
upholding the rule of law. Even the commitment of plain fact judges mattered in this regard, as
their willingness to uphold rule by law helped to maintain the possibility for the rule of law to be
realized by judges who adopted the common law approach.”255 Notably, in applying the distinction
here, Dyzenhaus associates the rule of law with judges who take the common law approach, and
the rule by law with judges who are more positivist or highly deferential to the political powers.
The twist for analyzing the problem of Canada as a settler colonial state through the rule
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of/by law frame provided by Dyzenhaus is that the Aboriginal rights jurisprudence is a primary
example of Canadian courts applying the common law approach. Yet, they have chosen to use
their creative common law powers to usher in an age of equality for some members of society,
while forcing only Indigenous peoples—who are already the most vulnerable polity—to negotiate
their place in society. Therefore, while Dyzenhaus’ frame provides us with a sliver of support for
holding on to the aspirational assumption, if we can identify that the rule of law is being upheld in
a judicial decision, we cannot answer the question of legitimacy with this frame alone because
what appears to be the rule of law could in fact be a rule by law.
As a result, we need to expand the definition of the rule of law within this distinction. In
the context of the judge’s role, I take the rule of law to be fundamentally about safeguarding against
arbitrariness by requiring both a fair process and sufficient reasons whenever power is exercised.256
The necessity of reasons, in this context, is particularly critical to the legitimacy of the form in
which the judge’s power to speak the law is exercised, because as Dorsett and McVeigh explain,
reasoning is “concerned with persuasion between equals, force is concerned with domination.
Authority gives people reasons to submit.”257 This distinction between reasons/equality with
force/domination in analyzing the form that power over others is asserted, fits nicely with
Dyzenhaus frame to give us a distinction we can apply when approaching the question of
legitimacy. Thus, rule of law is characterized by reasons and equality, while rule by law is
characterized by force and domination.
We know from the discussion above that settler colonialism is characterized by violence
(force), a power relationship of domination and a practice of racism (inequality). Thus, the settler
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colonial state, for the most part, falls into the rule by law category. But what of the existence of
reasons as evidence that the rule of law is being upheld? This is the site where our discussion about
the logic of elimination and the aspirational assumption come into direct conflict with each other.
In analyzing the reasons of a judge, if the logic of elimination is identified, then we can say that
the rule by law description applies and that there is no evidence to support the aspirational
assumption that the rule of law, and its “bare promise”, is being upheld.
Conclusion
The blockade case represents a site where the “frontier homicide” of settler colonialism continues
to live on through the exercise of jurisdiction and presumptive criminalization of Indigenous
peoples who continue to stand up, assert and exercise their jurisdiction over their lands. At the
centre of the blockade is a direct conflict over jurisdiction, or rather, who rightly holds the power
to speak the law over the contested space.
From this point of tension, the central questions of this thesis emerge at last: What happens
when the blockade enters the courtroom? How does the judge deal with the existential crisis before
them that threatens to undermine the settler colonial state’s assumption of territoriality? Does the
judge perform the power to speak the law in a way that is consistent with the rule of law? Or does
the judge rely upon the logic of elimination in a way that reproduces settler colonial violence
against Indigenous peoples?
Relying on all of the discussion to this point, these are the questions that we will attempt
to answer as we turn now to an analysis of many of the leading blockades cases in Canadian law.
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Chapter 4: Indigenous Blockades and the Power to Speak the Law
This chapter analyzes a selection of leading blockades cases in Canadian law. The choice to
analyze blockades cases has been discussed at length above, but in brief, blockades cases represent
a juridical site where the primary dispute is a conflict between competing jurisdictional claims to
the same territory by Indigenous peoples and the settler colonial state. The question to be focused
on in a legal analysis of these cases is whether the judge, or judges, exercise the power to speak
the law in a way that is consistent with the rule of law, or whether the logic of settler colonialism
is relied upon to affirm settler sovereignty and expand the state’s territoriality by eliminating
and/or criminalizing the expression of Indigenous jurisdiction through the blockade.
Some points have already been made above that inform the selection of the cases, but in
brief, all of these cases (except one) are situated in unceded territory, meaning they are in places
where no treaty has been signed between the Crown and the Indigenous Nation. The significance
of this factor, central to what distinguishes the exceptional case, is that the settler colonial state’s
assumption of territoriality is truly an assumption, while the pre-existence of the jurisdiction and
ownership of the respective Indigenous nation, prior to “discovery”, is a historical fact. Beyond
this factor, these cases have been chosen based on either their status as precedent (that is they have
not been overturned and have been adopted by other courts in other jurisdictions) and/or their
specific relationship to the leading cases in Aboriginal rights jurisprudence. On this point, as
discussed above, the heralded decisions of Delgamuukw, Haida Nation and Tsilhqot’in Nation are
regularly discussed and analyzed for their impact on Aboriginal rights and title jurisprudence.
While the doctrines attract much attention and generate much intellectual activity in the worlds of
lawyers, corporations, scholars and governments alike; what I have found throughout this project
is that the struggle that was responsible for bringing the cases forward in the first place is often left
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behind as just a part of the context, if it gets mentioned at all. I see this as a serious disconnect that
the literatures on settler colonialism and Indigenous resurgence reveals. Thus, while these
blockades cases offer us sites for a unique comparative analysis to the momentous decisions in
Aboriginal law, I wish to state that in selecting them as a focal point of analysis is my way of
acknowledging that they contain a central part of the legal story underlying these major decisions
that often gets lost, or eliminated, as the jurisprudence, and the corresponding analysis, develops.
In light of the discussion above around the uniqueness of each community’s struggle and complex
underbelly, I want to point out that in researching and providing context for these cases I have
drawn from the published accounts available, and within those accounts have chosen to prioritize
the voices of those who were on the ground, experiencing the struggle first hand.
In terms of order, I begin with the precedent setting case of R v Manuel258 which takes
place in Skwelkwek’welt, a sacred mountain space in Secwepecmùl’ecw, the unceded territory of
the Secwepemc Nation. This case is useful for seeing the jurisdictional conflict amidst a variety of
complicated factors and power dynamics at play which are explained by Arthur Manuel who was
Chief of the Neskonlith Indian Band during the blockade. The second case takes place in unceded
Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en territory and was peripheral to the Aboriginal title case in Delgamuukw.
This case highlights the explicit awareness of the judges to the fundamental conflict between
jurisdictional claims and examines how they engaged, or failed to engage, the question in an
impartial way. The third case takes place on the unceded island of Haida Gwaii and was peripheral
to the paradigm shifting case in Haida Nation. The reasoning of the judge in this case offers us an
important comparative through which we can analyze the value in the paradigm shift that took the
Haida Nation 20 years to achieve. The fourth case is the only case that is not in British Columbia.
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It takes place in unceded Algonquin territory and was precedent setting for its impact in ushering
in significant statutory changes to Ontario’s mining regime. The fifth case takes place in unceded
Tsilhqot’in territory and is a peripheral case to the landmark declaration of Aboriginal title in
Tsilhqot’in Nation. This case stands out as good comparative to the other cases because of how
the judge chose to deal with the “uncertainty” of the legal status of Aboriginal title.
The sixth and last case is the SCC’s decision in Behn.259 This case stands apart from the
others for two important reasons: First, it takes place in Treaty 8 territory, on the traditional lands
of the Fort Nelson First Nation (FNFN). This distinction means that the assumption of territoriality
is less uncertain, depending on the interpretation of the Treaty and its legitimacy. However, what
must also be kept in mind is that this increased level of certainty exists because of Treaty 8 and
should not be extended to jurisprudence that deals with unceded lands, particularly if it is done for
the benefit of the settler colonial state. Second, this case is unique because, at the time of this
project, it is the only Indigenous blockades case to be heard by the SCC.260 In this respect, it is an
important site of analysis because, while the case has now become a leading authority on
Indigenous blockades, it has largely flown under the radar in terms of its impact on Aboriginal
jurisprudence. My review of the commentary of the Behn decision has not revealed any substantial
analysis of this potential impact. The most significant comment I found was by John Borrows in a
footnote of his recent work where he described Behn as a “prominent example of the Supreme
Court’s failure to recognize individual exercises of Indigenous law.”261 From what we know about
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blockades, this is a clear conclusion to be made, but what we are still missing is an explanation for
that failure and analysis into whether the decision in Behn could impact Aboriginal rights
jurisprudence beyond the blockades context.
Skwelkwek’welt: Seeing the Violence in the Jurisdictional Conflict
In order to visualize the jurisdictional conflict in the context of a blockade and how it creates the
space for transforming settler colonial violence into law through the logic of elimination, it is
necessary to get a sense of what is actually playing out from the ground to the courtroom.
In his book Unsettling Canada, Arthur Manuel describes the events that took place while
he was the Chief of the Neskonlith Indian Band that were related to the Skwelkwek’welt Protection
Centre in the mountainous interior of so-called British Columbia. This was a peaceful blockade
that was set up to assert Aboriginal title and protect a pristine area of Secwepemc territory that
Manuel describes as “one of the last places in our territory where we can still hunt for food, gather
medicines, and continue to practice other Secwepemc cultural traditions.”262 In the late 1990s and
early 2000s, the area was threatened by the proposed development of “an all-season mega-resort,
an instant city of condos, hotels, and restaurants” called Sun Peaks.263 Explaining the extensive
impacts of the project, Manuel writes “The pressure of tens of thousands of tourists descending on
a mountain ecosystem would be immense; the water, sewage, and garbage needs of the resort
would all take their toll, forever changing the plant and animal habitats of these pristine mountain
ecologies.”264 A novel aspect of this project, from a jurisdictional perspective which serves to
reinforce the immense scale of the development, was that the government of British Columbia
actually “invented a new administrative structure they called a ‘mountain resort municipality.’
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This designation gave Sun Peaks municipal powers, even though it did not have enough permanent
residents to justify them.”265 After several unsuccessful attempts to deal with the Province and
Nippon Cable, the Japanese company behind the development, Secwepemc Elders and youth put
up a small protest camp in the fall of 2000.266 The BC government responded in June of the
following year by issuing “a lease to Sun Peaks for the land our camp was located on.”267 Shortly
after Sun Peaks sought an injunction and, in July “the police moved in.”268 Four people were
arrested, including two Elders; all were charged with criminal contempt for “refusing to leave the
camp.”269 As the conflict escalated, so too did the expressions of racism-fueled violence, and with
those expressions came fear, as Manuel explains:
[W]hen twenty members of the Native Youth Movement walked through the village
signing traditional Native songs and calling for a moratorium on the development,
several young white guys on a bar terrace began shouting racial slurs at them. One
of the men strode off the terrace and approached the Native youth shouting,
“Fucking Indians, get off our land!” and “You want war? Come on!” He swung
several punches in the direction of one of the young men, then directed his attention
to my daughter, Niki, shouting at her and, finally, hitting her in the face.
The police moved in and arrested not the man who had committed the assault, but
my daughter. Later, a cabin in the woods that the protestors were living in was
burned down, and our people began to receive threats of violence if we entered
nearby towns. After fanning this local anger, the resort began leading a call for mass
arrests of the protestors and went back to the courts to get another round of
injunctions against us. Once again, Elders and youth were arrested. It was
infuriating for our people to see eighty-three-year-old Irene Billy led away in
handcuffs for the crime of occupying her own family trapline.
…
By this time, the tensions were not only with the white community, but also within
our own. In Neskonlith, and even more so in other Secwepemc communities, people
began to have a genuine fear of white backlash and government reprisals. This last
fear was felt most acutely by the chiefs. They were in the business of delivering
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government programs and services, and it is at moments like this that our
dependency becomes most evidence. Some understand that the only way out is to
break that dependency once and for all, to assert our right to our lands and begin to
build true Indigenous economies on our territories. Many others test the wind and,
if it is blowing too strong, flee back to their subsistence benefactor at Indian Affairs,
which pays their salaries as well as the community program funding.270
As the conflict ensued, over 50 members of the Secwepemc Nation would be arrested for
occupying their own land leading to charges and convictions, and five Secwepemc homes and
structures built as part of the Skwelkwek’welt Protection Centre “were bulldozed or burned down
by the resort or by persons unknown. None of these acts were investigated by the police.”271
For Manuel, the wide net of criminalization captured many people in his family, including
his daughter who was jailed for 60 days and “was separated from her four-month-old baby boy”
who was left in Manuel’s care.272 The experience of having to make weekly trips to and from the
jail so that his grandson could continue drinking his mother’s milk had a deep emotional impact
on Manuel, as he writes:
I remember feeling not so much anger as shame for the whole system that had
produced this situation. This is not just how whites treat Indians, I thought, it is how
they treat each other. If I needed any inspiration to continue to try to get back our
people’s birthright, our land and our independence, taking my grandchild to the
Burnaby jail for those brief visits with my daughter was more than enough.273
The Skwelkwek’welt Protection Centre offers up many issues and problems that can be identified
at several points in time throughout the course of this blockade through a variety of legal, political
and sociolegal approaches. The immediate problem that faces an analysis of this event is that it
can be quickly overwhelmed by a variety of factors which are all likely to be relevant to the
question being asked. However, no matter how many factors there are, in cases like this the
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singularity that binds settler colonialism and Indigenous resistance as antagonizing forces emerges
so strongly that there is very little room to see how a true compromise between these competing
claims could ever be achieved through any form of “negotiations”.
This is where the argument for the necessity of direct action finds full purchase. It is also
where the rule of law, if it is upheld, is critically important for avoiding a literal “war” over claims
to territory, as the white racist bar patron so readily threatened. Unfortunately, the use and
formation of power in this context falls into the category of rule by law for how it repeatedly
demonstrated its capacity to perpetuate settler colonial violence by creating legal spaces for it to
take place. This not only took place through police inaction in relation to assaults and arsons
committed against Secwepemc people doing nothing more than existing on their lands. It also
occurred through the convenient lease of unceded and blockaded lands granted by the BC
government to Sun Peaks. This was followed quickly by an injunction order from the court, which
in turn lead swiftly to the arrests and criminalization of dozens of Secwepemc people, including
many Elders and youth. Finally, escalating spin-off violence and threats from the white/settler
community sparked fear and political divisions within the Secwepemc communities themselves.
Several years later, the British Columbia Court of Appeal (BCCA) heard an appeal on the
criminal convictions stemming from the blockade in the case R v Manuel.274 There are multiple
ironies in the case, beginning with the fact that because of the formality of the criminal justice
system, the two Secwepemc women, mother and daughter whose home had been one of those
which had been burned to the ground, could only argue the defence of colour of right. This required
proving that they were honestly mistaken in their belief that they were standing on unceded
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Secwepemc territory and acting in accordance with valid Secwepemc law.275
As the BCCA summarized, the trial judge “found that the appellants’ belief in the law of
the Creator was not a belief in law but in a moral right (at para. 27) and their belief in title to the
land was a belief about what should be or ought to be (at para. 32).”276 In upholding the trial judge’s
decision, the BCCA relied on the uncertainty of Canadian law in formally recognizing Aboriginal
title over that area, stating:
The issue in this case was whether the appellants’ beliefs that title to the land gave
rise to a legal right to block Sun Peaks Road were honest, in light of their knowledge
that the legal rights claimed by them were unadjudicated and unconfirmed in law
(taking into account all of Canadian law, including the aboriginal perspective,
aboriginal legal systems, and Canadian common law and criminal law), and
conflicted with established common law property rights. It was not a matter of
choosing one system of law over another, or of rejecting the appellants’ beliefs
because aboriginal title had not been established. The question was whether there
was any reasonable doubt that the appellants’ honestly believed they had the legal
right to block Sun Peaks Road in light of the uncertainty and conflict of legal
rights.277
In analyzing the court’s reasoning here, a problem should first be identified with the very
formulation of the colour of right defense as the only one available to the accused in their
circumstances. Here it can be seen that this form of defense already implies a presumption of guilt
based on the court taking as established facts that the land the accused were standing on and the
laws they were abiding by, were not and could not be recognized in law as Secwepemc. In this
way, this very formulation of the defense meets Lisa Ford’s litmus test for settler statehood: “the
legal obliteration of indigenous customary law.”278 In terms of the logic of elimination, the
formulation of this defense represents how the assumption of territoriality is conveniently
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embedded within some of the very forms of criminal law.
There is also in this passage, and its broader context, an effective illustration of what the
legal theorist Robert Cover described as the violence of legal interpretation, writing:
Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the imposition of violence upon others:
A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his
freedom, his property, his children, even his life. Interpretations in law also
constitute justifications for violence which has already occurred or which is about
to occur. When interpreters have finished their work, they frequently leave behind
victims whose lives have been torn apart by these organized, social practices of
violence. Neither legal interpretation nor the violence it occasions may be properly
understood apart from one another.279
Reading Cover’s theory in the context of the logic of elimination, what we identify with better
clarity is one of the practices—judicial interpretation—that a judge might use to transform violence
into law for the purposes of eliminating Indigenous peoples.
In looking at the court’s reasoning, the violence is performed in this case by interpreting
the words “uncertainty and conflict of legal rights” to literally mean certainty of the territoriality
of the settler colonial state and the elimination of any Secwepemc legal rights, thus removing
altogether the question of whether there is “a conflict” between legal rights. Notably, this same
practice performs the replacement element of settler colonialism by affirming the certainty of the
common law property rights of a newly created municipal resort authority which were convenient
recent creations of the settler colonial state to expedite land development and eliminate Indigenous
resistance. In the end, the BCCA transforms violence into law by making a ruling that relies on
the non-existence of Secwepemc authority and law, and the effective elimination, in Canadian law,
of what the court explicitly acknowledged was the possibility of a legal right to Aboriginal title.
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The Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en Nations: Competing Claims to Jurisdiction
As Val Napoleon explains, the precedent setting Aboriginal title case in Delgamuukw was deeply
rooted in the coordinated resistance of Indigenous peoples from across Canada who were
strategizing on how to continue advancing their claims in the wake of the Calder decision.280
Perceiving that they were being excluded from negotiations, in 1977 the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en
issued the Gitksan-Carrier Declaration which asserted “ownership and jurisdiction over 25,000
square miles of Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en Territory.”281 In contrast to this external expression of
authority, Napoleon explains that internally “there was a deliberate, and partially successful, effort
to shift local political authority away from the band council system to the Gitksan kinship system
of matrilineal House groups with hereditary chiefs as legal holders of the House territories
according to Gitksan law.”282 This is the underbelly of the struggle.
In 1984, the legal action that would become Delgamuukw was filed and it would be three
years before the 374 day trial would begin.283 Significantly, while this “massive and extremely
costly”284 trial was underway, the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en nations were still having to set up
blockades to try and stop logging companies from continuing to clear cut swaths of timber over
what they hoped would eventually be recognized by the courts as their land.285 Typically, the on
the ground conflicts captured by these blockades are quickly made subject to injunction orders
through an expedient process before a motions judge. We will analyze some of these motions
decisions in later contexts. But in looking at the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en struggle we look
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specifically at the BCCA’s decision in Westar to see that the courts were well aware that
underlying both the peripheral blockade case and the central title case were the competing claims
to jurisdiction by both the settler colonial state and the Indigenous Nations.
In the Westar appeal, the three judges on the panel each issued separate reasons and varying
dispositions, but they were all clear that the central issue in the case was the jurisdictional question.
Justice Carrothers writes “The Gitksan claim constitutes a direct challenge to the sovereignty of
the Crown and the validity of its laws.”286 Justice Esson expands on this by acknowledging that
the jurisdictional issue is dispositive of the outcome of the case, writing “to grant in injunction in
the circumstances of this case is tantamount to finding that the Gitksan are entitled now to act as
though such rights have been established.”287 Lastly, Locke J.A. not only frames the problem in
line with the other two, but also disposes of the issue without engaging it, stating “there is in the
case at bar a direct collision between the right of ownership of the Crown, solemnly confirmed by
the law, and the claim of the Gitksan to own the same land. The extent of the collision will have
to be adjudicated upon by the Supreme Court. The plaintiffs ask very specifically for all the rights
of sovereignty including control of the natural resources.”288
In analyzing these statements, what must be identified first is that each of the three judges
have consciously acknowledged that there is a real legal conflict between the competing claims to
jurisdiction. First, they acknowledge that there is an assertion to Indigenous sovereignty,
jurisdiction, laws and authority. Second, they acknowledge the possibility that this assertion could
be found to be true by the SCC. Third, they acknowledge that if such an assertion were true, that
it would directly conflict, or displace, the Crown’s own assertion to the same. And finally, they
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acknowledge that they don’t have jurisdiction to decide this legal conflict.
Identifying these factors brings to light how the logic of elimination was then relied upon
to eliminate what had just been acknowledged and perform jurisdiction, contrary to their admission
that they did not rightfully have or were not willing to exercise, to resolve the conflict. This was
done through the words “solemnly confirmed by law” which specifically results in a finding of
fact that Indigenous sovereignty does not exist and Crown sovereignty does. This speaks directly
to the disposition of the case at bar and upholds the Crown’s exclusive access to territory and
unilateral control over the natural resources.
By acknowledging on the one hand that they were avoiding the jurisdictional question,
while effectively answering the question in order to resolve the case in the Crown’s favour, the
BCCA undermined both their legitimacy as impartial adjudicators and the rule of law. When
looked at in comparison to the eventual Delgamuukw decision, we can start to see how this
avoidance is ultimately underwritten into the problematic that Borrows identifies in his analysis of
that decision. The SCC was, or ought to have been, well aware that the jurisdictional issue was
being fundamentally raised by the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en Nations and that it needed to be
resolved by an impartial adjudicator. Yet, in setting out the doctrine of Aboriginal title, it “conjures
fictions”289 which not only avoids the issue, but actually embeds it within the doctrine unresolved.
The effect of this is not limited to just embedding the logic of elimination within the
doctrine of Aboriginal title, but it problematizes the legal fiduciary remedies and the exclusively
political remedies of negotiation, consultation and reconciliation that the doctrine provides a basis
for. It is here where the “bare promise” that the rule of law in Canada is deeply problematized, if
it can be said to meaningfully exist in the jurisprudence on Aboriginal rights.
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However, when we take the longer view, we see that almost 40 years since the GitksanCarrier Declaration there still hasn’t been a legal or external recognition of the Gitksan and
Wet’suwet’en title and jurisdiction. We also see that 20 years since the Delgamuukw decision that
the internal struggle over the authority to engage in the political remedies continues to be impacted
by this,290 as Val Napoleon writes “Years later, tensions between the imposed Indian Act band
council system and the Gitksan kinship system continue and remain unresolved and conflicted.”291
The internal struggle of leadership and representation is a problem that must be
acknowledged by this analysis from the outside, even though it cannot be solved from the outside.
The reason for this is because it further problematizes the political remedies by raising greater
uncertainty about who is the proper authority to represent the collective rights and title of
Indigenous nations. This is an important question, but again, as I explain in the conclusion, it
cannot, and likely should not, be answered through legal analysis because the answer can only
come from the community itself defining and applying their own laws.
The Haida Nation: From Haida Jurisdiction to the Duty to Consult
Following Delgamuukw, the Haida Nation case is well known for establishing reconciliation, the
honour of the Crown and the duty to consult and accommodate as primary doctrines of Aboriginal
jurisprudence. However, like Grand Chief George Manuel’s assessment of the repeal of
criminalization, this perceived paradigmatic shift is not a result of convincing the Court of the
humanity of Indigenous peoples, but of the relentless struggle and direct actions of the Haida
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Nation as evidenced by the critical blockades of Moresby and Lyell Islands during the 1980s
against logging companies.292 The short oral decision of McEachern C.J. (the same trial judge who
presided over the Delgamuukw case) in Skidegate293 allows us to contrast the legal doctrine the
Haida Nation is known for and what the Haida Nation have been fighting for. This allows us to
consider whether the Haida Nation’s jurisdiction was supplanted by the Crown’s duty to consult.
In Skidegate, McEachern C.J. was faced with the situation that the Haida people had
peacefully and deliberately ignored an injunction order to take down the blockade granted to the
logging company Western Forest Products. Similar to the Westar case, McEachern C.J.
simultaneously acknowledges and refuses to answer the central jurisdictional question that was
being raised by the blockade, as he states:
Mr. Justice McKay made it clear beyond any doubt that he was not pronouncing on
the question of ownership of or title to Lyell Island or to aboriginal rights, but he
advised those appearing before him that as matters now stand Lyell Island, and
indeed all of the Queen Charlotte Islands, are a part of British Columbia and subject
to its laws. He did not purport to deal with the question of ownership, nor do I.294
Here McEachern C.J. explicitly relies on the assumption of territoriality in order to eliminate any
substantive legal interest the Haida Nation have to sovereignty and ownership, as well as any
procedural right they might have to challenge the Crown’s claim to the same. Again, the violent
effect of this performance of law is the disappearance of the Haida Nation’s jurisdiction, in order
to affirm that of the Crown’s.
In this, McEachern C.J.’s reasoning falls within a rule by law description which, as the rest
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of the decision unfolds, becomes conflated with his reference to the rule of law. This first occurs,
in how he frames the actions of the Haida people by stating “if the Haida people can disobey the
law then presumably others can also disobey the law, and that would be the end of a social order
and civilization as we know it.”295 Here we see elimination being performed through the clear
assertion that the settler colonial state is the only normative social order. From this assertion,
McEachern C.J. is then able to exercise jurisdiction over the Haida people by declaring the
presumptive unlawfulness of their actions (the blockade). Informing this jurisdictional move is the
bald assertion of their normativity captured by reference to the rule of law, as McEachern C.J.
states “Everyone who thinks about these matters will have no difficulty concluding, as I do, that
the rule of law which protects us all and which provides the solution to all disputes is infinitely
more precious than the rights or claims of any group or individual.”296 Notably, this is another
example of the practice of judicial interpretation that we saw being used in R v Manuel, except in
this case, McEachern C.J. is drawing on his normative conclusions to interpret the “rule of law” in
a way that eliminates any space in law for the existence of the substantive and procedural rights of
the Haida Nation to assert or exercise their laws. In McEachern C.J.’s reasoning, neither the Haida
people nor their jurisdictional dispute is included in the definition of “all.” They are simultaneously
eliminated as a people while being subjected to the settler colonial legal order. This is rule by law.
To this point, McEachern C.J.’s reasoning follows the logic of elimination to its
conclusion: the settler colonial state’s assumption of territoriality is affirmed as true, while the
existence of the Haida Nation’s sovereignty and authority, and even the possibility of proving its
existence, are eliminated.
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When we situate this decision within a longer view of the Haida Nation’s struggle, we find
the beginnings of a troubling refusal of the court to justify its legitimacy as safeguarding the rule
of law, and those who appeal to it from the unilateral and unequal powers of the political sphere.
This tension emerges in McEachean C.J.’s conclusion which explicitly leaves all of the problems
raised in his court to be dealt with exclusively by the political forum, as he states “They have
challenged the rule of law directly, and they cannot expect that this challenge can go
unanswered.… They have achieved maximum results from confrontation, for the Attorney General
has indicated a willingness to meet with them when disobedience ceases.297 Again, there is a
strange dissonance between McEachern C.J.’s “rule of law” and what is generally regarded as the
rule of law in how he acknowledges a challenge to the rule of law that he is tasked with upholding,
yet refuses to meet that challenge and leaves it to be dealt with through negotiations.
In hindsight we know that those negotiations failed to meet the Haida Nation’s challenge
to the rule of law and so they ended up back in court where they argued that the ongoing destruction
of their lands will render their existence as Haida people “irretrievably despoiled” by the time they
prove their Aboriginal title claim.298 On the other side, the government of BC argued that the Haida
people had no legal rights.299 In resolving the dispute by elevating the primacy of the duty to
consult to one that applies to prima facie claims to Aboriginal title and rights, the SCC also
remodeled the doctrines of the honour of the Crown and of reconciliation. Where, 20 years ago the
Haida people had to engage in a blockade in order to secure negotiations with the Crown, now, the
SCC held that the “honour of the Crown requires negotiations” and that the agreements (or
“Treaties”) which result from these negotiations “serve to reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal
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sovereignty with assumed Crown sovereignty”.300 Before setting out its discussion of the new duty
to consult, the SCC closes with a clear statement of what these paradigm shifting doctrines
recognize and the linear, predetermined process they secure:
Put simply, Canada’s Aboriginal peoples were here when Europeans came, and
were never conquered. Many bands reconciled their claims with the sovereignty of
the Crown through negotiated treaties. Others, notably in British Columbia, have
yet to do so. The potential rights embedded in these claims are protected by s. 35
of the Constitution Act, 1982. The honour of the Crown requires that these rights
be determined, recognized and respected. This, in turn, requires the Crown, acting
honourably, to participate in processes of negotiation. While this process
continues, the honour of the Crown may require it to consult and, where indicated,
accommodate Aboriginal interests.301
What must be noted is that when the changes in the normative language of the courts is stripped
away, the fundamental legal existence of Crown sovereignty and the current non-existence of
Indigenous sovereignty has not—despite explicit acknowledgements of its pre-existence. All that
has been gained in 20 years of struggle is that the necessity of exercising Haida jurisdiction through
a blockade to secure negotiations with the Crown, has now been supplanted by the duty to consult.
While I know that it may be controversial to say, I would argue that this transformation
performs the same act of settler colonial violence through a novel application of the logic of
elimination. By refashioning the legal duty to consult into a practical tool for governments and
industry to use when seeking access to Indigenous territories, the SCC greatly expanded the settler
colonial state’s territoriality by creating a clear division between Indigenous jurisdiction over
territory and settler jurisdiction over territory. The result of this is that the approach of negotiations
is now deemed to be the “honourable” or “legitimate” approach, while the former approach of
blockades is cast out, and becomes an “illegitimate” approach.
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This argument suggests that the legitimacy of the settler colonial state, which the Haida
Nation directly challenged through their resistance on the blockades, is being maintained by a logic
of elimination embedded in the doctrines of reconciliation, the honour of the Crown and the duty
to consult. What is more troubling, as we will now discuss, is how these doctrines have been relied
upon by courts, government and industry alike to justify the expansion of settler colonial
territoriality while reinforcing the assertion that an exercise of Indigenous jurisdiction through a
blockade is presumptively unlawful.
Robert Lovelace and the KI 6: The Presumptive Criminalization of Indigenous Law
The blockades at the centre of the precedent setting Ontario Court of Appeal (ONCA) companion
decisions in Frontenac Ventures302 and Platinex303 are excellent examples of Indigenous law being
exercised through blockades. The decisions of the motions court judges are revealing of how the
logic of elimination can crudely masquerade as the “rule of law” and perform the myth of settler
sovereignty by explicitly criminalizing expressions of Indigenous law. Despite the precedent set
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by the ONCA in overturning and rebuking the motions judges, an analysis of the ONCA’s
reasoning reveals that the same logic of elimination is still being reproduced in a way that is
carefully encoded in the progressive language of reconciliation and negotiation.
In Frontenac, the Ardoch Algonquin First Nation (AAFN) had exercised Algonquin law
by issuing a moratorium on uranium mining and then set up a blockade to enforce it. Injunction
orders were issued by the court and deliberately ignored leading to a charge of civil contempt of
court which resulted in punitive fines and jail time. At the sentencing hearing, Robert Lovelace,
former Chief of the AAFN, explained the authority for the moratorium and the blockade as follows:
The authority for this particular moratorium lies both with the AAFN Algonquin
First Nation -- Mr. Perry was our representative Elder who after hearing consensus
within the community and at the Family Heads Council -- and it also comes from
the authority of William Commanda who is the principal Elder of all of the
Algonquin people, and after he considered it, after he talked with the people that
are important to him and the Algonquins that he feels are -- are representative of
the Algonquin voice, then he also gave his hand to signing that moratorium.304
What is important to acknowledge in this statement is the lengths to which Chief Lovelace goes to
explain and trace out the legitimacy of the moratorium as an expression of Algonquin law.
However, this effort was ostensibly wasted in the mind of the motions judge Cunningham J. who
reacted to the suggestion that Algonquin law has any legitimacy, by writing in his decision:
Mr. Lovelace says that while he respects the rule of law, he cannot comply because
his Algonquin law is supreme. He says he finds himself in a dilemma. Sadly, it is a
dilemma of his own making. His apparent frustration with the Ontario government
is no excuse for breaking the law. There can only be one law, and that is the law of
Canada, expressed through this court.305
Here, settler sovereignty is explicitly performed, not only through the elimination of Algonquin
law, but through a declaration that it is contradictory to the “rule of law” as Cunningham J. defines.
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Notably, this exchange, between blockader and judge, was deliberately reproduced by the
ONCA in its decision and was directly related to its reasons for overturning Cunningham J. on the
basis that he “did not address the other dimensions of the rule of law referred to in Henco.”306 What
are these “other dimensions of the rule of law” and is it possible that they include a space for
Indigenous law? Sadly, the answer is no. To briefly see this, Henco was a decision before the
ONCA released two years earlier that involved a blockade set up by the Haudenosaunee Six
Nations in opposition to the development of claimed lands.307 Much has been written about this
blockade, particularly the disturbing notions of the “rule of law” held by the settler community
expressed through their strong reaction to the blockade.308 This notion was effectively captured by
the motions judge Marshall J. who opened his decision by stating that he was “reading this
judgment in open court because it is a matter of such importance to the communities and to this
court. Ladies and gentleman we speak of the rule of law.”309 Having seized the opportunity,
Marshall J. then waxed at length (without reference to authority or precedent) about his own
perspectives on the “rule of law” before applying them to strongly rebuke, first the governments
for engaging the Six Nations in negotiations as a result of the blockade, then the police agencies
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for not enforcing his injunction order by immediately arresting the blockaders.310
Now, in situating what the “other dimensions of the rule of law” would come to represent
when the ONCA defines them in Henco, it is critical to compare this with the precedent that we
saw taking place in the Skidegate case, then affirmed by Delgamuukw and Haida Nation, that
positioned negotiations and consultation as the only “legitimate” remedies available to Indigenous
peoples when dealing with settler governments and industry that want to access their territories.
Here, Marshall J.’s “rule of law” is so narrow, that he has cast those remedies as contradictory to
the rule of law. Not only does this stray from precedent, but if we do the math, this leaves precisely
zero remedies. In this way, Marshall J.’s “rule of law” is likely more realistic for at least it is
slightly more honest about the fact that Canada is a settler colonial state.
This is where the ONCA steps in and effectively turns our attention away from that fact.
On appeal, Laskin J.A. attempts to correct these perceptions stating in his conclusion:
Throughout his reasons the motions judge emphasized both the importance of the
rule of law and his view that “the rule of law is not functioning in Caledonia” and
“the law has not been enforced”. As we said in our reasons on the stay motion, no
one can deny the importance of the rule of law in Canada… But the rule of law has
many dimensions… These other dimensions include respect for minority rights,
reconciliation of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests through negotiations, …
It seems to me that in focusing on vindicating the court's authority through the use
of the contempt power, the motions judge did not adequately consider these other
important dimensions of the rule of law.311
The rebuke of the motions judge is clear, but problematically we see that the strictly political
remedies of reconciliation and negotiations are now being used to justify this new
multidimensional, or even pluralistic, definition of the “rule of law” in blockades contexts. The
problem is, that for all of its pretense about the inclusivity of Indigenous peoples, this expanded
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definition of the “rule of law” is still no different from the “rule of law” in Skidegate.
Turning back to Frontenac, the ONCA would further clarify its holding in Henco. First,
MacPherson J.A. links the blockades directly with Aboriginal law tracing the “the clear line of
Supreme Court jurisprudence, from Sparrow to Mikisew,” before stating:
I think it is important to give judicial guidance on the role to be played by the
nuanced rule of law described in Henco when courts are asked to grant injunctions,
the violation of which will result in aboriginal protestors facing civil or criminal
contempt proceedings.
Where a requested injunction is intended to create “a protest-free zone” for
contentious private activity that affects asserted aboriginal or treaty rights, the court
must be very careful to ensure that, in the context of the dispute before it, the Crown
has fully and faithfully discharged its duty to consult with the affected First Nations.
The court must further be satisfied that every effort has been exhausted to obtain a
negotiated or legislated solution to the dispute before it. Good faith on both sides is
required in this process.312
Here, the ONCA effectively performs the same move as McEachern C.J. in Skidegate only now it
is cast in the new and improved Haida Nation language of reconciliation and honourable
negotiations. But all of it amounts to the same thing: reinforcing settler sovereignty, expanding its
territoriality while eliminating Indigenous jurisdiction by (mis)characterizing its expression
through the blockade as “protest” and contradictory to the requirement of good faith.
Is this move deliberate? It’s impossible to know the mind of a judge, but one possible
answer to this question can be found in considering that the ONCA did reproduce the excerpts of
Robert Lovelace’s testimony asserting the existence and application of Algonquin law, and then
contrasted this with the reasons of the motions judge. From this we could infer that the ONCA was
aware that they were mischaracterizing Indigenous law as protest. However, whether it was
deliberate or not, the consequence is the same. This conclusion is made clearer when we look at
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the companion decision in Platinex which adopted the reasoning in Frontenac.313
In the motions decision in Platinex, Smith J. also rejected any suggestion that Indigenous
law and authority existed by stating more explicitly “If two systems of law are allowed to exist –
one for the aboriginals and one for the non-aboriginals, the rule of law will disappear and be
replaced by chaos. The public will lose respect for, and confidence in, our courts and judicial
system.”314 Here, settler sovereignty is again performed through the bald assertion that allowing
Indigenous law to coexist (again the existence of Canadian law is implicit) would eliminate the
“rule of law” as understood by “the public” (by which is meant the settler colonial state) would
cease to exist.
Rachel Ariss, writing with John Cutfeet who was one of the KI 6 involved in the Platinex
case, engage critically with the flaws in the legal reasoning in their book Keeping the Land by
discussing the many factors leading up to and surrounding the blockade and the judicial process.315
In reviewing their conclusions, I find they reinforce many of the conclusions here, as they find that
in Frontenac “Algonquin law is seen, which is a start, but it is not fully recognized. The Court
does not know how to value Algonquin law, or any Indigenous law, alongside Canadian law.”316
Their work as a whole reinforces the fact made consistently throughout the literature on blockades
that they are Indigenous actions and forms which are deeply embedded in the political, legal and
spiritual orders of Indigenous peoples. Their analysis demonstrates that when we analyze
blockades cases from this perspective, it is possible to identify the logic of elimination being
reproduced through the judicial statements of Smith J., as they write:
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What Justice Smith has forgotten here is that the Canadian criminal law already
shapes two legal systems—one for Aboriginal and one for non-Aboriginal people…
Here, the possibility of sentencing for contempt in a way that recognized the
particular role of defending Aboriginal rights in that contempt, is set up as so
contradictory to the rule of law that disrespect and chaos must result.317
This echoes the jurisdictional nature of the problematic at the heart of blockades cases, as
Ma'iingan puts it above, the problem is “about sharply different legal orders imposing differing
(and often conflicting) sets of obligations on the same group of people.”318 Although this conflict
is repeatedly seen by the courts in blockades cases, we have seen how it is just as quickly covered
up by the courts who distort their interpretation of the “rule of law” to eliminate Indigenous law
and jurisdiction by criminalizing it. In doing so the courts are severely undermining their
legitimacy as institutions tasked with the obligation to uphold the rule of law. For all that the
ONCA might be implying about seeing Indigenous law, it has continued to effectively deny its
existence in the same way that McEachern C.J. did 20 years earlier, only now it is couched in the
discourse of reconciliation, honourable negotiations and the Crown’s duty to consult.
The Tsilhqot’in Nation: Seeing Unproven Aboriginal title
As discussed above, the Tsilhqot’in Nation case has been marked as both a historic and empty
victory for Indigenous peoples. While an explanation for that emptiness is still elusive, I believe
we can start to unpack it by acknowledging the underlying story of their struggle on the ground.
The Tsilhqot’in Nation’s struggle is deeply rooted in a unique history of resistance, which for them
dates back to their first contact with Europeans in the 19th century, violent conflicts with
goldminers in the wars of 1858 and 1864,319 and a declaration of sovereignty, jurisdiction and
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ownership over their territory and their people in 1983.320 Similar to the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en
during the Delgamuukw trial, blockades were a constant necessity for the Tsilhqot’in Nation on
the ground before, during and after the Tsilhqot’in Nation trial as the case was making its way
through the appeal process. The blockades cases from 1999-2004321 that were peripheral to the
title action are interesting sites of analysis that share much with the struggles analyzed above. But
the blockade case that I will focus on here is the solo action of Marilyn Baptiste, who was Chief
of the Xeni Gwet'in at the time. The reason for focusing on this case, as mentioned, is because it
provides us with a good comparative with the cases above in how the judge interprets the
“uncertainty” of the Tsilhqot’in Nation’s Aboriginal title as a legal interest.
The story in this case is that Taseko Mines was determined to continue exploratory drilling
that would threaten or destroy important lakes in Tsilhqot’in territory and Chief Marilyn Baptiste,
on her own, blocked the road.322 In describing the actions of Chief Baptiste that day, Grauer J.
stated that Chief Baptiste refused “to recognize [Taseko Mines] authority to proceed into what she
described as Tsilhqot'in territory. In a blockade that appeared to me to be more moral than physical,
but was nonetheless effective, she declined to let Taseko's convoy of trucks and equipment
pass.”323 Significantly, this is the only factual description of the blockade in the decision. The next
time it is mentioned is at the end of the decision when Grauer J. twice describes the actions of
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Chief Baptiste as “unlawful”.324 In the whole context of the decision, this is asserted as both a fact
and conclusion. This is yet another example of how the judge performs settler sovereignty by
presumptively criminalizing Indigenous jurisdiction.
However, unlike the other cases where this move is made, in this case this is not decisive
of the outcome as the Tsilhqot’in Nation were successful in securing an injunction order and
Taseko was denied theirs.325 The key reason why the blockade trumped the exploratory program
of Taseko Mines was summarized by Grauer J. in weighing the balance of convenience, stating
“The geology will always be there. The ore bed is not going anywhere. The same cannot be said
of the habitat that is presently left to the petitioners. Once disturbed, it is lost. Once lost, the
exercise of aboriginal rights is further diminished.”326
What is significant about this case, in comparison with R v Manuel and Westar, is that the
still unproven Aboriginal rights of the Tsilhqot’in Nation were actually given some weight to merit
the implication that protecting Aboriginal rights and extracting resources are directly opposing
interests in a zero-sum balancing exercise. Unfortunately, there is nothing further that explains
why Grauer J. gave as yet unrecognized Aboriginal rights any weight in his decision. Whatever
the explanation, what is significant is that in recognizing the as yet unproven and unrecognized
Aboriginal title and rights of the Tsilhqot’in Nation, Grauer J. provides us with a unique example
of the ability of a judge to offer the “bare promise” contained in the rule of law. It is only a glimmer,
but—at least for those legal scholars who continue to search for evidence to support the
aspirational assumption—it is literally better than nothing at all. As I interpret it, this result at least
helps to confirm the necessity of blockades as a step towards decolonizing the rule of law.
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At length, the positive evidence in this case is still severely limited by Grauer J.’s assertion
of the blockade as unlawful, for while it provides some “recognition” of a legal interest in
Aboriginal title that is still subject to settler sovereignty, it simultaneously performs the elimination
of Indigenous jurisdiction.
George Behn and the Fort Nelson First Nation: Who is the Proper Authority?
The blockade of the 82-year-old George Behn from the Fort Nelson First Nation (FNFN)
in Treaty 8 territory started in October of 2006 and continued for several months.327 It was entirely
peaceful and there was no damage done to any machinery or work sites; it was a pure act of
physically occupying space and asserting authority over land.328 Like the others, it was also deeply
rooted in a long history of unfair and unilateral decisions made by the Crown that were
significantly impacting the territory.329 Unlike the other blockade cases, this one was not subject
to an injunction order. Instead, Moulton Contracting (Moulton) gave up trying to access the
territory to cut timber and instead filed a civil action seeking damages from the Behns and the
Crown.330 In their statement of defense, the Behns sought to argue that there was inadequate
consultation; that the Crown had breached its duty to consult and accommodate when it approved
and sold the timber licences to Moulton.331 Both Moulton and the Crown filed an application to
strike out the Behns defence on the basis that the Behns did not have the authority to argue it.332
Before we can get to analyzing the SCC’s reasoning, a brief review and analysis of the
procedural history in the case is necessary to understand how the framing of the jurisdictional issue
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as one of standing in this case ultimately influenced the disposition when it reached the SCC. For
our purposes, the jurisdictional question is effectively: Who is the proper authority in relation to
the territory at issue? It is important to understand that the conflict in this question is slightly
different from the blockades cases above. Here, the jurisdictional question was whether George
Behn, in his own right and on behalf of his family, had the power to speak the law on his family’s
territory and in relation to his family’s Treaty Rights.333 Or, if the FNFN, as the “Indian Band”
should be presumed to be the proper authority. What makes this question distinct is that it
effectively pits two Indigenous authorities against each other. However, what makes it similar is
that on one side the source of authority is grounded in Indigenous law and jurisdiction, while on
the other side, the source of authority is found in the settler colonial state’s racist Indian Act and
its problematic jurisprudence on Aboriginal and Treaty rights. Thus, from the lens of settler
colonialism, this is still a conflict between Indigenous jurisdiction and settler colonial jurisdiction.
The significance of analyzing how the courts dealt with this jurisdictional issue is that
uncertainty over who is the proper authority to represent collectively held Aboriginal title and
Treaty rights deeply problematizes the legitimacy of the political remedies of negotiation,
consultation and reconciliation. As deeply flawed as these remedies already are for the reasons
discussed above, they are based, fundamentally, on an assumption that the Crown or the industry
proponents are dealing with a body or individual with legitimate agency to represent and make
decisions that are impacting all of the holders of those collective rights. When we look broadly at
the jurisprudence on Aboriginal and Treaty rights, this assumption about the proper authority is
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largely untested.334 Yet it is inevitably situated at the heart of Aboriginal jurisprudence and
significantly, the political machinery of the discourse of “recognition”335 and the comprehensive
claims process that is extinguishing Aboriginal title one final agreement at a time.336 As the context
of the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en demonstrate, there may be significant reasons for undermining
this blanket assumption that courts, governments and industry are applying in different
communities with very different struggles.
In Behn, this fundamental assumption is being challenged by the blockade and George
Behn’s assertion of authority over his land. As with almost all cases involving Indigenous peoples,
as the blockade and Behn’s assertion of authority enters the court, it is immediately disadvantaged
by framing it as a very narrow question of whether Behn has standing to argue that the Crown
breached its duty to consult.337 Now, the act of framing the jurisdictional question as a question
of standing could arguably be seen as presumptively decisive of the matter in much the same way
that the formulation of the colour of right defence was in R v Manuel or the defective pleadings
was in Delgamuukw. However, the real risk is that it forces the underbelly of the struggle to be
exposed to the court. As we will see, the SCC arguably takes advantage of this vulnerability and
strikes a very damaging blow that is sure to have a critical impact on the future of Aboriginal
jurisprudence and the struggle of Indigenous peoples.
A. Procedural History: Moulton Contracting Ltd v British Columbia, BCSC & BCCA
As stated, the question in the case is: Who is the proper authority in relation to the territory at
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issue? The Crown argued that the FNFN is the proper authority.338 By contrast, the Behns’ assert
that they are the proper authority based on Indigenous law which they articulated by saying that
the FNFN “traditionally ordered themselves so that the rights to hunt and trap set out in Treaty 8
were exercised in tracts of land associated with different extended families.”339 The Crown in
response argued that the Behns “did not go so far as to assert that their family was charged with
the responsibility and authority to deal with the Crown in relation to those rights.”340
Notably, the Crown’s argument here asserts that there is, or must be, another authority that
is above the Behns. The immediate effect of this argument is to persuade the court to ignore the
Indigenous law that the Behns have just asserted which, for them, definitively answers the factual
and legal question of who is the proper authority in FNFN territory. Again, this effect can be seen
as a direct result of how the jurisdictional issue is framed from the outset.
In response to the Crown the Behns’ argued “that it would be odd to accept that George
Behn is a holder of a hunting right but then find that he cannot assert that right if he is sued in
relation to the manner in which he exercised his right.”341 Justice Hinkson rejects this argument
stating “It is not George Behn's hunting rights that he is relying on. Granted he and his family have
pled that their hunting rights have been infringed, but the action against him, and the defence to it,
is not with respect to any exercise of his hunting rights; rather, it is with respect to his blockade,
along with others, of the access of Moulton to areas ‘taken up’ by the Crown and licensed to
Moulton.”342 What is immediately apparent here, in light of the review of cases above, is that we
have another problem with how blockades as assertions of Indigenous jurisdiction over land are
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being characterized as illegitimate by the courts to presumptively defeat them. Here, the blockade
of George Behn is reworked so that it is juxtaposed with interfering with the Crown’s exclusive
and presumptive authority under the controversial “taking up” Treaty 8 clause to grant Moulton
access and license to take timber out of the Behns family territory. Again, the effect of this move
is to eliminate Indigenous jurisdiction in order to reinforce settler sovereignty.
While the statement of Hinkson J. reproduces the same problem identified in the blockades
cases above, there is an added twist due to the different nature of the jurisdictional question. Thus,
like the others, it relies on the presumptive unlawfulness of the blockade, but the twist here is that
Hinkson J. reframes the Behns assertion of authority over their family territory, as one of an
assertion of authority over collectively held Treaty rights of which the FNFN, not the Behns, are
presumed to be the proper authority. This reframing and the presumption allows Hinkson J. to
conclude that “the Behn defendants do not have standing” because, as he puts it “The Behn
defendants have not demonstrated that their family has been charged with the authority to deal
with the Crown in relation to those rights, and, in this case, the leadership of the Fort Nelson First
Nation is a separate party to the proceedings, advancing a position on behalf of their First
Nation.”343
Notably, the effect of Hinkson J.’s reasoning is to ignore, or rather eliminate, the
Indigenous law that the Behns’ have explained regarding how FNFN lands are managed internally
by different families. From the lens of settler colonialism, this is another example of how the logic
of elimination can be applied. However, from a strictly doctrinal perspective there is another
significant problem here in how Hinkson J.’s reasoning contradicts the rule from Delgamuukw
which he paraphrases or restates, writing “While aboriginal and treaty rights are exercised by
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individuals, such rights are collective rights and are neither possessed by nor reside with
individuals.”344 The immediate problem with Hinkson J.’s restatement of the rule in Delgamuukw
here is that it does not support the proposition that the Fort Nelson First Nation is the proper
authority. In fact, it is very likely that Delgamuukw not only contradicts Hinkson J.’s restatement
as a correct principle of law, but that it contradicts the notion that judges, as opposed to the
collective Treaty holders themselves, even have the power to be making such an assumption.
While a full analysis of Delgamuukw—particularly the preliminary issues related to the
initial pleadings and a review of the internal struggle that Val Napoleon described above345—
produces many reasons why this is; for our purposes, we need only look as far as the paragraph in
Delgamuukw that is cited by Hinkson J. which reads in full:
A further dimension of Aboriginal title is the fact that it is held communally.
Aboriginal title cannot be held by individual Aboriginal persons; it is a collective
right to land held by all members of an Aboriginal nation. Decisions with respect
to that land are also made by that community. This is another feature of aboriginal
title which is sui generis and distinguishes it from normal property interests.346
As a matter of doctrine, the actual statement of the rule in Delgamuukw is markedly different from
Hinkson J.’s restatement. When read in its entirety it is clear that this holding sets out a clear
distinction between the individual and community holdings of Aboriginal title (not specific Treaty
rights to hunting) with the central aspect of this holding being what Kent McNeil describes as
recognizing a “decision-making authority over their land.”347 Brian Slattery articulates this
authority inherent in Aboriginal title through an external/internal dichotomy, writing “Viewed
externally, aboriginal title is a generic right which possesses certain distinctive features, such as
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inalienability, that do not change from one Indigenous group to another. Viewed internally,
aboriginal title allows each Indigenous group to use its lands in its own fashion, within certain
broad limits.”348 Slattery has expanded on this in later analysis showing how “Aboriginal title has
a complex internal structure. It is like a clockwork egg, its smooth surface concealing an intricate
world within – a world as diverse as its Aboriginal title-holders.”349
We know that the scholarship analysing Delgamuukw and Aboriginal rights and title on
this particular rule is extensive and more could be reviewed. But the point to be made is that there
is nothing in the actual statement of the rule in Delgamuukw that Hinkson J. relies upon, and even
less when the circumstances of the decision as a whole are considered, that remotely supports his
proposition that the FNFN, not the Behns are the proper authority. By getting the law in
Delgamuukw wrong, Justice Hinkson’s conclusion is doctrinally flawed. However, the bigger
problem, in my view, is that from the lens of settler colonialism, Hinkson J. extends his jurisdiction
into the internal dimensions of the FNFN decision-making authority in a way that deliberately
overrides, and by effect eliminates, the clear and direct assertions of Indigenous law that were
provided to the court which give us just a small glimpse into the “intricate world” of how the
FNFN community makes decisions with respect to who is the proper authority.
The doctrinal error should have been one that the BCCA would be expected to notice and
correct. But instead, the court’s review of the trial decision becomes a disturbing example of the
courts ability to not only miss an error of law, but to see it and make it far worse. Justice Saunders
first states the holding at issue, writing Hinkson J. “concluded that individual members of the Fort
Nelson First Nation do not have standing to advance the legal positions set out in those paragraphs
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because the rights asserted in those paragraphs are collective rights of the Aboriginal
community.”350 Justice Saunders then frames the jurisdictional issue as one concerned with “the
right of individual defendants to challenge instruments they, but not the collective, say are invalid
because they violate collective rights.”351 Notably, by framing the issue this way, Saunders J.A.
reinforces the flawed proposition that the FNFN is presumed to be the proper authority.
From here, Saunders J.A. then performs the now familiar move of characterizing the
blockade as “self-help behaviour by some or all of the appellants in response to proposed
logging”.352 Again, there is nothing in this decision to indicate why Saunders J.A decides to
characterize the blockade in this way.
After a lengthy discussion, which includes reviewing the full excerpt of paragraph 115 in
Delgamuukw353 but does not notice that Hinkson J.’s reasoning clearly contradicts that holding,
Saunders J.A. reaches the conclusion that Hinkson J. was correct.354 Again, the failure to recognize
an error of law is a doctrinal problem. But the biggest problem, by far, in the decision is the lengths
that Saunders J.A. goes to mischaracterize the blockade as “self-help” in order to repeatedly
reinforce the flawed proposition that the FNFN are presumed to be the proper authority.
Justice Saunders does this in framing the issue, stating “To reach the point of success on
these defences, the Behns must clear the hurdle of invalidating Moulton's rights to log and use the
road. Yet the rights they assert in order to denigrate Moulton's claim are communal rights of the
Fort Nelson First Nation, and the Behns are not authorized to speak on behalf of the Fort Nelson
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First Nation.”355 This proposition is again reinforced through more aggressive language, as
Saunders J.A. states “The proposition that it does not lie in the mouth of individual members of
the Fort Nelson First Nation to attack these Crown granted instruments, whether as an offensive
move by starting a claim or as a defensive move in response to a claim, leaves to the Fort Nelson
First Nation the responsibility of speaking on behalf of the collective through its authorized
representatives.356
The disturbing move here is that this statement effectively conflates the flawed proposition
with the rule in Delgamuukw. Thus, it does more than just misstate the rule in Delgamuukw; it
effectively redefines the rule by reading the flawed proposition into it. In doing so, Saunders J.A.
has not only eliminated the Indigenous law in this case by replacing it with what the court thinks
should be the laws that govern the internal dynamics of the FNFN decision-making power; she has
now transformed this violent imposition of settler colonial jurisdiction into precedent of Aboriginal
rights jurisprudence within the jurisdiction of British Columbia.
Justice Saunders then uses her remodeled version of the internal dynamics of the FNFN’s
authority to complete the logical connection between her mischaracterization of the blockade and
the flawed proposition to decide the issue of standing, as she writes:
It is, further and in my view, to expose the respectful resolution of issues between
the provincial (or federal) government and the First Nation to the risk of an endrun, whereby individuals may engage in self-help rather than using available legal
channels and, when challenged by court process, then litigate individually these
communal rights. In this sense, allowing individuals to assert a position on a
collective right may have unexpected consequences and, simply, lacks order.357
While Saunders J.A. does not baldly cite the “rule of law” like the other blockades decisions, she
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has in every sense fully reincarnated the disturbing reasoning of McEachern C.J. in dealing with
the Haida Nation: blockades are presumptive unlawful, Indigenous law and jurisdiction is
illegitimate and to allow them any legitimacy leads inevitably to disorder.
This reasoning is only reinforced throughout as Saunders J.A. continues to mischaracterize
the blockade as illegal and completely contradictory to Aboriginal rights, describing it as “an attack
on a non-Aboriginal party's rights, on the basis of treaty or constitutional propositions.”358 The
connection between this mischaracterization of the blockade and the flawed proposition is further
reinforced in reaching the conclusion as, Saunders J.A emphasizes “the high importance of
recognizing the Fort Nelson First Nation as the sole authority for managing the advancement of
treaty and constitutional First Nations rights…Absent a challenge by the Fort Nelson First Nation,
the instruments in issue may not be attacked by individual members of the Fort Nelson First Nation
on the basis of inadequate consultation or on any other basis engaging constitutional or treaty
rights.”359 The reasoning of Saunders J.A. reveals a deeply disturbing move by the court to
eliminate Indigenous law and jurisdiction by mischaracterizing blockades and imposing the court’s
own opinion of who the proper authority is.
B. Behn v Moulton Contracting Ltd, 2013 SCC 26
Justice LeBel, writing for a unanimous decision of the SCC, frames the situation as one “of
relations between members of an Aboriginal community, a logging company, and a provincial
government… The courts below held that the individual members of the Aboriginal community
(the “Behns”) did not have standing to assert collective rights in their defence; only the community
could raise such rights.” 360 Here, before we have even reached paragraph 3, whatever authority
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the Behns’ might possibly be seen to hold, or trying to assert, has just been eliminated by carefully
framing the jurisdictional issue in a way that positions the authority of the FNFN as the “Aboriginal
community” against the Behns.
In turning to deal with the issue of standing, LeBel J. summarizes the established
jurisprudence on the duty to consult and reconciliation before stating “The duty to consult exists
to protect the collective rights of Aboriginal peoples. For this reason, it is owed to the Aboriginal
group that holds the s. 35 rights, which are collective in nature.”361 As discussed above, this general
rule is based in Delgamuukw which does not support the flawed proposition that the Indian Band
is presumed to be the proper authority in the sense that it is being used here. Perhaps because of
this, LeBel J. does not actually cite Delgamuukw here, but instead cites Beckman at paragraph 35
which requires some unpacking to see how this actually reinforces the flawed proposition.
The holding from Beckman reads “the entitlement of the trapper Johnny Sam was a
derivative benefit based on the collective interest of the First Nation of which he was a member. I
agree with the Court of Appeal that he was not, as an individual, a necessary party to the
consultation.”362 Notably, this holding relies on the proposition that the Little Salmon/Carmacks
First Nation (LSCFN) is the proper authority. This proposition is not entirely flawed, but is based
on the kind of creative leap that Walters identifies in Van der Peet. The proposition is not flawed
in Beckman because the LSCFN is not an Indian Band, but is a completely new legal entity created
by the LSCFN Treaty.363 In other words, the LSCFN Treaty terminated the predecessor Band under
the Indian Act and reincarnated it as the LSCFN. In doing so, all of the powers and assets of the
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Indian Band were “reconciled” with the Canada and Yukon governments by extinguishing them.
The relevance of this distinction in Beckman is that “Trapline #143” the interest registered
to Johnny Sam, is actually “in a category administered by the Yukon government, not the First
Nation.”364 Thus, the pre-existing Indigenous authority over land has already been eliminated and
replaced by the settler colonial authority through the LSCFN Treaty. The awkward result produced
from this is that the trapline and the “derivative benefit based on the collective interest” are
somehow two different legal interests. In order to “reconcile” this, the Court in Beckman has to
make a leap. The leap they make is that as a member of the LSCFN, Johnny Sam’s entitlement to
the trapline which is an interest under the jurisdiction of the Yukon, is not enforceable as an
individual right, but is seen as a “derivative benefit” that is based on the LSCFN as the proper
holder of that right as per the terms of the LSCFN treaty.
Now, it is critical to keep in mind that all of this unique context is specific to the proposition
that the LSCFN, not an Indian Band, is the proper authority. What is problematic about citing
Beckman as authority for a much more general proposition about s. 35 Aboriginal rights is that
that there is simply no discussion by LeBel J. about the unique facts in Beckman which are uniquely
relevant to supporting the specific proposition in that case. The effect of this is that LeBel J.
completely disconnects the important context in Beckman, and in doing so, distorts his own
statement of the general rule in order to reinforce the flawed proposition that the Indian Band is
the proper authority. This move is completed in the next statement as LeBel J. cites Beckman to
stand for the rule that “an Aboriginal group can authorize an individual or an organization to
represent it for the purpose of asserting its s. 35 rights.”365
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The problem here is that a very specific legal interpretation from the terms of the LSCFN
treaty, which extinguishes Aboriginal title and rights by converting them into fee-simple interests
and “derivative benefits” under settler colonial jurisdiction, has now been read into what has just
become a completely new and binding legal principle by virtue of the SCC’s supreme power that
is now applicable to all of the s.35 jurisprudence.
To be sure, there is no mistaking LeBel J.’s intention to promote the flawed proposition as
established law for it is deliberately reinforced throughout his reasoning as he upholds the
conclusions of the courts below stating “it does not appear from the pleadings that the FNFN
authorized George Behn or any other person to represent it… given the absence of an allegation
of an authorization from the FNFN, in the circumstances of this case, the Behns cannot assert a
breach of the duty to consult on their own, as that duty is owed to the Aboriginal community, the
FNFN.” 366 What is astonishing is how LeBel J. demonstrates his awareness that this new legal
principle could possibly be flawed by writing “Even if it were assumed that such a claim by
individuals is possible, the allegations in the pleadings provide no basis for one in the context of
this appeal.”367 Here, the irony of this holding is deeply disturbing. In this statement, the
cumulative effect of repeatedly mischaracterizing, reframing and narrowing the Behns blockade
and assertion of authority over their land comes home to roost. By faulting the Behns for not
framing their pleadings in a certain way, LeBel J. is completely disregarding the several ways
(discussed above) in which the courts below have deliberately reframed the Behns’ assertions to
reinforce the flawed proposition they want to rely on.
Instead of letting the possibility that the proposition is flawed raise awareness of the need
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for caution, LeBel J. serves to obscure that possibility further by reinforcing the proposition in his
discussion of whether there was a breach of Aboriginal and Treaty rights. Interestingly, LeBel J.
starts the discussion by rejecting the Crown’s argument “that claims in relation to treaty rights
must be brought by, or on behalf of, the Aboriginal community.”368 Justice LeBel states simply
that “This general proposition is too narrow.”369 In explaining why LeBel J. begins by stating “It
is true that Aboriginal and treaty rights are collective in nature.”370 Although the authorities cited
for this proposition are standard, they now include an interesting outlier in Beckman—which, as
discussed, is unique because it is a modern land claim agreement that extinguishes pre-existing
legal interests and Indigenous authorities; it is not like a historic treaty or an Aboriginal rights or
title case. Because it is so critical to understand why conflating Beckman with the other s. 35
precedents is wrong, the uniqueness of Beckman discussed above is made sharper when contrasted
against a brief review of those precedents developed over decades of Aboriginal jurisprudence.
First, the cited passage from Sparrow is sets out the guiding caution for the characterization
of Aboriginal rights as sui generis, by stating:
Fishing rights are not traditional property rights. They are rights held by a
collective and are in keeping with the culture and existence of that group. Courts
must be careful, then, to avoid the application of traditional common law concepts
of property as they develop their understanding of what the reasons for judgment
in Guerin, referred to as the "sui generis" nature of aboriginal rights.371
As discussed, the passage from Delgamuukw that sets out the internal/external dimensions of
Aboriginal title is consistent with this caution as the SCC respectively shaped the nature of
Aboriginal title.
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Next is Sundown where the SCC was dealing with the question of whether the harvesting
of wood by an individual to build a hunting cabin could be characterized as an Aboriginal right
that was “reasonably incidental” to the collectively held Treaty right. 372 Because the Aboriginal
right involved allowing an individual to make use of another individual’s property by building a
dwelling, the issue was further problematized by finding a way to articulate how such a right fit
within the province’s prevailing property law framework. In dealing with this complex question,
the SCC not only rejected defining Treaty rights in a way that accords with the common law
concepts of title and use, as per Delgamuukw, but emphasized the importance of characterizing
rights “specific to each Aboriginal community”373 and “the complexities of aboriginal history,
society and rights [that] must be defined in the specific factual context of each case.” 374 The
specific and unique context that is emphasized throughout Sundown is significant to the paragraph
that is cited which reads:
Any interest in the hunting cabin is a collective right that is derived from the treaty
and the traditional expeditionary method of hunting. It belongs to the Band as a
whole and not to Mr. Sundown or any individual member of the Joseph Bighead
First Nation. It would not be possible, for example, for Mr. Sundown to exclude
other members of this First Nation who have the same treaty right to hunt in
Meadow Lake Provincial Park.375
Critically, if this passage is read in isolation from its unique context in Sundown, then it appears
to stand for the proposition that an individual member of an Aboriginal community cannot depend
on treaty rights in a legal action because they are collective in nature. However, that proposition
makes absolutely no sense in the full context of Sundown which is fundamentally about an
individual depending on collectively held treaty rights in a legal action to serve as a full defense.
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Even in the distorted way that the courts have framed the Behns assertions, this is the very
thing that the Behns are trying to do in their defense to the civil action brought by Moulton. The
only difference is that the action in Sundown was building a physical structure, whereas the Behns
are simply physically occupying land. Thus, it must be understood that it is the blockade—in all
of its distorted mischaracterizations—and nothing else, that explains why the Behns are excluded
from the benefit of the precedent set in Sundown.
From Sparrow, to Delgamuukw, to Sundown, the consistent principle is caution and
attention towards the specificity and uniqueness of each community’s history, cultures and
traditions as they relate to their Aboriginal and Treaty rights. The same principle remains true in
the passages cited from Marshall, in which the Court stated “treaty rights do not belong to the
individual, but are exercised by authority of the local community to which the accused belongs,”376
and then applied this principle by emphasizing the importance of the Indigenous perspective in
framing “regulations that… define the Mi’kmaq treaty right in terms that can be… understood by
the Mi’kmaq community that holds the treaty rights.”377 Similarly, the Court in Sappier reinforced
this understanding and the importance of examining the facts, finding in that case that the
“evidence detailing the many uses to which wood was put by the Mi’kmaq as a whole is important
given the communal nature of aboriginal rights.”378
At last we come to the outlier, Beckman, which as discussed is a duty to consult case in the
context of a Modern Treaty. Of all of these leading precedents, even Beckman does not directly
support the flawed proposition that the Indian Band is presumed to be the proper authority.
Beckman only supports this proposition when it is stripped of the unique context that validates the
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proposition in that case, which is precisely what LeBel J. did earlier in the decision. By including
Beckman in with the others, LeBel J. imports this distorted proposition into that long line of
established jurisprudence in order to read the flawed proposition into the general rule.
This move allows him to dismiss the evidence tendered by the Behns’ to support their
assertion that they, not the FNFN, are the proper authority. That LeBel J. was acutely aware that
this evidence is before him, is reflected in his summary of it:
On the basis of an allegation of a connection between their rights to hunt and trap
and a specific geographic location within the FNFN territory, the Behns assert that
they have a greater interest in the protection of hunting and trapping rights on their
traditional family territory than do other members of the FNFN. It might be argued
that this connection gives them a certain standing to raise the violation of their
particular rights as a defence to Moulton’s tort claim.379
Again, the irony in this statement is palpable. Yes, it might be argued and there might be a defence,
if that argument and defence hadn’t been repeatedly reframed by the courts below in order to
eliminate Indigenous jurisdiction. What is truly perplexing throughout this analysis is that LeBel
J. continues to demonstrate his awareness that he might be applying a flawed proposition by
acknowledging that the Behns original argument, which he is rejecting without considering it,
could possibly succeed.
All of this is troubling, but the most troubling aspect of this case is found in how LeBel J.
ultimately disposes of the decision by applying the doctrine of abuse of process. As LeBel J. makes
clear, the doctrine of abuse of process is a broad and flexible tool through which the SCC can
exercise its power to speak the law.380 Justice LeBel demonstrates that power by finding that “the
Behns’ acts amount to an abuse of process.”381 There is no question that the “acts” being referred
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to are the peaceful and non-violent acts of physically occupying space and asserting Indigenous
jurisdiction over their land. Significantly, in reaching this holding about the “acts” of the Behns,
LeBel J. applies Saunders J.A.’s connection between the mischaracterization of blockades and the
issue of standing to make a finding based on the factual record, stating:
On the face of the record, whereas they now claim to have standing to raise these
issues, the Behns did not seek to resolve the issue of standing, nor did they contest
the validity of the Authorizations by legal means when they were issued… Instead,
without any warning, they set up a camp that blocked access to the logging sites
assigned to Moulton. By doing so, the Behns put Moulton in the position of having
either to go to court or to forgo harvesting timber pursuant to the Authorizations it
had received after having incurred substantial costs to start its operations.382
Everything stated here is a complete mischaracterization of several materially relevant facts. First,
as was evident in the consultation record, George Behn gave repeated warnings, in writing, in
person and over the telephone, about his opposition and his intention to blockade should the
Province decide to unilaterally impose their authority by granting permits to cut timber on his
territory.383 Not only that, there were boilerplate provisions in the application for timber licences
and the licences themselves that indemnified the Province in the event of a blockade or other
dispute related to Aboriginal and Treaty rights.384 The very fact these clauses exist as boilerplate
demonstrates how realistic the possible invalidity of tenure and occurrences of blockades is in the
BC logging industry. In other words, the risk of violating Aboriginal rights and being shut-down
by blockades is just part of the anticipated costs of doing business. But LeBel J. ignores this.
Second, the Behns did not “put” Moulton in any kind of either/or position. Not only do the
exemption clauses demonstrate that Moulton was, or ought to have been, fully aware of the
possibility that their activity could be invalidated as a result of conflict over Aboriginal and Treaty
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rights, including being subject to blockades; there is plenty of evidence throughout the factual
record to show that Moulton had other options, that even before the blockade went up, the Province
was asking Moulton to pause their activity while they tried to resolve the dispute with George
Behn before it escalated.385
Third, the suggestion that they “now claim to have standing” is completely inconsistent
with the fact that they were claiming all along to have standing, beginning in the trial decision
which Hinkson J. rejected, Saunders J.A. upheld, and LeBel J. himself just affirmed only a dozen
paragraphs earlier in this same decision.
Finally, it is clear throughout the record that the Behns have been contesting the legal and
constitutional validity of the licences from the beginning. The disconnect on this point is that LeBel
J. does not consider as “legal means” the many attempts of George Behn in contacting the Province
to tell them he is opposed to the logging as they are proposing it and when the Province ignores
him, his act of physically occupying space and exercising Indigenous jurisdiction in accordance
with the Indigenous law as he explained.
All of these complete distortions of fact and law, from the beginning of the decision to the
end, amount to the same thing: That the actions of George Behn in physically occupying space and
exercising his authority were presumptively illegal. By repeatedly embedding and connecting the
flawed proposition and mischaracterizations throughout his reasoning, LeBel J. is able to take
Saunders J.A.’s mischaracterization of blockades to another level, by declaring that blockades are
contradictory to the doctrines of reconciliation and the duty to consult, as he states in closing:
To allow the Behns to raise their defence based on treaty rights and on a breach of
the duty to consult at this point would be tantamount to condoning self-help
remedies and would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It would
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also amount to a repudiation of the duty of mutual good faith that animates the
discharge of the Crown’s constitutional duty to consult First Nations.386
And with that, another deeply disturbing precedent in the jurisprudence on Aboriginal rights is
shaped by the settler colonial court and put on the book as binding law.
The significance of the decisive holding in the Behn case is that it has come full circle to
where we were with McEachern C.J. back in the 1980s. Only now, asserting Indigenous law and
jurisdiction on the ground has been categorically held to be contradictory to the legal doctrines
that were won only because there was a struggle and blockades in the first place.
Conclusion
Analyzing the blockades cases that were peripheral to the leading cases in Aboriginal law has
revealed that the settler colonial courts have been keeping the narrative of Indigenous resistance
separate from the Aboriginal jurisprudence in order to avoid dealing directly with the fundamental
jurisdictional question of the legitimacy of settler sovereignty. This move is ultimately being done
to maintain and expand the assumption of territoriality. The dangerous precedents set by the Behn
decision is already impacting Aboriginal jurisprudence in every jurisdiction in the country,
particularly on cases involving natural resource development, the Crown’s duties to consult and
accommodate, the assertion of a veto and the issue of proper authority.387 This illustrates how
quickly the logic of elimination can spread through the jurisprudence and how seemingly
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irreversible the violence can become once the court imposes its jurisdiction on an Indigenous
Nation in order to supplant the legally recognized Indigenous authority and jurisdiction that the
Indigenous Nation already has over their internal affairs.
Given the robustness of this problem, this begs the question as to whether there are any
actions that courts could take in legitimately upholding the rule of law? Generally, it is clear from
the analysis above that courts should not reframe issues, mischaracterize actions so as to cast them
as presumptively illegitimate, and create and rely on flawed propositions to eliminate Indigenous
jurisdiction. In the Behn case, from the trial to the SCC, it is clear that based on the scholarship
and historical precedent demonstrating a clear connection between blockades and Indigenous law,
that the courts should have simply accepted and respected George Behn’s assertion of Indigenous
law and jurisdiction. If not that, then upholding the rule of law at the very least required them to
turn their minds fairly and impartially towards the underlying jurisdictional question and the
factual determination that needed to be made. In doing this, they could have looked at the evidence
available to them that might have supported George Behn’s assertion. Had they done this they may
have found, as the eventual trial decision of Behn did when it was released after the SCC decision
in 2013, that there was plenty of documented evidence, in the Crown’s possession, that clearly sets
out how the FNFN had been applying their laws to answer the question of authority at the time.
They would have found that on October 1, 2006, George Behn notified the Chief of the
FNFN that he would be setting up a blockade and that in response the Chief asked him to meet
with the FNFN Council, which Behn agreed to do “because it was traditional to seek the blessing
of the community leadership for what he was about to undertake [and] that it was his ‘policy’ to
do so.”388 They would have found that George Behn met with the Chief and Council of the FNFN
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the next day and that this was the first of several meetings, exchanges and correspondences
between George Behn, the FNFN, the Province and Moulton over the next several weeks.389 They
would have found that Chief Logan of the FNFN had told the Province in a letter dated November
30, 2006 “I have always made it clear to the province that the question of whether the Behn’s camp
stays in place or if any cutting can occur on the trapline if the camp is taken down is entirely up to
George Behn. If the FNFN were to take a position on this matter, it would not be respectful of
George Behn’s personal connection to his family trapline.”390
All of these findings at trial were drawn from documentary evidence that would have been
before the court at all stages of the interlocutory matter in the Behn case. If the court at any stage
was adhering to the standards set by the rule of law they likely could have concluded from this
evidence that George Behn was the proper authority. But instead of adhering to the rule of law,
instead of impartially framing the question and looking at the facts and trying to determine the
truth; the courts at each level, including the SCC, went to extreme lengths to fabricate a cascading
complexity of mischaracterizations and flawed propositions in order to maintain and expand the
jurisdiction and territoriality of the settler colonial structure of power that was determined to
destroy the last pristine area of the Behn family’s territory.
All of these moves fundamentally undermine the legitimacy of the court based on the basic
tenets of the rule of law. Although it is difficult to determine for certain what the courts’ true
motivation for doing this in Behn were, we can say that the consequences of how they performed
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their power to speak the law not only eliminated the jurisdictional claim that George Behn had
been making from the beginning, but presumptively criminalized it as well. At length, this review
of blockades cases demonstrates that the blockade is still an active site where the “frontier
homicide” is alive and well, and the settler colonial courts are still actively transforming violence
into law.
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CONCLUSION
Towards a Theory of Authority Grounded in Indigenous Legal Orders

The myth of settler sovereignty continues to be performed over and over by Canada in an endless
pursuit to perfect it. In this thesis we have traced examples of this performance since its inception
in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, to the imposition of the Gradual Civilization Act and the Indian
Act in the nineteenth century, to the era of criminalization under the Potlach Law in the early
twentieth century, into the decades long struggle for constitutional recognition and now the present
discourse of reconciliation and negotiations. Each violent performance has been met in lock-step
by the resistance of Indigenous peoples that has, for centuries now, guarded and protected the
vision of a society where Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples can live, side-by-side, in peace
and mutual respect and recognition of each other’s inherent human rights to self-determination.
Canada’s project of perfect settler sovereignty has yet to be accomplished. Despite the fact
that this project is fundamentally genocidal and violent, and in complete contradiction to the goal
of world peace as Arthur Manuel puts it; Canada continues to pursue this project with innovation
by developing increasingly new practices, techniques and rationalizations. As others have
demonstrated, some of these include the Federal government’s comprehensive land claims policy,
resource sharing and impact benefit agreements, and the colonial politics of recognition.
Broadly this thesis has sought to examine whether the courts are manufacturing similar
practices and tools to effect the elimination of Indigenous peoples; whether they, like their
nineteenth century predecessors, were also transforming settler colonial violence into sovereignty,
jurisdiction and law. It approached this by first identifying glimpses of an underlying trend in the
jurisprudence on Aboriginal rights that suggested the courts were relying on a logic of elimination
to dissolve Indigenous jurisdiction in order to affirm the sovereignty and expand the territoriality
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of the settler colonial state. The analysis of the blockades cases exposed how this underlying trend
has been fomenting in the shadows of each of the major Aboriginal title and rights decisions.
When I first set out to engage in this analysis, admittedly I expected to see the courts
reproducing traits of settler colonialism in the blockades decisions. However, I was surprised to
uncover the complexity of practices that the courts have developed for criminalizing and
eliminating expressions of Indigenous jurisdiction. I was even more surprised by the extent to
which this was done in the Behn case, from the trial decision, all the way up to a unanimous
decision of the highest court in the country. Altogether, this analysis presents deeply troubling
evidence that the courts are not just impotent against the project of settler colonialism, but that
they are complicit in it to a degree that borders on being predatory. When we impose a burden on
the judges to demonstrate their impartiality and legitimize the jurisdiction they exercise, their
reasons simply do not live up to the standards that the generally accepted definition of the rule of
law has set. By failing in this way judges have broken the trust that society and Indigenous peoples
place in them each time they seek their help as impartial adjudicators in resolving disputes.
However, we cannot conclude from this that all judges are predetermined to perpetuate the
violence of settler colonialism against Indigenous peoples through their power to speak the law.
In as much as this thesis has been searching the reasons of judges for evidence of violence, it has
also been searching for evidence to support the hope being reflected in the aspirational assumption
of the legal scholarship. If evidence of hope can be found to exist by the slimmest of margins, then
we still have reason to hope. The smallest bit of evidence for hope was found in the reasons of
Grauer J. who, despite his awareness that the Aboriginal title of the Tsilhqot’in Nation had yet to
be proven as a legal interest, gave it enough weight to put a stop to the efforts of Taseko Mines.
Of course, the role that Grauer J. played in exercising his jurisdiction to stop the mining of
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Tsilhqot’in territory was miniature in comparison to the courageous efforts of Chief Marilyn
Baptiste who single-handedly stopped the trucks by exercising Indigenous jurisdiction that was
firmly grounded in the territory over which it was asserted. The findings here suggest that we must
see that Indigenous resurgence premised on direct actions, including blockades, will continue to
play a necessary role in decolonizing law in Canada.
Taking this direction, however, is not without questions that will need to be answered. This
thesis has identified one in particular which I believe will need to be answered by further studying
Indigenous law in the context of Indigenous resurgence.
As the analysis shows, the issue of proper authority in relation to Indigenous laws and
Aboriginal rights and title are deeply problematized by the underbelly of the struggle. In Unsettling
Canada, Arthur Manuel captured the danger of this complexity and its capacity to undermine the
struggle for Indigenous resurgence by pointing out specific examples, writing:
One of the ironies of the name “Idle No More” is that most of the key activists
behind it have not been idle at all. Indian resistance has not stopped in Canada, but
it had, for several decades, been cut off from the leadership. In fact, activists, many
of whom would be more comfortable in describing themselves as sovereigntists,
were disowned by our leadership to the point where we recently learned that the
Assembly of First Nations was secretly working with the RCMP to contain protests
at the community level.391
Manuel’s words suggest that the prediction of his father, Grand Chief George Manuel, is
potentially coming to fruition, as he wrote back in 1974:
For colonialism to be fully effective it is necessary that the leaders who propagate
the myths about those whom they have conquered must not only convince
themselves of what they say—it need hardly be said that they must convince their
followers down to the humblest peasant and foot soldier—they must also convince
the conquered. The conquered will only submit to the theft of everything they hold
when they can be convinced that it has been done for their own good. Conquest
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only becomes colonialism when the conquerors try to convince the conquered that
the rape of his mother was committed for the sake of some higher good.392
The efforts of judges to maintain the settler colonial structure in their decisions is reflective of
George Manuel’s prescient words. However, it is simply a disturbing and unsettling sign that this
prediction is starting to come true when evidence that the present day leadership of the Assembly
of First Nations—which is the successor to the National Indian Brotherhood that Grand Chief
George Manuel started in order to organize Indigenous peoples against the clear determination of
the Canadian government to assimilate them and terminate their constitutional rights to land—is
secretly working with the settler colonial structure of power exercised through the RCMP in order
to undermine the grassroots struggle; the heart of Indigenous resurgence.
The Behn case revealed that judges are directly interfering with the internal dynamics and
struggle of Indigenous peoples. When the underbelly of the struggle was exposed, the courts in
Behn sharpened their swords and violently imposed their own determination of who was the proper
authority by ignoring and eliminating the authority that was being asserted and claimed by
Indigenous peoples on the ground. This is a problem that must be stopped. But, again, that does
not mean the courts should refrain from taking any action whatsoever.
While each of the blockades cases are disturbing when looked at in isolation; what we see
in examining the reasons of the judges is that they are relying on the violent logic of settler
colonialism to eliminate Indigenous jurisdiction. However, critically this analysis has
demonstrated that this is not a predetermined outcome. It is fundamentally the logic, not the people
relying on it that is the problem.
If the rule of law—and by this I mean specifically judges recognizing and enforcing
Indigenous law and jurisdiction as they should and must do (because to do anything contrary would
392
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be to repeat the objective of elimination)—is to have any role in reversing this endemic violence,
the findings in this thesis have suggested that we will need to determine, in all cases, the question
of who is properly authorized to define the relevant Indigenous laws in a given case.
While there is a role for law to play in decolonization, there is simply no way to reconcile
settler colonialism with legal pluralism. They are opposing forces in the sense that one is predicated
on the elimination of Indigenous peoples and the other, if it is to be accepted by Indigenous
peoples, will have to fully protect and respect their inherent right to self-determination. As a result,
judges must choose which force they are going to express and uphold through their power to speak
the law. If they choose to reinforce settler colonialism, they are choosing to reproduce colonial
violence and subjugation by force. But if they choose to uphold the right of Indigenous peoples to
exist and to exercise their jurisdiction, then they are choosing to play a role in the resurgence of
Indigenous peoples.
At length, the rule of law requires that we make deliberate moves to tear down the settler
colonial structure of power and rebuild a system of laws, politics and relationships that are based
on concepts like Glen Coulthard’s notion of grounded normativity which is “deeply informed by
what the land as a system of reciprocal relations and obligations can teach us about living our lives
in relation to one another” and is defined as “the modalities of Indigenous land-connected practices
and longstanding experiential knowledge that inform and structure our ethical engagements with
the world and our relationships with human and nonhuman others over time.”393 We need to move
towards a theory of authority that is grounded in the legal orders that were developed over
millennia by Indigenous peoples, living on and respectfully with the land. Because it does not
make sense to consider how or why a foreign legal order that was mythically transplanted through
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violence and deception, and is still being maintained through the same means, has any place in
governing these sacred and important relationships.
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